

Merle Kling Undergraduate Honors Fellowship

SLIDESHOW



THE INQUIRY

Mellon Mays
Undergraduate
Fellowship

Slideshow and The Inquiry

The Journals of the Merle Kling Undergraduate Honors Fellowship and Mellon Mays Fellowship Programs
Dedicated to Undergraduate Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences

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editor's note

All the articles in this journal are formatted in the Chicago style, even social sciences papers that would normally use APA formatting. This was done for the sake of uniformity (to make the journal as professional looking as possible by giving it one style) and readability (to make the journal easier to read by not abruptly changing styles from article to article, particularly in regards for nonacademic readers, who constitute a significant portion of the journal's audience). We wish to make social science professionals who may read this journal aware of this fact and why this formatting was used. Aside from normal copyediting and uniform formatting, the content of these articles was not changed in any way

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foreword

Included in the mission of the Center for the Humanities at Washington University is explicit instruction to reach out to undergraduate students, an unusual, though, in the end, fitting but challenging, directive for a Humanities Center, largely untried, and perhaps even disdained, if the activities and goals of most humanities centers around the country are any indication. Few humanities centers engage undergraduates, though this is slowly changing, most feeling that their universities provide enough services and activities for them. The centers are largely the province of faculty and graduate students. This is an understandable prejudice, if not quite, at this time, a sustainable one. Undergraduates occupy to large a portion of the population and the reality of a university to ignore them.

As the Center offers few courses and has no teaching staff, one way that this Center's advisory board thought that we could engage students is through encouraging and supporting independent research for a select number of students who majored in any of the humanities disciplines. We were interested as well in students with social science majors who, we thought, might benefit from being around humanities students. We felt that humanities students would benefit as well from being part of a group where they had to grapple with and take seriously the work of their social science peers. In this way, it was felt that the Center might be able to contribute to the spirit of interdisciplinary exchange on the campus among the students, markedly different, though, from what they encountered in the classroom. Faculty did not often find undergraduate students very helpful as research assistants but have often thought that as professors they might be helpful in guiding undergraduates in the students' own research project.

The Merle Kling Undergraduate Honors Fellowship Program, named in honor of former WU provost and political science professor Merle Kling, was inspired by the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program, established at Washington University back in the early 1990s and, while open to all students, meant particularly to encourage members of underrepresented minorities to consider pursuing the Ph.D. and become university teachers. (The re-naming of the program may have been in some small measure connected with the fact that I, as director of the program, hold an endowed chair named in honor of Kling, but it was Dean of the College James McLeod's idea to identify the program more closely with the academic traditions and personages of Washington University itself, a very sound idea, indeed.) The MKUHF is a two-year program, which accepts a small number of its applicants at the end of their sophomore year. We pair the student with a mentor and guide the student through a long-term research project through the structure of weekly seminars devoted to the discussion and analysis of their research. Kling Fellows are also provided with a summer stipend and support during the academic year to facilitate their research, permitting them even to travel to archives and attend conferences. Finally, Kling Fellows, like their peers in the Mellon Mays Program, produce annually a journal of their work, *Slideshow*, the latest volume of which you hold in your hands. (Copies of the earlier volumes may be requested

from the Center for the Humanities at cenhum@arts.wustl.edu.)

The work featured here is what was produced by the students in the 2009-2010 seminar. Robin Meyer discusses bilingualism, cultural politics, and the Basque Country; Travis Proctor, who began his career in the Honors Program with a project on ecumenism, writes about demonology and reason in the writings of the early Christian martyr Justin. Greg Allen takes on the CIA, intelligence gathering, the decision-making process, and the Iraq War as it unfolded in the Bush II administration. And finally Laura Soderberg takes us to the Middle East through an account of the travel books of several nineteenth century American writers including Mark Twain and General Lew Wallace's novel *Ben-Hur*, to explain the United States' imagined cultural relationship with the cradle of civilization.

These are independent essays, polished and meant to stand alone, extracted from their Honors theses. For undergraduates especially, this effort to produce a free-standing essay, meant to be read by non-specialists, culled from a larger work can be daunting. But if they are to consider becoming college professors and high-level researchers, they must come to understand this exercise as a necessary and useful skill. Redacting, editing, revising, recasting, reshaping, re-contextualizing are all writing and thinking skills that college professors who publish must have in order to get the most mileage out of their research. Professors must master many different forms of presentation of their work, and this is one of the goals of the Merle Kling Honors Fellows Program: to teach undergraduate students how this is done.

Make no mistake; while the students themselves are in charge of producing this publication, it is no amateur indulgence. These essays have been vetted by their mentors, corrected by a professional copy editor, and tested over many months in the crucible of the seminar. There is no guarantee that a student's work will be published in the journal. If the work is found to be substandard and if the student fails to meet the deadlines of the various stages of production, the work is not published. The students are tough on each other. This effort means a great deal to them, and they want very much to be taken seriously as contributors of merit to their fields. Moreover, the cost for producing this journal is about the same as it would be for a professional academic journal of the same size. We want the students themselves, the university, and the larger community to know that we at the Center take this work seriously as we take any good scholarly work by our colleagues seriously.

I hope you enjoy reading this journal. If you have any comments about what you have read, we would love to hear from you.

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Persuaded by the Echoes of Their Own Voices: How Cognitive Biases Crucially Influenced the Bush Administration's Decision to Go to War with Iraq

Greg Allen

***Abstract:** This paper argues that the conventional wisdom of a broad failure of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the 2003 War in Iraq mistakenly ignores the oversized influence of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, whose repeated and colossal errors in judgment were the direct cause of mistaken beliefs about the existence of Iraqi WMD and ties to terrorist organizations. This paper details six crucial erroneous judgments made by the Bush Administration's intelligence analysts and evaluates the connection of those policies to the predictably irrational effects of cognitive bias. The cognitive biases approach offers a powerful explanation for why top administration officials not only made serious errors in judgment, but also ignored consistent and compelling evidence that contradicted their faulty assessments. The paper concludes that the errors made by intelligence analysts and the consumers of that intelligence neatly align with the predictions of a bounded rationality model that takes into account the effects of cognitive bias.*

Introduction

What makes for a “good” decision? One common answer is that a good decision is one that leads to a desirable outcome (by whatever criteria). According to this view, if my goal is to make money, and I invest in a stock that eventually loses money, I have made a bad decision. However, this paper argues against the above formulation. A bad decision is not one that necessarily leads to a bad outcome (though this can often result); rather, a bad decision is one that is based on a flawed process for selecting between alternatives.

This definition has the advantage of avoiding the implication that those who are merely lucky in the outcomes of their choices made a good decision. If, for instance, I choose stocks by throwing darts at the stock page of the *Wall Street Journal*, then, even if my decision results in huge profits, it will still have been a “bad” decision because my process for making decisions did not give strong reasons to believe that my choices would lead to good outcomes. Likewise, a decision that leads to a bad outcome could still have been a good one so long as it was the most prudent and reasonable interpretation of the relevant evidence. Herein lies the key distinction: a good decision is one that uses a process of narrowing alternatives that maximizes the likelihood of a good outcome. As such, the actual outcome may

help tell us something about the quality of the process, but outcomes are not necessarily the final arbiters of good and bad decisions.

In the political sphere, where decisions of enormous consequence are being made constantly, one should accordingly be concerned with not merely whether or not those decisions turn out well or poorly, but whether the process for making those high-level decisions narrows alternatives in a way that is likely to lead to good outcomes generally. Unfortunately, the political science literature is largely lacking on what this paper argues is a crucial aspect of evaluating decisions according to such criteria. Here I refer to the psychology literature on individual and group decision-making cognitive errors. Cognitive errors (alternatively referred to as cognitive biases) are the predictable tendencies of individuals to deviate from pure rationality under certain circumstances such that judgments are made based on criteria that are irrelevant from the cost-benefit analysis.¹ The effects of cognitive biases are both persuasive and well documented, and a number of them threaten to affect the quality of political decision-making even beyond the problems outlined in the more conventional political science decision-making literature.

Outside of the policy-making community, the cognitive biases literature has already made an important impact on social science scholarship, most notably in the field of economics. Because cognitive biases so directly challenge

the assumption of rationality (defined as utility maximization), economists have developed new models of human behavior that take into account cognitive biases, resulting in the young yet flourishing field of behavioral economics². However, the same inroads have been limited in Political Science, even in areas strongly connected to rational choice theory.

This absence is especially problematic because political science is rich with excellent research on decision making, especially at the highest levels of foreign policy making³. While some scholars have advanced the field by applying the findings of the psychology literature on cognitive biases to formulate hypotheses for their effects on foreign policy decision making,⁴ there is a serious absence of studies that attempt to falsify the predictions of the cognitive biases literature as applied in a political context. This study attempts to bridge the gap between laboratory experiments and actual events with a case study of the decision of the Bush Administration to invade Iraq in 2003.

The paper is accordingly divided into five sections. The first section provides a summary of the most applicable research on cognitive biases. The second section provides a historical background to the 2001–2003 period in which the Bush Administration formulated its Iraq invasion policy. The third section outlines six crucial mistaken judgments in assessing the threat posed by Iraq and connects these errors to cognitive biases. The fourth describes the experimental precedents on mitigating the effects of cognitive bias and explains how different procedures and organizational paradigms within the Bush administration might have made use of these debiasing effects. Finally, the fifth section concludes and describes implications of this study for further research.

Literature Review on Cognitive Biases/ Discussion of Methods

Confirmation Bias

The bias that most readily appears to be at work in the formulation of Iraq policy is confirmation bias, which describes the tendency of individuals both to seek out information that accords with their preconceived ideas and also to interpret new evidence as further support for their initial hypothesis. In experimental cases where there is an objective right answer, confirmation bias has been demonstrated to prevent individuals from realizing the answer. When evaluating arguments for and against potential decisions, the confirmation bias implies that individuals will tend to evaluate those arguments through the filter of their prior hypotheses. Details that support the prior hypothesis are generally found more persuasive. Details that go against the prior hypothesis are generally found less persuasive.

A study by Sanitioso and others expertly describes the actual mechanism of cognitive bias. Their experiment found that “people attempt to construct a rational justification for the conclusions that they want to draw. To that end, they search through memory for relevant information, but the search is biased in favor of information that is consistent with the desired conclusions.”⁵ Confirmation bias thus amounts to a subconscious and unintentional reprioritization of remembered details: memories that accord with prior hypotheses are given an unfair advantage in the individual’s final weighing of the evidence. Most problematically, the fact that this search for evidence nevertheless occurs fools individuals into thinking that their conclusions are unprejudiced. Hence, individuals are able to maintain a self-deceiving “illusion of objectivity” while still attaining the desired conclusion.⁶

An experiment by Jerome Bruner and Mary Potter, cited by Matthew Rabin, succinctly demonstrates the effect:

Subjects were shown blurred pictures that were gradually brought into sharper focus. Different subjects began viewing the pictures at different points in the focusing process, but the pace and final degree of focus was identical for all subjects. Of those subjects who began viewing at a severe-blur stage, less than a quarter eventually identified the pictures correctly, whereas over half of those who began viewing at a light-blur stage were able to correctly identify the pictures. Bruner and Potter conclude that “interference may be accounted for partly by the difficulty of rejecting incorrect hypotheses based on substandard cues.”⁷

In the Bruner and Potter experiment, individuals misread ambiguous sensory clues as support for their initial hypothesis. As a result, they were less likely than individuals who never received the ambiguous clues to correctly identify the picture. The experiment therefore demonstrates how commitment to a prior hypothesis can lead individuals to wrongly discount new, helpful information. Though the experiment is a particularly illustrative example of the confirmation bias, the phenomenon is not merely a sensory one.

One particularly disconcerting illustration of bias comes from an experiment run by Daniel T. Gilbert and Edward E. Jones. Their test subjects were asked to write speeches of either a politically liberal or a politically conservative leaning and then watch strangers read aloud one of the speeches chosen at random. Bizarrely, test subjects were unable to disregard the crucial fact that all political commentary was written by them. When debriefed by experimenters, they claimed to have tried to interpret ideological meaning from the speakers’ delivery, but subjects nevertheless tended heavily to place those who read liberal speeches as liberal and

conservative speeches as conservative—even though they knew the speakers were assigned to a particular speech at random. The subjects were therefore unable to erase the influence of the predicatively irrelevant information of speech content when trying to assess the true political affiliation of readers.⁸ Crucially, the experiment also demonstrates that individuals can be heavily affected by confirmation bias even when they are directly responsible (and aware of this fact) for the information that is clouding their judgment.

Availability Bias

Closely related to confirmation bias is the availability bias, which describes the tendency of individuals to weigh various pieces of evidence based on the degree to which they are cognitively available. In other words, individuals unknowingly adopt the evidentiary standard if you can think of it, it must be important.⁹ The results of the bias are incredibly diverse, but a useful illustration is the estimation of probabilities. Individuals systematically overestimate the probability of their being killed in a vivid manner, such as a plane crash or electrocution, and systematically underestimate the probability of their being killed in a manner that is comparatively routine, such as by stroke¹⁰. One can be confident that the poor estimate of such likelihoods derives from cognitive availability and not some other phenomena because the same effect can be reproduced in more experimental settings. Indeed, Carroll¹¹ found that merely asking individuals to imagine a future occurrence significantly increased their estimation of the probability of that occurrence.

The effect is not limited to probability estimation, however. Individuals are more likely to believe an explanation that has been made more cognitively available. Anderson and Sechler designed an experiment in which subjects were asked to provide a causal explanation for the results of a fake research study.¹² The subjects were split into two groups: the first was told the research study had found that bold firefighters were more likely to succeed at their jobs, while the second was told cautious firefighters were more likely to succeed. The individuals in each group then generated causal explanations for the (unbeknownst to them) fabricated results. For instance, an individual in the bold group might write that a bold firefighter possesses courage necessary to jump through a blaze in order to escape a burning building. The next part of the experiment is of particular significance: test subjects in both groups were told that the firefighter study was entirely fabricated and that no research on the common attributes of successful firefighters exists. They were then asked to provide their own prediction for whether bold or cautious firefighters were more likely to be successful. Almost invariably, the subjects chose in accord with their group assignment. This conclusion bears repeating: even when their only evidentiary basis for choosing

one group or another is *entirely discredited*, the subjects still believed that the group they were assigned to by chance *just happened to be* the group with the accurate causal relationship. Individuals were thus entirely ignorant of the fact that the researcher induced their beliefs. Tversky and Kahneman have replicated this systematic reversal of preferences across a diverse set of experimental conditions.¹³

Furthermore, the explanations that individuals provided as part of the first experiment were held by test subjects as the very justification for remaining unmoved by the fact that the study upon which they had based their initial beliefs was fabricated. In other words, the explanation they gave for the study (when they thought it was factual) acted as a protective mechanism against changing their minds (once researchers informed them the experiment was made up).

Anderson and Sechler's experiment demonstrates the degree to which the availability bias drives individual decision-making. Decisions made under the influence of the availability bias are irrational in that individuals are unduly influenced in their choice among options by virtue of the options' varying cognitive availability, instead of criteria that might be correlated with the objective correctness of the decision.

Limitations of the Experimental Literature

The experimental literature on cognitive biases is both rich and deep. However, there are limits to what can be accomplished in the experimental setting. For one, there can be little examination of how the biases operate in real world settings over extended periods of time. Whereas experimenters carefully control the decision contexts of test subjects, individuals in the real world are forced to form opinions and make choices in contexts determined by social and institutional practices, which may or may not vary widely over time. Moreover, the social aspect of choice making raises the question of how one individual's susceptibility to the effects of cognitive bias alters the decisional context of her coworkers and potentially their susceptibility to cognitive bias as well. These deficits indicate that something beyond laboratory experiments is needed if we are to more fully understand the significance of cognitive biases.

Benefits of a Political Case Study

Because experiments are not conducive to the sort of rich contextual evaluation that a real world application of cognitive biases literature requires, this paper accordingly presents a case study: the Bush Administration's prewar Iraq policy. The most obvious benefit of this approach is that it captures the dual flow of causality: how cognitive biases affected and were affected by the administration's organizational procedures for gathering information and making decisions. In this way, the topic of this paper not only applies to but also goes beyond the experimental literature by demonstrating that policymaker decisions can propagate and exacerbate

cognitive biases in ways that substantially affect subsequent decisions. As such, this study is a productive companion to the experimental literature because it illuminates the path dependency aspect of cognitive biases in a way that the experimental literature cannot. This paper will evaluate two hypotheses regarding prewar assessments of Iraq in order to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to conclude that cognitive biases played a causal role in the mistaken intelligence analysis.

Primary Hypothesis: *The organizational procedures and analytical methodologies used by the Department of Defense's Office of Special Plans made them and the consumers of their intelligence uniquely vulnerable to irrational judgments resulting from the effects of cognitive bias. As a result, policymakers based their decisions about Iraq on incorrect information.*

Alternative Hypothesis: *The Department of Defense's Office of Special Plans willfully and maliciously produced and disseminated intelligence that they knew to be false in order to manipulate policymakers and the public into supporting the Office's desired political objectives. As a result, policymakers based their decisions about Iraq on incorrect information.*

Contribution and Limitations of This Paper

This paper is not meant to be the definitive account of the run up to the War in Iraq, nor is it meant to be a definitive exploration of the political effects of cognitive biases. Rather the goals of this paper are more modest: it serves as a proof-of-concept work, demonstrating that the predictions of the cognitive biases literature can be meaningfully evaluated in the absence of experimental conditions. Though the study presented here is not entirely conclusive, its insights are fruitful and noteworthy. The paper contributes to the body of knowledge on the decision to invade Iraq in a novel way by examining the decision-making process from a new perspective. Additionally, this paper provides analysis on the previously unstudied interactions between policy-making/policy-analysis institutions and cognitive bias. Finally, the paper offers institutional prescriptions for mitigating the harmful effects of cognitive bias and an analysis of how such changes might have altered the quality of the Bush Administration's deliberations on Iraq policy.

Background to the War with Iraq

Relations between the United States and Iraq were outwardly hostile as the Bush Administration was transitioning to power in late 2000 and early 2001. The United States' official policy towards Saddam Hussein's regime was one of containment. As part of this strategy, the U.S. military had enforced no-fly zones over roughly sixty percent of Iraqi airspace beginning in April 1991 at a cost of nearly

\$1.5 billion per year.¹⁴ Periodically the United States would also bomb targets in Iraq, such as air defense systems. The largest military action undertaken by the United States during this period was the four-day-long Desert Fox bombing campaign in 1998. In Desert Fox the United States bombed 97 different sites. The key targets were facilities related to the production and storage of chemical weapons and missile technology.¹⁵

During the 2000 election campaign, the Bush Administration's stated policy was maintaining the containment policy toward Iraq. However, in January 2001, before Bush was inaugurated, Vice President-Elect Dick Cheney contacted the outgoing Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, and requested that the first national security topic on which the outgoing administration should brief the incoming administration be potential options for dealing with Iraq.¹⁶ At this time, Iraq was the only country that the United States was bombing on a regular basis, so this request was not wholly arbitrary, albeit still unusual. Prior to September 11, the Bush Administration's national security principals regularly held meetings discussing Iraq policy, but they implemented no radical changes in policy. At these meetings, only one individual, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, actively advocated toppling the Hussein regime.¹⁷ Despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's warnings, Bush accepted Wolfowitz's "drum that would not stop" as "good contingency planning."¹⁸

The major shift in internal debates on Iraq came with 9/11. That afternoon, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld raised with his staff the possibility of attacking Iraq along with Osama bin Laden.¹⁹ On September 15, the top Administration officials met at Camp David to discuss the response to 9/11. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz presented the case for attacking three targets—Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Iraq—but Wolfowitz was the only person pressing the case that day for attacking Iraq.²⁰ Also around this time, Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, a group of Shiite, Iraqi exiles who fiercely opposed Saddam Hussein, spoke before the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board. As a result of Chalabi's presentation, Douglas Feith, the Department of Defense's Undersecretary for Policy, told his staff to refocus on Iraq.²¹

Critical Organizational Mistakes in the Run-up to War

The principal justification for the Iraq war in both internal and external deliberations was that Saddam Hussein's regime possessed and was developing weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the United States and its allies. The later revelation that this was in fact completely false came as a shock to the Bush Administration. Though this mistake is often called an intelligence failure,

that description glosses over the fact that many of the key intelligence failings that led to the mistaken assessment of Iraq's WMD capability were detected and debunked by the intelligence community prior to the National Intelligence Estimate of 2002; pieces of poor-quality intelligence were stripped of their prior vetting and reinserted into policy deliberations by key constituencies within the administration. Thus, a more accurate description of the failure to adequately judge the status of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is that the intelligence community succeeded prior to being led to toward failure. The mechanisms of this breakdown, however, are consistent with the predictions of cognitive bias. To illustrate, this paper will discuss six key mistaken judgments that laid the foundation for the administration's broader failure and will explain their relation to cognitive bias.

(1) Seeking Only the Intelligence that Supported Prior Conceptions about Iraq

Shortly after the attacks of September 11, a separate office at the Pentagon was created to collect and disseminate intelligence and policy analysis. Called the Office of Special Plans (OSP)²² the group, which rapidly grew in size and influence after its creation, was under the direction of Douglas Feith. According to the declassified Department of Defense Inspector General's *Review of Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*, the group "developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers."²³ The *Review* goes on to describe how the OSP produced intelligence reports utilized by top administration officials that did not "show the variance with the consensus of the Intelligence Community."²⁴ In other words, the group produced assessments that conflicted with those of the mainstream intelligence community, but the OSP did not accurately represent this discrepancy in their reports.

The OSP's misleading interagency practices were mirrored by its poor standards for evaluating and producing intelligence. According to Patrick Lang, a Middle East Analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, the OSP "brought in people who were not intelligence professionals [...] because they thought like them. They knew what answers they were going to get."²⁵ In other words, the OSP saw a need to reevaluate CIA intelligence assessments because they disagreed with the conclusions *even before* examining the evidence on which those conclusions were based. Seymour Hersh cites an anonymous Pentagon adviser who describes the function of the OSP as specifically tasked with digging up additional evidence supporting action against Iraq. He writes,

Special Plans was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, believed to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States.²⁶

Such beginning with the end in mind left the OSP willing to base assessments on raw intelligence that had been weeded out by the vetting process of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Essentially, the OSP had a paradigm in which any evidence supporting their preconceived conclusions was immediately taken as credible while any evidence that undermined their conclusions was discarded or discredited. It is not that the OSP falsified evidence; none of the evidence they used was internally fabricated or deliberately altered. Rather, the OSP's central failing was an evidentiary paradigm that included a seemingly unlimited willingness to jump to conclusions so long as those conclusions were the ones desired.

This glaring intelligence failure about Iraq makes a great deal more sense when considered in light of confirmation bias. For one thing, the explicit purpose of the Office of Special Plans was to search for intelligence that lent credence to the claim that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda and was seeking weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the key intelligence body examining these claims had essentially enshrined the tenets of confirmation bias as an operational paradigm.

Only looking for evidence that connected Iraq and Al Qaeda guaranteed that members of the Office of Special Plans would find it. As one CIA analyst put it, "The Defense Department and the Office of the Vice-President write their own pieces [...] We collect so much stuff that you can find anything you want."²⁷ What an understanding of confirmation bias adds to the picture, though, is a compelling explanation for why members of the Office of Special Plans were convinced by their own faulty intelligence gathering. Jervis writes:

[E]ach bit of evidence the [intelligence community] used was ambiguous or impeachable, and yet formed the basis for far-reaching conclusions. Each account lent credence to the others [...] if each report were worthless, the sum total of even a large number of them would still be zero, although listing them together would give them an air of credibility. But if there was a reasonable probability that any one of them were correct, the fact that there were several did indeed make the positive finding more reasonable. The "mosaic effect" may be such that pieces of evidence, each ambiguous in itself, together provide quite convincing evidence.²⁸

In other words, the operationalized methodology for confirmation bias used by the OSP for investigating claims about Iraq created a potent psychological effect for reinforcing confidence in their hypothesis. This force also offers a compelling explanation for why the OSP was so willing to utilize intelligence provided by the Iraqi National Congress.

(2) Use of Information from the Iraqi National Congress

The Iraqi National Congress (INC) is a political group under the direction of Ahmed Chalabi, created in 1992 for the purpose of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. The group received millions of dollars in assistance from the CIA between 1992 and 1996. In 1996, the CIA severed ties with Chalabi after discovering that he was unable to deliver on his promises and that the intelligence he had provided was actually worthless.²⁹ In 1996, however, Chalabi moved to Washington and lobbied the U.S. congress on Iraq policy. There he continued making grand statements about the ease with which Saddam's regime could be overthrown and expressing his support for Israel. Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith noticed and were excited by Chalabi's atypical statements, and they proceeded to introduce him into prominent neoconservative circles during 1997-1998. Among those Chalabi befriended were Dick Cheney and Richard Perle, who under Bush would eventually become the influential chairman of the Defense Policy Board.

Upon the election of George Bush and Dick Cheney in 2000, the Iraqi National Congress was made a key source of intelligence for the Bush Administration, and the INC was put back on the government payroll. Between 2000 and 2003, the INC received more than \$36 million dollars from the U.S. government.³⁰ Chalabi had another route for influencing U.S. policy, however, that was nearly as potent. He and his coached "defectors" were the key sources for a number of *New York Times* articles on the subject of Iraqi WMD. In one of those articles, Richard Perle described the Iraqi National Congress as, "without question the single most important source of intelligence about Saddam Hussein."³¹ When the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans was set up under the direction of Douglas Feith, it was more than happy to accept new intelligence information from Chalabi's INC, despite the fact that the CIA still considered him untrustworthy.³² According to Seymour Hersh, by 2002, the OSP and through it the Iraqi National Congress,

rivalled both the C.I.A. and the Pentagon's own Defense Intelligence Agency, the D.I.A., as President Bush's main source of intelligence regarding Iraq's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction and connection with Al Qaeda.³³

Unfortunately, virtually all of the intelligence provided by the INC proved to be either irrelevant or false. According to the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intel-

ligence, *The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress*, the statements of two INC defectors were used for the production of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate.³⁴ The first claimed that Iraq possessed mobile biological weapons capabilities, and the second alleged that an Iraqi facility was involved in the production of nuclear material. After the invasion, both statements were found to have been baseless. The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) findings, however, were merely the tip of the iceberg in a constant stream of gripping but utterly fabricated narratives provided by the INC to the Pentagon and to the media. Hersh writes:

With the Pentagon's support, Chalabi's group worked to put defectors with compelling stories in touch with reporters in the United States and Europe. The resulting articles had dramatic accounts of advances in weapons of mass destruction or told of ties to terrorist groups. In some cases, these stories were disputed in analyses by the CIA. Misstatements and inconsistencies in INC defector accounts were also discovered after the final series of UN weapons inspections, which ended a few days before the American assault.³⁵

That INC accounts contradicted more solid intelligence by the CIA is especially noteworthy. Again, *not* all aspects of the U.S. intelligence apparatus were failing at once, but administration policy and trust in the INC made it impossible for one part of the intelligence community to correct the errors of another.

Confirmation bias offers a compelling explanation for why the OSP was so readily willing to utilize intelligence provided by the Iraqi National Congress. As the coached defectors were spinning yarns about Iraq's WMD programs and connections to Al Qaeda, the members of the OSP could easily connect the dots to other low quality and unvetted intelligence snippets that they had collected. Essentially, the analysts encased themselves in an echo chamber of their own making. The weight of the aggregated details was enough that Richard Perle, who was fully aware of Chalabi's sordid history with the CIA, still named the Iraqi exile the single most important source of intelligence on Saddam's regime. In Perle's mind, how could a few questionable years outweigh the significance of the seemingly infinitely interwoven narrative of Chalabi's defectors and the OSP's cherry picked intelligence? Moreover, there was a readily available counter-explanation for any inaccuracies in Chalabi's or other problematic intelligence sources, namely, deception on the part of Saddam's government. Thus, every conceivable detail could remain consistent with the administration's hypothesis that Iraq was seeking WMD and had ties to terrorist groups.

Alas, the persuasiveness of the OSP echo chamber was of

course a psychological artifact, ultimately revealed to have been wholly unjustified. The OSP could have just as easily spent its efforts trying to confirm the hypothesis that the Iraqi regime had disarmed, no doubt resulting in an equally compelling constellation of facts. A more comprehensive and useful analysis would necessarily take into account what Jervis refers to as the “dogs that do not bark”:

cases in which specified behavior does not occur or in which evidence is absent are highly significant if an important proposition or argument implies the contrary. Political scientists refer to this kind of evidence as “dogs that do not bark,” borrowing from the Sherlock Holmes short story in which Holmes, but not Watson, realizes that the fact that the murder victim’s dogs did not bark the night he was killed shows that the murderer was an acquaintance: had he been a stranger, the dogs would have barked. As this example shows, negative evidence and events that do not occur are not automatically or uniformly important, but matter when a significant argument or proposition implies that they should be present.³⁶

Put simply, the OSP only focused on details that substantiated their hypothesis and never properly considered the number and significance of reports by knowledgeable informants who did not see traces of WMD programs.³⁷ As a result, the OSP never properly attempted to contextualize the significance of the information they collected, but, then again, being so sure of their correctness, the need probably never even occurred to them.

The administration had reasons, however, for its trust in defector accounts. In his crucial speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Cheney emphasized that the 1995 defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, had provided a wealth of information on Iraq’s first WMD program that was unknown even after the completion of UN inspections. Cheney insinuated in that speech that current defectors (meaning the INC) should be treated as already possessing more reliable information about Iraq’s WMD than would be gathered by a new round of inspections. However, while the Kamal incident did demonstrate that defectors could be of immense utility in gathering intelligence, the evidence provided by Kamal actually directly contradicted that of the INC. In fact, Kamal had testified to the effectiveness of inspections, “you should not underestimate yourself. You are very effective in Iraq.”³⁸ Kamal also described the total destruction of all Iraqi WMD capabilities and facilities. Only a few years later, Saddam had Kamal killed for providing this information, which ought to have hinted that it was substantively more credible than the accounts provided by the INC. Moreover, the U.N.’s series of inspections right before the commencement of war in

2003 had already disproven a number of the WMD claims of INC defectors. Despite the overwhelming evidence that Chalabi was a fraud, the Bush Administration still provided him a leading role in the Coalition Provisional Authority. He eventually went on to be Iraqi Oil Minister, before the U.S. eventually severed ties.

(3) Stovepiping Raw Intelligence to Top Policymakers

It was through the OSP that the intelligence reports based on claims from defectors provided by the Iraqi National Congress reached the ears of top-level policymakers. This alternative intelligence route was crucial since the CIA had worked with the INC before and had found the organization to be manipulative and untrustworthy.³⁹ The DIA reached similar conclusions. Unfortunately, the interview-coached members of the INC were all too able to provide the OSP with exactly the tales of terrorist ties and WMD programs that the OSP thought were underrepresented in mainstream intelligence reports.⁴⁰

This evasion of standard intelligence vetting is known as stovepiping, which Robert Jervis defines “as the delivery of selected raw intelligence to policy-makers, bypassing intelligence analysts who could critically evaluate it.”⁴¹ The lack of standard vetting allowed intelligence of seriously dubious worth to reach the highest levels of government. Then, when other intelligence agencies did finally challenge the false conclusions, their arguments would often fail to spread far beyond their own agency. When they occasionally did reach the ear of top-level policymakers, it came only after those ears had been primed by confirmation bias and availability bias. Greg Theilman, who worked at the State Department’s Intelligence arm during this period, describes a typical case of stovepiping:

[The mainstream Intelligence Community would] pick apart a report and find out that the source had been wrong before, or had no access to the information provided [...] There was considerable skepticism throughout the intelligence community about the reliability of Chalabi’s sources, but the defector reports were coming all the time. Knock one down and another comes along. Meanwhile, the garbage was being shoved straight to the President.⁴²

Thus, even though the belief of the mainstream intelligence community was that the reports coming out of the OSP and the INC were of little or no value, those groups had disproportionate access to the Bush Administration early on. It was these raw, unvetted intelligence reports that convinced the Bush Administration that Iraq was aggressively moving towards WMD. By the time disconfirming analysis was forthcoming from other agencies, the weight of evidence available to top level policymakers made that which was actually mainstream seem like an outlier. Any bit of intelligence that actually threatened the OSP’s con-

clusions could easily be explained away within the administration's existing hypothesis as the results of the Hussein regime's deception.

Stovepiping, therefore, was the principal mechanism through which the OSP's false conclusions about Iraqi intelligence caused by confirmation and availability bias spread upward in the Bush Administration ranks. With those false conclusions came a feedback loop of biased judgment. As top level officials were persuaded by the OSP's narrative, they became subject to the same underlying cognitive bias and correspondingly less capable of being persuaded against that narrative.

(4) Preventing Meaningful Deliberation with the Mainstream Intelligence Community

Not only did the OSP inaccurately represent discrepancies between its own analyses and those of the CIA and DIA to policymakers, but the OSP also took steps that limited the ability of other agencies to evaluate the OSP's assessments. In September 2002, the OSP staff gave a White House briefing on the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship that contained different information from the presentation given before the Director of Central Intelligence. The additional information was never vetted by the Intelligence Community and was not supported by available intelligence. The intelligence community was never notified of this discrepancy.⁴³ Even worse, CIA officers described how their agency, in an echo of the bureaucratic maneuverings of Henry Kissinger, was so bogged down with requests to justify previous intelligence assessments, that the agency's ability to interpret new information and evaluate other intelligence assessments was compromised. As Kenneth Pollack, former CIA analyst and NSC staffer put it, "They were forcing the intelligence community to defend its good information and good analysis so aggressively that the intelligence analysts didn't have the time or the energy to go after the bad information."⁴⁴

(5) Modifying Intelligence Report Tone and Diction to Increase Alarmism and Impact

Greg Thielmann describes the problem as one in which the consumers of intelligence, "were dropping qualifiers and distorting some of the information that we provided to make it seem more alarmist and more dangerous than the information we were giving them." This detrimental effect naturally compounded upon itself. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence notes that the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate "suffers from a 'layering' effect whereby assessments were based on previous judgments without carrying forward the uncertainties," thereby leading each successive revision of the report to sound more certain and paint a continually darker picture about Iraq's intentions and capabilities. As information about the underlying sources of a report are stripped away,

analysts are given only a generic description of the source, and indeed that can vary from one report to another, which in this case led the analysts to overestimate the number of different sources who were reporting. In other cases, the descriptions omitted important details about the source's specific expertise and access that would have helped the analysts judge the information.⁴⁵

This snowballing effect of certainty and alarmism provides the clearest connection to the availability bias. The oft referred to "smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud" was an event that was by virtually all expert accounts terrifically unlikely. Those who had mistakenly judged that Saddam Hussein did have an active nuclear weapons program still argued that the earliest he could actually produce a bomb was more than five years out. Additionally, the only "mushroom cloud" scenario even considered by the Intelligence community was that Saddam would provide nuclear weapons to a terrorist group as a last act of vengeance for the destruction of his regime. The experts did not judge a nuclear attack on U.S. soil to be even remotely likely. Despite this, discussion of that worst-case scenario dominated public discourse on Iraq policy, especially as intelligence assessments were gradually stripped of their probabilistic hypotheticals and caveats.

The inevitable result of this aggregating source and detail anonymity was that the judgments of the CIA and DIA gradually came to suffer from the same analytical failings that those of the OSP did. When available for proper evaluation, the findings of the OSP were often contradicted by more reliable sources and reports from different agencies (e.g. the INC testimony). But, as mentioned above, the OSP was incredibly lax in vetting evidence. Once the top administration officials started tasking the CIA and DIA with following up on leads that were ultimately based on poor quality intelligence that had been stovepiped by the OSP, the CIA and DIA were understandably no longer in a sufficiently strong position to adequately vet the underlying intelligence and were essentially persuaded where they otherwise would not have been.

Moreover, the increasing public pronouncements of certainty by top administration officials that the WMD risk was real and imminent convinced most members of the intelligence community with lingering doubts that their cause for alarm must be the result of their not seeing the whole picture. Regardless, the picture was rapidly becoming more simplistic as source-stripped details from the OSP gradually came to dominate the inter-agency conversation on Iraq. A senior intelligence official stated that when the National Intelligence Estimate was first released in 2002, "there was disagreement over details in almost every aspect of the administration's case against Iraq." Unfortunately,

these crucial dissents were omitted from the published document since the administration did not want “a lot of footnotes and disclaimers.”⁴⁶ That document, which was produced in one-eighth the normally allotted timeframe for producing a National Intelligence Estimate, thereafter left those intelligence analysts with remaining doubts about Iraqi intelligence with little to contest.⁴⁷

This snowballing effect also seems to have been responsible for serious lapses in judgment among the top Bush Administration officials, who began to confuse the possibility of a worst-case scenario with its probability. The most salient example of this comes from a September 2002 press conference, wherein Bush claimed that a recent International Atomic Energy Agency report had stated Saddam Hussein was merely six months away from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In fact, the report to which President Bush referred was not from the IAEA but from U.S. intelligence, and the six month time frame was not an expected outcome but the posited worst case scenario.⁴⁸ In this instance as in the gradual shift in tone of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the availability bias transforms perceptions of possible into the plausible, and the plausible into the certain, merely by function of frequency and salience of thought.

(6) Inadequately Considering Alternative Explanations on Iraqi Aluminum Tubes

In 2001, the CIA learned of Iraq’s attempt to purchase 60,000 high-strength aluminum tubes from a Jordanian company. Such activity violated the UN sanctions on Iraq at the time, and the CIA concluded that the tubes were meant for use in centrifuges to enrich uranium.⁴⁹ In addition to being used in Colin Powell’s February 2003 speech before the UN, the tubes were the central evidence presented in the 2002 NIE for a reconstituted Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Notably, the CIA claimed no other evidence of uranium enrichment, even circumstantially. When the story was deliberately leaked to the *New York Times* in September 2002, the narrative thereafter constituted the key argument in the public for an Iraqi nuclear threat.

However, the CIA’s analysis was actually more reserved than the language of administration officials who introduced the topic into the public discourse. While the CIA had repeatedly described the aluminum tubes as “dual-use” technology, the administration officials consistently argued in public that the tubes were only suited for use in centrifuges.⁵⁰ Actually, centrifuge experts at Oak Ridge National laboratory consulted by the CIA prior to the public leaking raised very strong objections to the claim that the tubes were meant for uranium enrichment. Most notably, “Aluminum had not been used for rotors since the 1950s. Iraq had two centrifuge blueprints, stolen in Europe, that were far more efficient and already known to work. One

used maraging steel, a hard steel alloy, for the rotors, the other carbon fiber.”⁵¹

Thus, the CIA’s hypothesis required that Iraq deliberately handicap its own efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon. More damning, however, is the fact that in December of 2002, experts uncovered that the tube specifications were identical to an Italian-designed rocket’s casing. Even though this information was made known to the Department of Energy and the Intelligence community, including a photograph from Iraq of one of the tubes marked with the Italian manufacturer’s logo and the English words, “81mm rocket,” Secretary Powell still cited the tubes as evidence of an Iraqi uranium enrichment program in his speech before the UN in 2003.⁵² In that speech, Powell acknowledged that there was dissent among the U.S. intelligence community as to the significance of the tubes, but was still convinced. He argued,

What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it were a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?⁵³

In fact, the anodized coating actually makes it even clearer that the tubes were meant for use in rockets and not in centrifuges: “It resists corrosion of the sort that ruined Iraq’s previous rocket supply. To use the tubes in a centrifuge, experts told the government, Iraq would have to remove the anodized coating.”⁵⁴

Mitigating the Harmful Effects of Cognitive Bias

Experimental Evidence for Debiasing

The most important conclusion from an understanding of cognitive biases is that policymakers should take measures to ensure that changes in judgments and policies occur for the right reasons, which will almost never be reasons of cognitive bias. Having now outlined those biases believed to be most relevant for our purposes, discussion will now shift to the method for mitigating their worst effects. Measures can and do exist to lessen the impact and prevalence of cognitive errors. Babcock and Loewenstein demonstrated that merely being educated on the existence and effects of cognitive bias was no inoculation against its effects.⁵⁵ Another technique, however, had better results. Subjects were not only told of bias, but also told that it resulted from failing to adequately consider counter-arguments to their own position. They were then made to list their case’s weaknesses before making their final decision. According to Babcock

and Lowenstein, the result was a marked decrease in biased judgments.⁵⁶

Forcing individuals to consider the weaknesses of their beliefs and assumptions led to a less biased evaluation in the research. These results are consistent with those of Sanitioso and others,⁵⁷ who found that since cognitive bias is connected to the skewed availability of evidence in favor of one decision, mechanisms designed to alter the choice architecture such that availability is more equal can have beneficial debiasing effects. Individuals who are made to meaningfully and rigorously consider various ways their reasoning could have gone astray are thus less likely to make mistakes due to cognitive errors.

Here the psychology literature is in perfect harmony with the literature of foreign policy decision-making. Herek and others undertook a far-reaching study of the different decision-making processes used by the executive branch during key international crises.⁵⁸ The researchers concluded that failure to use new information is the single most important factor leading to negative outcomes in foreign policy crises. As illustrated in the aluminum tubes example, the prewar period of the Bush Administration shows a consistent failure to give proper weight to contradicting evidence.

Evaluating Iraq Policy Planning: Procedural Changes to Mitigate Cognitive Bias

Increasing the availability of counterarguments suggests a number of important procedural differentiations from the practices of the Bush Administration. First and most obviously, the administration should not have altered intelligence reports so as to downplay uncertainties in the intelligence community's judgments. Without these reasons for skepticism being as plainly available as the judgments themselves, skepticism is likely to give way to undue certainty, as it did in the Iraq case.

Second, the executive branch should have had a more sincere deliberative process throughout war planning. By withholding key information and blanketing the CIA with unnecessary information requests, the OSP and Bush Administration marginalized the mainstream intelligence community in a way that compromised the possibility for worthwhile interagency deliberation.

Third, the intelligence agencies should have looked for signs of additional information that was implied with their judgments about Iraq's capabilities. For instance, once the Bush Administration considered the aluminum tubes as meant for use in centrifuges, the implication was that Iraq had a more wide scale nuclear program. However, the administration seemed content to rest on its conclusions about aluminum tubes without aggressively seeking new intelligence to confirm or deny their judgments. As Jarvis writes,

asking "If Iraq has reconstituted its nuclear

program, what would it have to do?" might have pointed intelligence to areas that should have been probed more deeply, such as the lack of evidence that Iraq was seeking the components other than tubes that it would have needed if it were building centrifuges.⁵⁹

Instead of considering the possibility that the lacking intelligence could indicate a wrong conclusion, the lack of other evidence was nonchalantly ascribed to Saddam's effective deception. This was of course a possibility, but there is no indication that the administration ever made a significant effort to consider the alternative, that Hussein was sincere in his claims to have disarmed—which is now known to have been the case.

Evaluating Iraq Policy Planning: Organizational Changes to Mitigate Cognitive Bias

In the aforementioned study by Herek and others on foreign policy decision-making, the researchers found that the decision-making process most likely to prevent failed outcomes is a "vigilant" approach, wherein formal and thorough processes of disagreement are utilized to probe the assumptions, implications, and logic behind all relevant potential courses of action. This particular deliberative model has both adversarial and collegial elements, but the overall effect is clearly an increased availability of counterarguments.

One way to conceptualize the effect of substantive deliberation on cognitive errors is to pit one individual's bias against another's in the hopes that they might "cancel each other out." Though that is an overly simplified description, there is an intuitive logic behind the idea, especially as it relates to confirmation bias. Consider, for instance, the analysis of Hermann and others on the virtue of majority rule decision-making in politics: "If a majority rule group takes action even though some of its members oppose the decision, that minority may be more alert to negative feedback."⁶⁰ Though the researchers are not specifically addressing confirmation bias, the logic of their argument travels nicely. Confirmation bias gives reason to predict that a dissenting group will be particularly attuned to forthcoming evidence that contradicts the policy pursued by the majority. If both the majority and the minority respect and earnestly engage with each other's opinions, there may be an effective means of correcting for bias.

Because the most successful experimental method for mitigating the effects of cognitive biases is increasing the cognitive availability of counterarguments, I hypothesize that the foreign policy decision-making process most robust in the face of cognitive errors is Alexander George's "multiple advocacy" model, which holds that there ought to be multiple independent centers of equally distributed analytic and persuasive resources within the administration (i.e. the

State Department should be deliberately equal with the Defense Department etc.). Furthermore, the model holds that on key issues where substantive disagreement does not exist, measures ought to be taken to bring in outsider, devil's advocates in order to expose the decision-makers to contrasting views. As such, George's multiple-advocacy model, with its central focus on disagreement, certainly fits the description of "vigilant" deliberation. Citing Bower, who studied the role of conflict in decision-making groups, George writes:

The personal commitment of a subject to an initial position [...] motivates him to defend his choice by presenting all the information which supports his position [...] group search is stimulated in both extent and quality.⁶¹

In other words, the multiple-advocacy model makes effective use of the incentives inherent in policy disagreements a mechanism for stimulating the analytical process. Additionally, the multiple-advocacy model has the advantage of making disagreements routine and formalized. Individuals are more likely to make effective use of the evidence made available to them, even when it conflicts with their prior judgments, if the setting encourages such deep evaluation.

Conclusion: Contrasting the Two Hypotheses on Iraq Intelligence

The available historical evidence indicates that the Office of Special Plans utilized extremely problematic methods for producing its intelligence assessments on Iraq. Moreover, the OSP did not always provide an honest account of its evidence, sources and conclusions to other intelligence agencies. This often prevented those other agencies from effectively rebutting the OSP's mistaken conclusions to top administration policymakers, who themselves ultimately fell prey to the same cognitive biases. While there is ample evidence that the key producers of intelligence about Iraq knew the atypical procedures they used would affect the deliberative outcome, there is no evidence that the OSP or the administration officials it convinced did not believe the content of their intelligence reports. Furthermore, the reports that the OSP produced always had a basis in actual raw intelligence. In short, the problems of the Bush Administration's Iraq intelligence were due to methods and not motives.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded as much in its 2008 *Senate Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information*. The report, which had access to ample classified documentation, concludes that the public statements of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense regarding key issues such as Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction and

ties to terrorist organizations were fundamentally rooted in and substantiated by available intelligence. To the extent that these statements did depart from the intelligence, they "reflected a higher level of certainty than the intelligence judgments themselves."⁶² This undue certainty is precisely what the cognitive biases hypothesis predicts. The alternative hypothesis of malicious falsification, therefore, should be rejected on the grounds that it unnecessarily ascribes malicious motives for which there is no good evidence.

As Kenneth Pollack states, none of the OSP or Bush Administration statements on Iraqi intelligence "in itself was untrue. However, each told only a part of the story—the most sensational part."⁶³ The primary hypothesis of cognitive bias is consistent with this claim and supported by the evidence: The OSP and those who made use of their intelligence were wrongly persuaded of Iraq's possession of WMD because they devoted disproportionate cognitive and analytic resources to the evidence that supported this conclusion. Had their procedures and paradigms been more suited to deal with the adverse effects of cognitive bias, it is possible they would have reached a different, more accurate conclusion about Iraq's capabilities and intentions.

- 1 There are a variety of different cognitive errors, and they are not always directly or clearly related. It is accordingly difficult to generalize about them as a group. For a helpful survey, see Matthew Rabin, "Psychology and Economics," *Journal of Economic Literature* 36, no.1 (1998): 11-46.
- 2 For examples, see Max Bazerman and Jared Curhan, "Negotiation," *Annual Review of Psychology* 51 (2000): 279-315.
- 3 See Alexander L. George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy," *The American Political Science Review* 66 (1972): 751-785, and Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
- 4 For examples, see Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon. "Why Hawks Win," *Foreign Policy*, 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3660 (accessed March 16, 2009), and Nancy Kanwisher, "Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (1989): 652-675.
- 5 Rasyid Sanitioso, Geoffrey T. Fong, and Ziva Kunda, "Motivated Recruitment of Autobiographical Memories," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 59 (1990): 229.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Rabin, "Psychology and Economics," 26, quoting from Jerome Bruner and Mary Potter, "Interference in Visual Recognition," *Science* 144, no. 3617 (1964): 424-425.
- 8 Though I have labeled this an example of the confirmation bias, the tendency of individuals to take the actions of others as indicative of personality traits and not environmental circumstances is more normally called the "fundamental attribution error" (Daniel T. Gilbert and Edward E. Jones, "Perceiver-Induced Constraint: Interpretations of Self-Generated Reality," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50, 1986, 269-280). It is also possible, however, to think of this bias as an extension of the availability bias, since the experimental

- subjects may be inaccurately assessing the speakers' ideologies due to the unequal cognitive availability of arguments. Remembered "evidence" in the form of the ideology expressed in the speech content is highly available (though not actually conclusive or even helpful) while the evidence for the opposite ideology is scant.
- 9 Anthony Eastgate, *An Introduction to Applied Cognitive Psychology* (New York: Psychology Press, 2004), 200.
 - 10 Cass Sunstein and Timur Kuran, "Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation," 51 *Stanford Law Review* 707 (1999).
 - 11 John S. Carroll, "The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the Event: An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 14 (1978): 88-96.
 - 12 Craig A. Anderson and Elisabeth S. Sechler, "Effects of Explanation and Counterexplanation on the Development and Use of Social Theories," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 50 (1986): 24-34.
 - 13 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," *Science* 211 (1981): 453.
 - 14 Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Boston: Penguin, 2007), 15.
 - 15 *Ibid.*, 19.
 - 16 Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 9.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, 21
 - 18 *Ibid.*, 22
 - 19 *Ibid.*, 24-25.
 - 20 Ricks, *Fiasco*, 31.
 - 21 *Ibid.*
 - 22 Office of Special Plans is now the name generally used for the activities and working groups of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith. There was also a separate group officially titled the Office of Special Plans, which was not related to intelligence analysis.
 - 23 Department of Defense, *Report on Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*, Washington DC: United States Department of Defense, 2007, 2.
 - 24 *Ibid.*
 - 25 Quoted in James Risen, "How Pair's Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," *New York Times*, April 28, 2004, 2.
 - 26 Seymour Hersh, "Selective Intelligence." *The New Yorker*, May 12, 2003, 2, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact (accessed December 4, 2009).
 - 27 *Ibid.*, 6.
 - 28 Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 1 (2006): 38.
 - 29 Jane Mayer, "The Manipulator," *The New Yorker*, June 7, 2004, 1.
 - 30 Ricks, *Fiasco*, 57.
 - 31 Quoted in Ricks, *Fiasco*, 57.
 - 32 Hersh, "Selective Intelligence," 2.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, 1.
 - 34 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006, 39.
 - 35 Hersh, "Selective Intelligence," 4.
 - 36 Jervis, "Reports, Politics," 26.
 - 37 *Ibid.*, 25.
 - 38 Quoted in Hersh, "Selective Intelligence," 3.
 - 39 Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, *Postwar Findings About Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare With Prewar Assessments*, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006, 3.
 - 40 Hersh, "Selective Intelligence," 2.
 - 41 Jervis, "Reports, Politics," 34.
 - 42 Quoted in Seymour Hersh, "The Stovepipe," *The New Yorker*, October 27, 2003, 5, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/10/27/031027fa_fact (accessed December 4, 2009).
 - 43 Department of Defense, *Report on Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*. DoD Inspector General. February 9, 2007, 8.
 - 44 Quoted in Hersh, "Stovepipe," 2.
 - 45 Jervis, "Reports, Politics," 30.
 - 46 Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, "Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence," *The Washington Post*, August 10, 2003, 8.
 - 47 *Ibid.*
 - 48 *Ibid.*, 5.
 - 49 Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, *Postwar Findings*, 9.
 - 50 Gellman and Pincus, "Depiction of Threat," 5.
 - 51 *Ibid.*, 8.
 - 52 *Ibid.*, 2.
 - 53 Colin Powell, Speech given before the UN, quoted in Gellman and Pincus, "Depiction of Threat," 3.
 - 54 Gellman and Pincus, "Depiction of Threat," 10.
 - 55 Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein, "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11.1 (1997): 109-126.
 - 56 *Ibid.*, 116.
 - 57 Sanitioso, Fong, and Kunda, "Motivated Recruitment," 235.
 - 58 Gregory M. Herek, Irving L. Janis, and Paul Huth, "Decision Making During International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (1987): 216.
 - 59 Jervis, "Reports, Politics," 27.
 - 60 Charles F. Hermann, Janice Gross-Stein, Bengt Sundelius, and Stephen G. Walker, "Resolve, Accept or Avoid: Effects of Group Conflict on Foreign Policy Decisions," *International Studies Review* 3 (2001): 164.
 - 61 George, "The Case for Multiple Advocacy," 757.
 - 62 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Senate Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information*, Wash-

ington DC: Government Printing Office, 2008, 50.

- 63 Kenneth M. Pollack, "Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong." *The Atlantic*, January/February, 2004, 14.

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The Quest for *Convivencia*: Conflicting Ideologies of Language in the Basque Autonomous Community in Spain

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Abstract: Now, more than thirty years after the Basque language was declared co-official in Spain, the Basques continue to search for a sustainable balance between promoting Euskara and maintaining Spanish in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC). In this paper I argue that one reason language planning remains a contended issue is that the parties involved possess different underlying language ideologies and linguistic goals for the region. Taking the debate over the structure of the Basque educational system that emerged in 2007 as my focal point, I examine the differing ideas about Euskara and its relationship to Basque identity held by the government of the BAC and the parent activist group “Freedom of Linguistic Choice.” I then show that the conflict over language in the school setting can be seen as representative of the larger conflict over language in the BAC through an analysis of the two group’s interpretations of the word *convivencia*, or “coexistence.” Understanding the role of language ideologies in shaping public debates over language such as this can help illuminate a more nuanced understanding of the challenges currently facing multilingual communities and provide a useful lens through which to explore questions of globalization and the politics of multicultural citizenship.

Introduction

On November 4, 2008, the citizens of Missouri voted to make English the official language “of all governmental meetings at which any public business is discussed.”¹ As I stood in line at my local precinct that morning, what caught my attention was not my peers’ excitement about the day’s presidential election, but the zeal with which the young man behind me defended this “official English” proposal to the person standing next to him. Why, I wondered, was he so adamant about this proposal? The amendment passed with 86.3% of the vote, the largest majority received by any statewide ballot measure by more than twelve percentage points.² What was it about the idea of controlling language that ignited the passions of Missourians enough to elicit more than 28 thousand more votes than either of the two “hot button” issues on the ballot, alternative energy and health care?³

Language ideologies are a way to begin to understand this passion. Language ideologies tell us about the connections people make between language and their social, political, and moral environments.⁴ Anthropologists regularly note that a vast array of culturally informed ideas about relationships, status, power, and identity are related to the language people choose and the way in which they use it.⁵ More recently, however, scholars in the fields of anthropology, sociolinguistics, and cultural studies have begun to recog-

nize that examining language ideologies, or popular ideas about how language works and what it does, can be equally enlightening.⁶

Woolard and Schieffelin note that “a wealth of public problems hinge on language ideology...[and] coming to grips with those issues means coming to grips with the nature and working of language ideology.”⁷ They illustrate this with a number of brief examples from the United States, including the English Only movement and policies regarding language in education and law.⁸ In this article, I argue that bilingual language planning in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) in Spain is an excellent example of one such “public problem” which “hinge[s] on language ideology.”

Spanish and *Euskara*, the Basque language, have been in contact in the Basque region for hundreds of years, but the current situation is such that language planning remains one of the most hotly debated political issues. I argue that this continued presence of language as a topic of political debate is due, in part, to the failure of members of differing ideological camps to recognize and “come to grips with” each others’ underlying ideas about language. In this article I present two key understandings of Basque identity which are linked through language ideologies to distinct patterns of language use and ideas about the politics of language in the BAC. I then discuss two examples of how these competing language ideologies are impeding the suc-

cess of the Basque revitalization project. I first examine the conflict which erupted in 2007 over changes made to the structure of the Basque educational system and then show how this example can be seen to be indicative of the larger language debate with an analysis of the differences between the two groups' linguistic goals for the BAC. Although the groups imagine the specifics of their language planning goals in different ways, an overarching goal of both groups is for the Basque society to be characterized by *convivencia*, or peaceful linguistic coexistence.

There is currently a dearth of publications related to Basque language ideology, use, or policy for which the fieldwork was conducted in 2008 or later. The legal change enacted in September of 2007 (referenced above) gave rise to many strong responses which reveal much about the current state of language ideologies and political feelings in the BAC, but the literature in this area has not been substantially updated to reflect these responses. In May of 2009 another significant change took place in the BAC, the effects of which are only now beginning to be seen. As I will discuss further below, a new political party took office for the first time in the history of the BAC, and, as of February 2010, the new administration has begun the process of reversing the legal changes enacted in 2007. Thus, this article examines language ideologies in the BAC from roughly 2007 to 2009, the small and understudied window of heated debate in the BAC between the legal changes of 2007 and the political changes of 2009. As such, this article contributes to the growing body of scholarly work examining questions of language and politics in relation to individual and collective identity as well as the established conversations regarding languages in contact and language planning in the European Union, and the area of Basque cultural studies.

The story of Euskara in Spain is unique in its particular historical development and the combination of ideas about identity associated with it, but the underlying question driving the plot forward is one which underlies many issues and social movements around the world today, including the English Only movement in the United States: how can diverse cultural perspectives coexist within a larger cultural context? "Coming to grips with...language ideolog[ies]," as I attempt to do in this article, can help illuminate a more nuanced understanding of the challenges facing multilingual communities and provide a useful lens through which to explore questions of globalization and the politics of multicultural citizenship.

Language Ideology and Imaginings of Basque Identity

In this section I demonstrate how language ideology theory is pertinent to the work I am doing and explore the

differences between the linguistic ideology held by the Basque government and that held by monolingual Spanish speakers.

In their chapter "Language Ideology and Linguistic Differentiation," Irvine and Gal (2000) define language ideologies as "the ideas with which participants and observers frame their understanding of linguistic varieties and map those understandings onto people, events, and activities that are significant to them," noting that these ideas are always "suffused with the political and moral issues pervading the particular sociolinguistic field." This mapping, they argue, involves a process of rationalization and simplification of the complexity of the sociolinguistic environment whereby popular ideas about language "identify[] linguistic varieties with 'typical' persons and activities and account [...] for the differentiations among them."

Through this process, the infinite number of possible individual beliefs about the relationship between language, identity, and politics in the BAC get recognized as several basic categories of Basques, each represented by its own "typical" member: "new," or non-native, Basque speakers, monolingual Spanish speakers, native Basque speakers, and radical Basques. In addition, the Basque government is an active generator of linguistic ideology, and, as the leading party remained unchanged for thirty years and generated fairly consistent ideologies of language, I also consider "the government" to represent a specific way of thinking about the relationship between Basque identity and language to the same extent that "Spanish monolinguals" represent a specific perspective on these issues.

It is important to remember, however, that these categories are fluid, and individual Basques might identify with one category and then another depending on the circumstances. In addition, although a category name (e.g., "monolingual Spanish speaker) may reference a certain linguistic ability, this does not mean that every person in the group has that ability or fits that linguistic description. Rather, the actions and attitudes of people with diverse linguistic skills are "simplified" and "rationalized" as characteristic of a specific "type" of speaker.¹⁰ To emphasize the linguistic diversity within these "types," I use "monolingual Spanish speakers" and "monolingual-minded Spanish speakers" interchangeably to refer to the category of individuals in the BAC who show a strong preference for Spanish over Euskara and who may identify more readily as Spanish than as Basque.

In this article, I examine the conflict between the underlying language ideologies of the Basque government (prior to the 2009 elections) and monolingual Spanish speakers in the BAC. The most fundamental difference between these two groups is that the government promotes the idea that individual bilingualism is a component of contempo-

rary *vasco*, or Basque, culture, while monolingual Spanish speakers adhere to the idea that the BAC is unique in that citizens have the right to choose between two languages.

Before further exploring these contemporary conceptions of Basque identity, however, it is wise to examine the tradition of relating Basque language to Basque identity out of which the government's position, at least, has emerged. The most traditional definition of Basque identity holds that in order to be Basque, one must speak Basque. The only way to say "Basque person" in Euskara is "*euskaldun*," a word that also translates as "Basque speaker," or, literally, "one who has (possesses) the Basque language." Linguistically, it is language that grants one full membership in Basque culture. Mark Kurlansky, the author of the popular history *The Basque History of the World*, illustrates this perspective with the following quotation from Juan San Martín, an early member of the Basque Academy of Language: "Someone with a Basque name from the Basque Country who does not speak Basque is a Basque, but he is not an Euskaldun. And in Basque culture, being Basque is not significant. It can't even be said."¹¹ In this view, where being Basque is not significant, speaking Basque is paramount. There are a variety of alternative definitions of Basque identity available today based on family lineage, citizenship, and political ideology, among other factors, but the connection between language and cultural identity remains salient.

I now further examine the differences between the language ideologies of the Basque government and monolingual-minded Spanish speakers. On April 29, 2008, the office of the Basque sub-ministry of Language Policy published a report entitled "Foundations for Language Policy at the Beginning of the 21st century: Euskara, a living language for every day and all purposes in the 21st century."¹² In this report, the Basque government's understanding of Basque identity and its relationship with Euskara is outlined as follows:

The future of Euskara is not just Basque-lovers' [*euskaltzales*] business—much less nationalists'. As it is the patrimony of all Basques [*vascos*], everyone, including those who do not feel they are Basque-lovers, should consider it their job to encourage the Basque language to grow in the heart of our society and each individual, increasing its use and overcoming monolingualism.¹³

According to this statement, everyone who lives in the BAC is a *vasco*—regardless of whether or not he feels like one—and a necessary component of enacting one's Basque identity is "overcoming monolingualism" (i.e. increasing individual bilingualism). The statement acknowledges that there may be other conceptions of who is a Basque (the *euskaltzales* and the nationalists) and alludes to the fact that there may be people living in the BAC who do not believe

bilingualism is essential to their identity, but this statement frames these as unpatriotic understandings of Basque identity—by not speaking Basque these individuals are not doing their "job" to help "society."

The monolingual Spanish speakers I analyze here represent the organization *Libertad de Elección Lingüística*, "Freedom of Linguistic Choice." The name of this group summarizes well its take on Basque identity—not all Basques need to be bilingual, but having the opportunity to choose between languages is part of what makes the BAC different from other communities, so the linguistic choices of all Basques need to be respected. This group's understanding of Basque society is included on their website as follows: "Basque society is a plural society, and the citizens that comprise it represent a diverse linguistic reality in which one may find distinct sociolinguistic circles."¹⁴ This conceptualization of Basque society implies that the region's different sociolinguistic groups should be viewed as such and contrasts with the description of Basque society given by the government which implies that what is good for one *vasco* (i.e. individual bilingualism) is good for all *vascos*.

A History of *Euskara*, the Basque Language

In this section I sketch a brief history of the Basque language from prehistoric times to 1978. I spend the most time exploring the 20th century, as the events of this century played an important role in the development of



Map of the Basque Provinces in both Spain and France.

Credit: Image courtesy of www.kondaira.net

current political tensions and ideologies of language.

The Basque Country, a country, Kurlansky remarks, that "appears on no maps but its own,"¹⁵ is an area of roughly eight thousand square miles spread across the western third of the Spanish-French border surrounding the Bay of Biscay, with the majority of the territory falling on the

Spanish side. This paper is concerned with the area known today as *Euskadi* or the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC), which is located in what is today recognized as Spain.

There are approximately three million people currently living in the Basque region, with about two million located in the BAC.¹⁶ According to the 2006 sociolinguistic survey administered by the Basque Government, 30.1% of all people aged sixteen and older in the BAC claim to “speak Basque well,” 51.5% claim not to speak or understand Euskara at all, and 18.3% claim to have some ability to understand but not speak the language.¹⁷ However, due to the geographic, cultural, and historical differences between the provinces of the BAC discussed above, these percentages are not consistent throughout the community.

Linguistic (as well as physical) evidence points to the ancient origins of the Basques. Euskara is a linguistic isolate—it has never been proven to be related to any known language or language family—which suggests that the language was well established by the time of the Indo-European invasion. Although exposed to Latin and later Spanish and French by their neighbors, the Basques experienced relative linguistic and cultural independence through the 17th century as a result of the development and maintenance of a limited contractual relationship with early Spanish monarchs.¹⁸

After the French Revolution, French and Spanish nation-building efforts led to some of the first attempts to limit the use of Euskara and impose new “national” languages in educational and institutional settings. While these initial attempts had little real effect, one hundred years later, the Spanish Basque Country was heavily industrializing, and Spanish and Spanish-Basque bilingualism were becoming widespread, at least within the booming urban zones.¹⁹ This linguistic change occurred as non-Basques moved to the region for work and ideas of liberal reform became popular.

It was in this period that Basque nationalist sentiment first began to be self-consciously formulated and expressed. In the midst of the cultural diversity which characterized industrial Bilbao in the 19th century, Sabino Arana, the son of a wealthy Bilbao industrialist and the founder of Basque nationalism, felt the need for a return to the traditional Basque way of life.²⁰ He feared that if an effort was not made to protect and preserve the Basque culture it would be lost forever.

Arana emphasized lineage as the determining factor of Basque identity, but he assumed the same one nation-one language ideology championed by both Spain and France and was passionate about the importance of Euskara to the Basque nationalist movement.²¹ He was not a native Basque speaker, but he taught himself the language and

tried to purify it himself, inventing new words to replace Spanish loan words and changing the spelling of words to reflect less Spanish influence.²² As a result, the formal study of Basque became more common and the first serious interest in producing written Basque emerged.²³

Such explicit support for the Basque language came to an abrupt end with the onset of the Spanish Civil War in 1937. The war inflicted much hardship upon the Basque region and the Basque population and concluded, in 1939, with the rise to national power of fascist dictator Francisco Franco and the exile of the leadership of the Basque Nationalist Party (founded by Sabino Arana). The outcome of this war, along with the events following the death of Franco in 1975, represent two of the most important moments in 20th century Spanish history in general and in the development of contemporary Basque culture, politics, and ideologies of language in particular.

Franco dreamed of a politically, culturally, religiously, and linguistically unified Spain. In addition to putting an end to the public practice of traditions unique to the Basque region and other culturally-distinct regions of Spain, he banned public use of the Basque language and instituted Spanish-only educational policies, forcing the newly formed Basque language schools to disband.²⁴ This dramatic change in language policy was a huge shock to the existing cultural system. Franco remained in power until his death in 1975, and, though his policies on cultural and linguistic expression had relaxed somewhat by the time he died, the effect of his early language planning was immense. The resentment and anger of many Basques in the 1940s and 50s led to the formation of several underground student groups who met to study Euskara and Basque culture. Within fifteen years, these groups had transformed into the militant nationalist Basque terrorist group, ETA.²⁵

Throughout Franco’s regime, Basque was relegated to the domestic and remote rural spheres, and fewer parents chose to speak Basque with their children—some perhaps because they were afraid, some because they felt it served no purpose, and some because they bought into fascist propaganda which promoted the image of Euskara as a “primitive” language characteristic of uncultured, illiterate, and outdated Basque farm laborers.²⁶ It is commonly accepted that by Franco’s death in 1975 there were no remaining monolingual Basque speakers in Spain.

In 1978, after a difficult period of transition in which the pent up emotions of Spaniards all across the country were unleashed, Spain ratified a new, democratic constitution. It was at this time that the current boundaries of the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) were drawn. The BAC was identified in the Spanish constitution as a bilingual community in recognition of the historic importance and contemporary use of Euskara in the region.²⁷ This change

represented a dramatic reversal of Franco's language policies and was the second major shock of the 20th century to the Basque population and their experience with language.

Legal Framework and Educational Structure

In this section I explore the legal obligations and constraints which impact the development of language policy in the BAC and the structure of the educational system established by this legal structure.

Language planning efforts in the BAC primarily exist as a result of, and are shaped by, a complex scaffolding of laws established by both the Spanish national and local Basque governments in the years immediately following Franco's death. According to the 1978 Spanish constitution, all citizens of Spain have "the duty to know [Spanish] and the right to use it,"²⁸ and within the "bilingual communities" official second languages are considered co-official and subject to each community's particular statute of autonomy.²⁹ The BAC's statute of autonomy asserts that all citizens of the community have "the right to know and use both official languages."³⁰ Moreover, article six of the state statute holds that the government shall "guarantee [...] the use of both languages" and "regulate the necessary means to assure the knowledge of them."³¹

In order to fulfill the obligations outlined in the statute, the first elected government of the BAC created the position of the Assistant Minister of Language Policy under the umbrella of the Ministry of Culture and subsequently enacted a series of laws to promote the use of Euskara in various settings. The first among these measures was the 1982 Law of Normalization of the Basque Language. This law defines Euskara as the "patrimonio," or special heritage, of the Basque people and attempts to ensure its use in public offices, education, the media, and the social environment.³²

Since this law was passed, education has been one of the primary foci of Basque language planning efforts. Chapter Two of the Law of Normalization states that the government will work towards "the general progression of bilingualism in the educational system" and "guarantee all students the possibility...of possessing a practical knowledge of both official languages by the time they complete their studies."³³ The practical implications of these laws were further outlined in 1983 by the Basque Autonomous Government and the Department of Education.³⁴

In the following paragraphs I outline the educational system as it was laid out in the 1980s and the subsequent changes made to it in 2007. Growing out of the government's vision of vasco identity as linked with individual Spanish/Euskara bilingualism, the goal of Basque linguistic education is to develop equal competency in both Span-

ish and Basque in all students. The educational system in the BAC consists of three linguistic models of instruction. Model A uses Spanish as the language of communication in the classroom, and Euskara is taken as a mandatory subject; model B is bilingual: Euskara and Spanish are used more or less equally in the classroom; and model D (the letter "C" does not exist in the Basque alphabet) uses Euskara as the primary language with Spanish as a required subject. Education is available in all three models from preschool through the end of compulsory education at age 16, and it is not uncommon for more than one Model to be offered at the same school site.³⁵ For example, a school might have both model B and model D classes for each grade level. Basque education expert Nick Gardner notes that the number of post-compulsory classes and degrees available in Euskara continues to rise as students continue to "pressure for further expansion of Basque medium teaching."³⁶

However, Maitena Etxebarria notes that in the mid 2000s, assessments made by the Basque government showed that students educated in models A and B were failing to achieve the targeted level of proficiency in Euskara (B2 in the European language leveling system) by the time they reached the end of their compulsory studies. She adds, though, that "the available evidence indicates that the student population leaves Primary and Secondary education knowing how to speak, read, and write in Spanish at the same level as their peers from other parts of the country."³⁷ Because, in part, of the government's belief in the connection between modern vasco identity and individual bilingualism, and also in part because of their legal obligation to "regulate the necessary means to assure the knowledge of [both languages]"³⁸ the government decided that the educational system needed to change to better facilitate the acquisition of Euskara.

In 2007, a law was passed to adjust the educational system in hopes of attaining this goal. This law, decree number 175/2007 of the 16th of October, describes all aspects of the now current school system³⁹. Article 13 of the decree, "Bilingualism and Multilingualism," specifies that "in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives [sufficient fluency in both official languages]...Euskara will be the primary language of instruction in the academic environment."^{40, 41} This represented a radical departure from the idea set forth in the Law of Linguistic Normalization (1982) that everyone who lives in the Basque Country has "as much right to receive an education in Euskara as in Spanish," although 175/2007.13.2 allows for some flexibility in this regard as it states that schools should adapt the guidelines presented in the decree to fit each school's linguistic needs.⁴² From the government's perspective, a more Euskara-intensive curriculum was needed to reach the goal of linguistic normalization previously established by the government of the BAC.

Ideologies of Language in the Education Debate (2007-Present)

Decree 175/2007 may have come about as a response to complaints raised against the previously existing system, but it did not put an end to the debate about language in the Basque educational system. In this section I compare monolingual Basques' responses to this law to the government's perspective, drawing attention to how these differences can be seen as originating in their differing language ideologies. Many monolingual-minded Spanish speakers who do not see Euskara as vital to their Basque identity resisted, and continue to resist, the changes brought about as a result of 175/2007.

The new law did not do away with the three model educational system completely, but one of its effects has been the gradual replacement of many model A (intensive Spanish) programs with model B (bilingual) programs.⁴³ There are many individuals who believe removing the option for model A education and declaring Euskara "the primary language of instruction" violates their basic linguistic rights as parents and as citizens of the BAC. The following conversation, an excerpt from the comments section of a blog post titled "Official Languages and Bilingual Communities," encapsulates many of the tensions currently at play in the debate over the education system in the BAC.⁴⁴

CARLOS: Is it so difficult to educate your child in your native (and official) language [i.e. Spanish]? It is here (in the Basque Country.)

UNAI: Would you also support parents who try to educate their children in Euskara in Navarre but the local government doesn't permit them?

[Unrelated comments]

VELEIA: ...And I ask: Does the sociolinguistic reality have anything to do with language planning? Do children not have a right to be educated in the reality of their cultural surroundings? Read, dear Unai, something by one of the social educationalists like Durkeim, or the very Chomsky that is so loved by the nationalists

UNAI: So, Veleia, what are you defending? The freedom to educate you child in the language you choose, or the freedom to educate your child in Spanish?

Libertad de Elección Lingüística (Freedom of Linguistic Choice) is one of the most vocal and well-organized groups of parents involved in this debate, and the group's frustrations are similar to those articulated by Carlos and Veleia in the blog conversation above. From this group's perspective, the Basque government is violating their rights as parents to choose the language in which their children will be educated and their right as Basque citizens to freely use either

of the region's two official languages. On the organization's website,⁴⁵ the main argument put forth in support of ensuring parents' right to linguistic choice is that students should be able to attend school in their mother tongue because students perform better in school when the language of instruction is their native language.⁴⁶ To give credibility to their argument, the website references UNESCO's long-standing support of native language education. (According to the website of UNESCO's education division,⁴⁷ "UNESCO was the first UN agency to stipulate, in 1954, the importance of mother tongue education." However, this quotation goes on to say that it was also the first UN agency "to advocate for more bi/multilingual language education.") Mainstream political parties in Spain support groups like *Libertad de Elección*. The *Partido Popular*, the "People's Party" (PP), has made guaranteeing education in Spanish a very high priority on its national agenda. PP is the main conservative party in Spanish national politics; many of its leaders have Francoist pasts, and the Spanish language remains deeply connected with this party's understanding of Spanish identity. On the national level, they also speak to the parallel debates in Catalonia and Galicia, which have similarly structured educational systems and debates about language.⁴⁸ In the BAC, the local PP (a small percentage of the electorate), actively lobbies for the Basque government to change the structure of the educational system back to the three model system, evidenced by the multitude of headlines similar to "The Basque PP requests 'a greater push' for the freedom of choice of model"; "The PP opens another linguistic war in the Basque Country"; and "Freedom of choice platform obtains the support of the PP."⁴⁹

Recently, PSOE, *Partido Socialista Obrero Espanola* (the Spanish socialist workers' party), has also pledged its support for guaranteeing the availability of education in Spanish to all citizens.⁵⁰ For these politicians, both PP and PSOE, the key issue at stake is protecting parents' right to have their child receive an education in Spanish, which all citizens have a constitutional obligation to know, not defending the need for children to be educated in their native language. From this perspective, Spanish identity—at least in the perspective of the national political parties—unquestionably assumes precedence over any form of Basque identity.

In 2007, the Basque government boldly declared Euskara the primary language of education in the BAC. This decision was founded on the government's underlying language ideology that Basque identity is related to Basque/Spanish bilingualism. However, this decision came into immediate conflict with the Spanish monolingual language ideology that Basque identity is related to linguistic choice. The upheaval this decision created within the Spanish monolingual community has set many members of this community

more in opposition to learning Euskara than ever.


Convivencia in Crisis

Convivencia (coexistence) is one of the primary goals of the Basque government's language policy, and many other groups in the BAC also claim to be striving for this goal.⁵¹ Yet, the government and these groups do not always understand *convivencia* in the same way. In this section, I will show that the differences in language ideology which led to the debate over the education system in the BAC also give rise to conflicting definitions of the term "convivencia." As *convivencia* is seen as a major goal of language planning efforts, such distinct ideas about the nature of *convivencia* lead to different conceptualizations of the entirety of the Basque language revitalization project. In this way, language ideologies can be seen as underlying both specific conflicts such as the education debate and general debates over language policy in the BAC.

Both *Libertad de Elección Lingüística* (and groups like them) and the Basque government agree that the BAC is and should be a bilingual community and that increased respect for the region's languages would make life in the Basque Country better. In this sense, these groups do agree on what *convivencia* means. But, their ideas of how to achieve this effect differ greatly. For this reason, I argue that the groups envision distinct versions of *convivencia*.

In keeping with its belief that *vascos* are bilingual individuals, the Basque government promotes an idea of *convivencia* that is essentially synonymous with individual bilingualism. The "Foundations of Language Policy" report discussed above states that "the only protagonists of this *convivencia* are those who, above all, can stimulate the use of Euskera: the citizens."⁵² In other words, in order to effectively work towards *convivencia*, one must be able to "stimulate the use of Euskera"; in order to effectively stimulate the use of Euskara, one must speak Euskara; and, as there are not currently any monolingual Basque speakers, in order to speak Euskara, one must be bilingual. Increasing bilingualism in the region may not make everyone in the BAC "get along," but it could, for example, decrease the stress and frustration associated with speaking Euskara by allowing speakers to speak without fear that they will not be understood.

The link between individual bilingualism and *convivencia* was highlighted by the Basque government's 2006 campaign to promote the use of Euskara. "*Ukan*, the virus of *convivencia*," was the central symbol and metaphor of this campaign.⁵³ A virus may seem like an odd choice of a campaign mascot, but the metaphor for language spread is surprisingly apt. Like a virus which leaves one host and is able to infect several others, the effect of a few people speaking more Euskara each day could be exponential,



"Ukan, the Virus of Convivencia"
Credit: Image courtesy of the
Basque government

especially because, according to the 4th sociolinguistic survey, one of the main reasons people who currently know Euskara choose not to use it is their lack of a "social network" of other Basque speakers with whom to speak.⁵⁴ It is important to note, though, that "Ukan" is not framed primarily as a virus that spreads knowledge and encourages the use of Euskara—it is framed as a virus which spreads "convivencia." According to the designers of the campaign:

Ukan is a virus, yes, but a healthy virus. A virus that heals...Ukan instills in the citizen the *desire* to *coexist* in a fruitful manner. In essence, those who contract the virus *move away from monolingualism and towards bilingualism* (in other words, towards Euskara): they decide to improve their knowledge of Euskara and encourage knowledge of Euskara among their descendants (emphasis mine).⁵⁵

According to this description, one's "desire to coexist in a fruitful manner" with Basque society is demonstrated most clearly by learning and using Euskara; this shows the way in which the Basque government neatly collapses the ideas of *convivencia* and individual bilingualism when setting goals for the BAC. In addition, this quotation emphasizes intergenerational language transfer rather than "encourag[ing] knowledge of Euskara among" peers. This reveals that the government conceives of *convivencia* as something which it may take more than one generation to attain.

Unlike the Basque government, monolingual-minded Spanish speakers, represented again by the members of *Libertad de Elección Lingüística*, do not view individual bilingualism and peaceful societal coexistence as necessarily linked. For these individuals, linguistic coexistence does not have to mean anything more than Spanish speakers and Euskara speakers residing in the same community and respecting each other's linguistic choices in the present.

The word "convivencia" appears four times in *Libertad de Elección Lingüística*'s decalogue of founding principles and goals listed on their website.⁵⁶ According to this site, "coexistence, real and stable, based on the respect of the

two official languages”⁵⁷ is one of the primary goals of the organization. The fifth article in the decalogue, which also focuses on *convivencia*, underscores the difference between the government’s view of individual bilingualism and Spanish monolinguals’ view of linguistic choice as linked to Basque identity. This article states that *Libertad de Elección Lingüística* hopes to obtain “respect for all those who are only interested in having knowledge of Euskara that is sufficient for affable coexistence with neighbors [*los de más*, lit. ‘everybody else’] and enjoying the cultural events dedicated to the language.”⁵⁸ This statement hints that the members of *Libertad de Elección* have little to no interest in seeing themselves as fully functional bilinguals. In addition, the statement draws a strong line between those Basques interested in only minimal Euskara and “everybody else.” From this perspective, the “solution” to the tensions in the BAC is not forcing everyone to become bilingual, but rather providing equal opportunities in both languages so that each individual may use whichever language he prefers (e.g., ensuring the availability of intensive Spanish education in the BAC). The time frame for this solution is immediate, unlike the solution proposed by the government. The monolingual-minded interpretation of *convivencia* challenges the idea proposed by the Basque government that bilingualism is relevant to contemporary *vasco* identity. Members of *Libertad de Elección Lingüística* may be monolingual Spanish speakers, but they choose to remain in the BAC. If they felt that Spanish/Euskara bilingualism were central to their children’s identity as *vascos* or a vital aspect of the local culture, it would not make sense for them to reject so forcefully the structure of the current educational system. While some may claim that having a geographical location and one language (Spanish) in common should be enough to inspire *convivencia* in the BAC, there is no real evidence that would prove this claim. With the current distribution of languages, many Basque speakers today feel they do not have the freedom to use Euskara when they choose but instead must speak Spanish in order to communicate with their monolingual peers.⁵⁹

Conclusion

With the ratification of the 1978 Spanish constitution and the 1979 Basque statute of autonomy, Euskara gained a new legal status as an official language in Spain, and all citizens of the BAC were granted the explicit “right” to know and use Euskara as much as Spanish. However, because this right was conferred after 40 years of Spanish monolingual language policy, few individuals were in a position to take advantage of this right.⁶⁰ According to the Basque government, the knowledge and use of Euskara needed to be planned, protected, and promoted if the language was to survive. Deciding how best to balance Euskara and

Spanish has been a source of great debate within the BAC in the 30 years since this right was first conferred, and the recent debate over the structure of the educational system is but one manifestation of this larger, ongoing problem of understanding and negotiating the relationship between Basque language and culture and Spanish language and culture within the BAC.

There are many language ideologies and cultural perspectives currently enmeshed in the Basque language debate. This article has examined two of them, the government’s position and the position of monolingual-minded Spanish speakers; however, a more complete consideration of the “social problem” of language planning in the BAC must also include an examination of native Basque speakers’, new Basque speakers’, radical Basques’, and non-Basque Spaniards’ ideologies of language and language practices. It is likely that this would be a productive investigation, as even a cursory glance at these positions reveals direct conflicts among them. For example, in 2007 the Basque government launched a campaign to encourage Basques to speak even just “a little bit” of Euskara.⁶¹ However, Jacqueline Urla, a prominent scholar of radical Basque cultural practices and ideologies of language, notes that to some radical Basques, “sprinkling in” words and phrases in Basque “is really no better than no Basque at all [and,] in fact, it might be worse.”⁶²

When considering the language ideologies at play in the BAC and what they might reveal about situations of cultural and linguistic difference in general, the difference between an Indo-European language and a pre-Indo-European language cannot be overestimated. If theories such as Whorf’s linguistic relativity hypothesis⁶³ or later incarnations of this idea such as Slobin’s thinking-for-speaking⁶⁴ are even partially valid (as studies of indigenous languages in North America, South America, and Africa have suggested⁶⁵), there is reason to suspect that Euskara and Spanish, which represent the epitome of Whorf’s Indigenous—Standard Average European linguistic binary, highlight different features of everyday experience.

Moreover, Roslyn Frank’s work in cognitive linguistics suggests that root metaphors in Euskara and Spanish may embed different ontological perspectives within the structure of these languages.⁶⁶ Frank’s research shows that new Basque speakers often prefer non-traditional syntactical structures of Euskara and incorrectly interpret traditional syntax from a more Western, Ego-centric frame than do their native Basque speaker peers.⁶⁷ Despite this, Kurlansky writes that the image of Basques as more “indigenous” to the Iberian Peninsula than Spaniards has been actively repressed for centuries by the Spanish government because this would have posed a challenge to the Spanish interpretation of “history as the struggle of their people, the right-

ful indigenous occupants, to defend their land against the Moors, invaders from another place.”⁶⁸

In light of these ideas, I offer the suggestion that it is possible that the incompletely examined indigenous-colonizer relationship in the Basque Country is exacerbated by the continual contact between the region’s languages and may be contributing to the continuation of debates over language planning in the BAC. This is a perhaps a large claim to make, but its validity is for future research to determine. I suggest that future in-depth ethnographic studies, along with continued linguistic analysis in the tradition of Frank, investigate how ideologies and practices of language and politics in the BAC relate to larger questions about the relationship between indigenous and standard average European cultures and languages in complex multicultural societies around the world.

It is difficult to say what the future will bring in terms of language planning in the BAC. As in the 2008 election in Missouri, language ideologies played an important role in the most recent elections in the BAC. However, whereas the outcome of the “official English” ballot measure in Missouri essentially converted a *de facto* language situation (government meetings taking place in English) into one that is *de jure*, the outcome of the 2009 Basque elections brought an enormous change to Basque politics. Just over one year ago, on March 1, 2009, an unprecedented event occurred—Patxi Lopez, a socialist, was elected president of the BAC, breaking the thirty-year history of Basque Nationalist leadership in the region.⁶⁹ Lopez’s election was possible because, among other reasons, an agreement was struck between the PSOE (Lopez’s party) and the PP (the main conservative party in Spain) over two key issues: language policy and anti-terrorist policy.⁷⁰ Language policy has been a frequent topic in the news since the PSOE-PP took power (including recent discussions of the repeal of decree 175/2007⁷¹), but it remains to be seen if Lopez and his administration will have a lasting impact on the region.

As I demonstrate in this article, the language planning debate in the Basque Autonomous Community is an excellent example of what Woolard and Schieffelin describe as “social problems [that] hinge on language ideology.” In order to address such problems, they say, groups must “come to grips with the nature and working of language ideology.”⁷² The prolonged nature of the debates over language in the BAC suggests that this awareness of language ideologies and their influence on politics is not yet widespread within the region.

The Basque government (pre and post 2009) and monolingual-minded Spanish speakers alike share a vision of the BAC as a multilingual community characterized by mutual respect for the languages and linguistic choices

of all its members. However, as the events of the past 30 years, and especially the past three years, show, language policy has not been an effective method of bringing about the feeling of *convivencia*. This lack of success has been due, in large part, to differences in the deep underlying beliefs about the nature of Euskara and its relationship to Basque identity which affect the thinking and decision making of both the Basque government and monolingual-minded Spanish speakers.

Similar evidence for the presence of strong language ideologies can be seen in many places around the world today, as minority language revitalization and maintenance movements, as well as movements to protect the status of currently dominant languages, increase in popularity and strength. Language ideologies tell us most explicitly about the connections individuals see between language and society, but the passion with which these ideas are defended reveals their deeply personal nature. Language is a part of how we define ourselves and our relationships to others, and as these relationships become increasingly complex, for many, the drive to clarify them intensifies. As such, the ongoing debates over the English Only movement in the United States and the Basque revitalization project in the BAC in Spain highlight the importance of developing an awareness of the presence and effects of language ideologies in developing an understanding of situations of languages in contact in cultures around the globe today.

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- 1 “2008 Ballot Measures,” *Missouri Secretary of State*, <http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2008ballot/>.
 - 2 “Election Night Reporting,” *Missouri Secretary of State*, <http://www.sos.mo.gov/enrweb/allresults.asp?arc=1&eid=256>.
 - 3 Ibid.
 - 4 Judith Irvine and Susan Gal, “Language Ideology and Linguistic Differentiation,” in *Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Politics, and Identities*, edited by Paul Kroskrity (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2000), 35; Kathryn Woolard and Bambi Schieffelin, “Language Ideology,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23 (1994): 55.
 - 5 See, for example, Roger Brown and Albert Gilman, “The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity,” in *Language and Social Context*, edited by Pier Paolo Giglioli (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1972 [1960]): 252-282; Alessandro Duranti, “Politics and Grammar: Agency in Samoan Political Discourse,” *American Ethnologist* 17, no. 4 (1990): 646-666; Kathryn Woolard, “Language Variation and Cultural Hegemony,” *American Ethnologist* 12 (1985).
 - 6 For examples, see authors in Paul Kroskrity, ed., *Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Politics, and Identities* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 2000); and bibliography of Woolard and Schieffelin, “Language Ideology,” 73-82.
 - 7 Woolard and Schieffelin, “Language Ideology,” 72.
 - 8 Ibid.
 - 9 Irvine and Gal, “Language Ideology and Linguistic Differ-

- entiation,” 35-36.
- 10 Ibid.
 - 11 Mark Kurlansky, *The Basque History of the World*. (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 314.
 - 12 BAC Ministry of Culture, Subministry of Language Policy, “Bases Para la Política Lingüística de Principios del Siglo XXI: El Euskera, una lengua viva, cotidiana y polivalente del siglo XXI,” report, 29 April 2008, <http://blog.euskara21.euskadi.net/uploads/file/PonenciaBase.pdf>, (accessed 20 March 2010). Title translation mine. “Euskera” with a second “e” rather than an “a” is the Spanish spelling of the language; in my paper I use the Basque spelling, “Euskara.”
 - 13 Ibid., 57. “*El futuro del euskera no es únicamente asunto de los euskaltzales—y mucho menos de los nacionalistas. Puesto que es patrimonio de todos los vascos, todos, incluso quienes no se sientan euskaltzales, deberíamos considerar tarea propia la de dar aliento al euskera en el seno la sociedad y en el terreno individual, incrementando su uso y superando el monolingüismo.*” Translation mine.
 - 14 Libertad de Elección: Plataforma por la libertad de elección lingüística, <http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/argumentos.php> (accessed 20 March 2010). “la sociedad vasca es una sociedad plural, y los ciudadanos que la conformamos representamos una realidad lingüística diversa, en la que se pueden encontrar distintas realidades sociolingüísticas.” Translation mine.
 - 15 Kurlansky, *The Basque History of the World*, 19.
 - 16 BAC, Departamento de Cultura, *IV Encuesta Sociolingüística 2006 (CAV)*, June 2008. [http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/libro/iv_inkesta_soziol/es_ink/adjuntos/IV_inkesta_es%20\(15-70\).pdf](http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/libro/iv_inkesta_soziol/es_ink/adjuntos/IV_inkesta_es%20(15-70).pdf) (accessed March 20, 2010).
 - 17 Ibid., 19.
 - 18 Cameron Watson, *Modern Basque History: Eighteenth Century to the Present*, (Reno: University of Nevada, Reno, 2003), 35.
 - 19 “...had no real effect” Ibid., 91, 102 ; “one hundred years later...” Ibid., 126.
 - 20 Kurlansky, Ibid, 165.
 - 21 Kurlansky, Ibid, 170, 165.
 - 22 Kurlansky, *The Basque History of the World*, 165. Woolard and Shieffelin remind us that “[o]rthographic systems cannot be conceptualized simply as reducing speech to writing but rather they are symbols that carry historical cultural and political meanings” (1994:65). Urla notes the practice of “using Basque spelling convention in Castilian words (e.g., *k* for *c*, or *tx* for *ch*) in *barrikada*, or *la matxa*, functions as a badge of oppositionality” (2001:175) in radical Basque youth culture today.
 - 23 Watson, *Modern Basque History*, 201.
 - 24 Ibid., 302, 307.
 - 25 Ibid., 320-335.
 - 26 Ibid., 334.
 - 27 Constitución Española (1978), <http://www.boe.es/boe/consultas/enlaces/documentos/ConstitucionCASTELLANO.pdf>, preamble and art. 3.2
 - 28 Ibid., art. 3.1
 - 29 Ibid., art. 3.2
 - 30 Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco (1979), http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/pdfdocs/c_estatuto.pdf, art. 6.1.
 - 31 Ibid., art. 6.2.
 - 32 *Ley Básica De Normalización Del Uso Del Euskera*, 10/1982, (24 November 1982), http://www.parlamento.euskadi.net/pdfdocs/leyes/ley19820010_f_cas.html, preamble.
 - 33 Ibid., art. 2.2.
 - 34 Decreto 138/1983, del Departamento de Educación y Cultura, por el que se regula el uso de las lenguas oficiales en la enseñanza no universitaria en el País Vasco, (11 July 1983).
 - 35 Nick Gardner, “Education and Lesser Used Languages: Basque,” *Regional Dossier Series*, (Leeuwarden, The Netherlands: Mercator-Education: European Network for Regional or Minority Languages and Education, 2000), 6.
 - 36 Ibid., 18.
 - 37 Maitena Etxebarria, “Normalización del Euskera y educación bilingüe,” *Estudios de Lingüística*, 15 (2001), 50-51. “la evidencia disponible indica que la población escolar egresa de la Educación Primaria y Secundaria sabiendo hablar, leer, y escribir en castellano con un nivel similar al de otras partes del Estado.” Translation mine.
 - 38 Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco (1979), art. 6.2.
 - 39 Decreto 175/2007, del Departamento de educación, universidades e investigación, por el que se establece el currículo de la Educación Básica y se implanta en la Comunidad Autónoma del País Vasco. (16 October 2007).
 - 40 Ibid., art. 13.2
 - 41 Ibid., “Para el logro de los objetivos senalados en el apartado anterior...el euskara sera la principal lengua vehicular en el ambito escolar,” Translation mine.
 - 42 Ibid.
 - 43 (####) gradual removal of A.
 - 44 The original blog post was written by the independent blogger “Un Padre,” “One Father,” in March of 2008, and the name of his blog is “Libertad de Elección,” “Freedom of Choice” (http://libertaddeeleccion.blogspot.com/2008_05_01_archive.html). All comments originally in Spanish, translation my own.
 - 45 Libertad de Elección, <http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/index.php> (accessed 20 March 2010).
 - 46 Libertad de Elección, <http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/argumentos.php> (accessed 20 March 2010).
 - 47 UNESCO—Primary Education, http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.php-URL_ID=30871&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed 20 March 2010).
 - 48 EDUCATION IN GALICIA/CATALONIA/PP ENTRE
 - 49 NEWSPAPER ARTICLES PP SUPPORT
 - 50 PSOE SUPPORT
 - 51 STRIVING FOR CONVIVENCIA
 - 52 BAC Ministry of Culture, “Bases Para la Política Lingüística,” 32. “*los unicos protagonistas de dicha convivencia son quienes sobre todo pueden impulsar el uso del euskera: los ciudadanos, precisamente.*” translation mine.
 - 53 Subministry of Language Policy, “Ukan,” style guide, http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/informacion/ukan_estiloa/es_ukan/adjuntos/ukanestiloa_es.pdf

- (accessed 20 March 2010).
- 54 BAC, Departamento de Cultura, *IV Encuesta Sociolingüística 2006 (CAV)*, June 2008. [http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/libro/iv_inkesta_soziol/es_ink/adjuntos/IV_inceusta_es%20\(15-70\).pdf](http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/libro/iv_inkesta_soziol/es_ink/adjuntos/IV_inceusta_es%20(15-70).pdf) (accessed March 20, 2010). 53.
- 55 Subministry of Language Policy, "Ukan," style guide, http://www.euskara.euskadi.net/r59-738/es/contenidos/informacion/ukan_estiloa/es_ukan/adjuntos/ukanestiloa_es.pdf (accessed 20 March 2010).
- 56 Libertad de Elección, http://www.libertaddeeleccion.org/decalogo_libertad_eleccion.php#adherirse (accessed 20 March 2010).
- 57 Ibid., "La...aceptación de una convivencia real y estable basada en el respeto hacia las dos lenguas oficiales." Translation mine.
- 58 Ibid., "Respetar a todos aquellos que únicamente deseen conocer la lengua autonómica lo suficiente para convivir afablemente con los demás y disfrutar de las manifestaciones culturales de ella" (Translation my own).
- 59 (####) feel must speak Spanish.
- 60 Benjamin Tejerrina, "Los procesos de cambio lingüístico y sus agentes. Un balance de la política lingüística de promoción del euskera en la Comunidad Autónoma Vasca," in *Las lenguas de España: Política lingüística, sociología del lenguaje e ideología desde la Transición hasta la actualidad*, ed. M. Lluich (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2006), 115.
- 61 Garcia, Arturo, "Un extraño virus beneficioso," *Diario Vasco*, 11 November 2006, http://www.diariovasco.com/prensa/20061111/aldia/extrano-virus-beneficioso_20061111.html (accessed 20 March 2010).
- 62 Jacqueline Urla, "Outlaw Language: Creating Alternative Public Spheres in Basque Radio," *Pragmatics* 5, no.2 (1995): 256.
- 63 Benjamin Whorf, *Language, Thought, and Reality*, ed. J. Carroll (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956).
- 64 Dan Slobin, "Language and Thought Online: Cognitive Consequences of Linguistic Relativity," in *Language in Mind*, eds. Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 257-192.
- 65 Whorf proof.
- 66 Roslyn M. Frank, "Shifting Identities: The Metaphorics of Nature-Culture Dualism in Western and Basque Models of Self," *Metaphorik.de*. (April 2003), <http://www.metaphorik.de/04/frank.pdf> (accessed 20 March 2010).
- 67 Ibid., 81.
- 68 Kurlansky, *The Basque History of the World*, 25.
- 69 patxi
- 70 acuerdo
- 71 Repeal?
- 72 Woolard and Schieffelin, "Language Ideology," 72.
- lingüística de principios del siglo XXI. Jan. 2009, www.euskadi.net/euskara21, (accessed 22 May 2009).
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The Battle in the Soul: Demons, the Logos and the Purpose of Justin Martyr's Apologies

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***Abstract:** Scholars have long recognized the important role that demons play within the Apologies of Justin Martyr but frequently limit their studies to an exclusive examination of his demonology. In contrast, this paper situates Justin's demonology as one side in a dichotomized cosmology. Justin's Apologies, I argue, reveal a dualistic worldview where the Christian Logos, representing rationality, struggles against demons, symbolizing irrationality. When understood within Platonic psychological discourse, this cosmological battle, I propose, is used as an allegory for the battle within the soul between reason and irrationality. With such an allegorical reading in mind, I argue that Justin's Apologies may have been intended for a role in addition to apologetic. More specifically, Justin aimed to use the Apologies as a pedagogical text to instruct his audience in the ways of Platonic rationalized psychology, the dominant mode of philosophical instruction of the time.*

In the sixth chapter of his 2 *Apology*, Justin Martyr, the second century Christian philosopher and teacher, provides two purposes for Jesus' incarnation. First, the Apologist claims Jesus was "made man" for the sake of "believing men and women."¹

Secondly, and more relevant for our purposes, Justin says that Christ was "conceived according to the will of God the Father" so that he could bring about the "destruction of demons."² Likewise, in 1 *Apol.* 46, Justin identifies the demons as Jesus' "enemies," and asserts that Jesus aims to "subdue" them upon his Second Coming. As evidenced by these passages, Justin considers demons an important part of understanding both Jesus' earthly ministry and his eventual triumphant return. Who were these demons? What was their role on earth? And, most importantly, why was it so important that Jesus destroy them?

The answers to these questions, I argue, are essential in understanding Justin's conceptualization of the structure and nature of the early Christian church. Additionally, just as demons helped Justin understand the purpose of Jesus' ministry, these evil spirits may also aid the modern reader in discovering a new layer to the purpose of Justin's *Apologies*. This new purpose, as will be argued in this piece, was to instruct his fellow Christians through an extended allegory, where the cosmic battle between demons and the Christian *Logos* stood for the internal battle between irrationality and reason.

There are two contexts important for understanding this allegorical reading. The first that will concern us here is Justin's life; this brief description allows us to understand both Justin's philosophical and religious background as well as the context in which the *Apologies* were written and disseminated. Secondly, it is important to recognize the demonological context within which Justin was participating. Prior to the writing of the two *Apologies*, Christianity maintained a rich demonological tradition. The most prominent tradition in earlier Christian writings, the canonical Gospels, concerned exorcisms performed by Jesus of Nazareth. While Justin certainly acknowledges this tradition, he nonetheless shifts the focus of demonic activity from physical possession to psychological manipulation. Justin demonstrates this in his description of demonic collaboration with humans, where he stresses exploitation of human irrationality as the method by which demons perform wicked deeds on earth. With his emphasis on human irrationality, Justin demonstrates his reliance upon Middle Platonic psychology, the dominant mode of thought concerning the soul in the second century. In Middle Platonism, the soul was bifurcated into rational and irrational parts, and the interaction of these parts of the soul determined the fate of man.

While Justin consistently connects demonic activity with irrationality, he conversely equates acceptance of Christianity to rationality. Similarly, Justin identifies Jesus as the true and complete *Logos*, or 'rational principle.' Throughout the *Apologies*, Jesus and the forces of rationality (namely,

Christians) battle against the irrational, evil activity of demons and their collaborators. This battle, I argue, when understood in the context of Middle Platonic psychology, is actually an allegory of the ongoing battle within the soul between rationality and irrationality. Justin's use of allegory reveals a new purpose for the *Apologies*: psychological instruction. Allegorical instruction has a long tradition in Greco-Roman philosophy, best exemplified in the famous Allegory of the Cave from Plato's *Republic*. Furthermore, while writing the *Apologies*, Justin was operating a small Christian philosophical academy in Rome. Hence, the pedagogical context for the *Apologies* is essential in understanding their composition and purpose. Based on these two points, I conclude that Justin uses this allegorical model as a way of instructing his audience in the discipline of rationalized psychology. Therefore, Justin's *Apologies*, while still serving their traditional role as a defense of Christianity, doubly serve as a pedagogical text as part of a Christian psychology-based philosophical curriculum.

II

Justin Martyr was born in Flavia Neapolis, a Greek city located just north of Jerusalem, in the early second century CE. According to the account of his conversion in the *Dialogue with Trypho*, Justin turned to Christianity after a



Justin Martyr, second century Christian Apologist
Image courtesy of author.

meandering exploration of the philosophical schools, including trysts with Stoicism, Peripateticism, Pythagoreanism, and, finally, Platonism.³ Justin rejected all these philosophies, however, and, after an intense discussion concerning Jewish scripture with an “old man,” his spirit “was immediately set on

fire” for Christianity, which he concluded was “the only sure and useful philosophy.”⁴ Shortly after his conversion, Justin moved to Rome and founded a small philosophical school, an institution that traditionally instructed Christian thinkers such as Tatian. During his time in Rome, Justin

composed three extant works: *1 Apology*, *2 Apology*, and the *Dialogue with Trypho*.⁵ In *1 Apology*, written between 151 and 155 CE, Justin presents a defense on behalf of Christianity in the form of an appeal to the Roman Emperor Antoninus Pius (r. 137-161 CE) for the end of Christian persecution.⁶ Shortly thereafter, Justin composed *2 Apology* in response to the fallout from a dispute between a Christian woman and her non-Christian husband, a dispute that resulted in the persecution of her Christian teacher. Finally, the *Dialogue*, written between 155 and 161 CE, records a supposed conversation between Justin and Trypho the Jew, wherein the Apologist heralds Christianity as the ultimate philosophy and Jesus as the prophesied messiah against the competing claims of Judaism.⁷ A short time after his writing of the *Dialogue*, ca. 162-167 CE, the Roman prefect Rusticus martyred Justin for his apparent refusal to sacrifice to the Roman gods and retract his Christian beliefs,⁸ perhaps due to a conflict between Justin and the Cynic Crescens.⁹

III

Justin's writings suggest, however, that the Apologist likely suspected that demons were somehow responsible for his martyrdom. Justin believed these evil spirits instigated evils in the world and describes in detail their wicked activities. In doing so, Justin participates in an already long-standing tradition of demonological discourse in the Ancient Mediterranean. Greco-Roman, Jewish and early Christian cultures contributed significantly to Justin's understanding of demons, and the Apologist demonstrates a willingness to alter and incorporate diverse demonologies in his writings. In his depiction of Jesus as a conqueror of demons in *2 Apol.* 6, Justin echoes themes prevalent in the Gospel tradition. Perhaps the most significant aspect of demonology in the Gospels is the important role that demon possession and exorcism played in the ministry of Jesus. Demon exorcism is mentioned frequently as an important element of Jesus' overall ministry,¹⁰ and in Mark's Gospel, Jesus' first activity after his baptism and calling of the disciples is an exorcism.¹¹ Langdon notes that the Gospel of Mark, in particular, portrays Jesus as the great exorcist, while all the Synoptic Gospels maintain exorcism as one of the main activities of Jesus' ministry.¹²

Hence, from these frequent references to demon possession and exorcism, we may conclude that the Gospel narratives viewed human possession as the main activity of demons. Where the Gospels describe exorcisms, the demons typically controlled human activity through a violent alteration of normal physical behavior. In Acts 19,¹³ the author describes how Jewish exorcists were attempting to use the name of Jesus and Paul to drive out demons. However, after the demon questions the exorcist's identity,



The exorcism of demons, as depicted here, is a major theme in Gospel demonology. Image courtesy of author.

the possessed man attacks the Jewish exorcists and leaves them naked and bleeding.¹⁴ The Garasene Demoniac episode from Mark 5 also reveals that demoniacs exhibit inhuman behavior. When Mark describes the possessed man, he notes his erratic and unruly conduct and claims that not even chained shackles could contain the man's strength.¹⁵ In contrast, once Jesus exorcises the demon, the formerly possessed man sits tranquilly, "in his right mind" (NASB), displaying none of his previous uncontrollable behavior.¹⁶

IV

As in the Gospel narratives, Justin portrays demons as altering human behavior to complete their wicked deeds. However, in contrast to the Gospels, Justin portrays demonic influence over humans not as a physical takeover, but instead as a psychological manipulation. When describing the Roman persecution of Christians, Justin claims that Roman leaders illogically submit to "unreasoning passion" and the "instigation of evil demons" when they "punish [Christians] without trial or proper thinking."¹⁷ Justin's linking of the "evil demons" with "unreasoning passion" is significant. In Greek psychological thought, the 'passions' were thought to be part of the 'irrational' part of the soul. Hence, with this statement Justin is explicitly claiming that demons instigate human wickedness (in this case, Roman persecution) by taking advantage of the irrational parts of the soul. Justin states his case more clearly in *1 Apol.* 12, where the Apologist claims that evil spirits "demand sacrifices and service" of irrational people.¹⁸ In both examples, while demons are the impetus for the wicked activity, humans nonetheless play a central role in the contemporary persecution of Christians and the historical condemnation of Socrates because of the inherent irrationality within their souls.

Within Christian communities, Justin claims demons have "put forward" self-proclaimed holy men, including Simon Magus, his disciple Menander, and Marcion of Pontus.¹⁹ These men deceived people "through the art of the demons," particularly magic.²⁰ Of their human pawns, Justin claims they have been "snatched away *irrationally* as lambs by a wolf, and become the prey of godless teaching and of demons."²¹ As previously, Justin connects man's irrationality with a tendency to be deceived by demons, a connection that explicitly attributes the cause of the collaborator's decision to a lack of reason.

Conversely, Justin believes humanity can avoid falling into partnership with demons by properly exercising rational thought. The Apologist adjures Roman leaders to watch out for the demons: "For we forewarn you to be on your guard, lest those demons who were previously accused by us deceive you and compel you to turn away from reading and understanding everything that we say."²² Hence, Justin believes that through attentiveness ("be on your guard") and comprehension ("reading and understanding"), the Roman authorities can avoid falling under the influence of the evil demons. Furthermore, Justin argues that wicked men are culpable for their actions, due to their natural "knowledge of good and evil."²³ According to Justin, the possession of such rational faculties brings condemnation upon those who improperly choose to cooperate with demons: "all people are without excuse before God; for they have been born capable of *exercising reason and intelligence*."²⁴ Justin credits the *Logos* for revealing this knowledge and giving humanity the chance to exercise such choice: "...correct reason [*Logos*] demonstrated that not all opinions or beliefs are good, but some are evil, and some are good."²⁵ Therefore, Justin asserts that man remains responsible for his choice between good and evil teaching and thus willingly participates as an ally of the demonic forces.

As seen in the examples above, Justin places a special emphasis on the rationality of men in their success or failure in resisting demonic influence, as well as their ability to discern good and evil. If humans would simply use the rational faculties provided them by *Logos*, they could resist demonic advances. Those who fail to use reason, however, will face divine punishment precisely because of this provided ability. Justin echoes his emphasis on rationality in his discussion of the *Logos* and its battle with demons, where the Apologist stresses rationality as the key determinant in selecting the proper ally in the *Logos*-demon battle.

V

The Greek term and concept *Logos* has a substantial pedigree in Greek philosophical and Jewish-Christian thought. The original term *Logos* simply refers to 'word' but also translates as 'account,' 'explanation,' or intellectual

'reason.'²⁶ Moreover, Greco-Roman thought, as seen in the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus, frequently used *Logos* to refer to 'Divine Reason'.²⁷ As seen in both the Septuagint and the Gospel of John, the Jewish-Christian tradition used *Logos* to refer to the 'Word of God'.²⁸ Throughout the *Apologies*, Justin uses typical *Logos* terminology to refer to a variety of concepts, including human reason, argument and account.²⁹ However, Justin also appropriates the term to refer to the methods by which God reveals Himself to man. When Justin combines *Logos* with epithets such as 'divine' or 'complete,' he refers to God's revelation as seen in the person, example and instruction³⁰ of Christ.³¹ Justin explicitly equates Christ with the *Logos* in *2 Apol.* 6, where he states, "But [God's] Son...the *Logos* who is with God and is begotten before creation...is called Christ."³² R.M. Price argues that Justin adopts his equation of Christ and the *Logos* from the use of "Word of God" in the Septuagint,³³ and Edwards concurs that the Apologist inherits the bulk, if not all, of his *Logos* conceptualization from Jewish and Christian sources.³⁴ For Justin, Christ embodied the entirety of the *Logos*, and represented both the fulfillment of the Jewish Mosaic Law³⁵ and, through revelation of the whole of *Logos* ('reason'), the basis for Christianity's claim to philosophical superiority.³⁶

While Christ alone can reveal the complete *Logos*, man can also partake of *Logos* through the *sperma tou logou*, or 'seeds of reason' that exist in all men.³⁷ The spermatic *Logos* existed even before Christ's incarnation, as exemplified in the philosopher Socrates' ability to grasp parts of the *Logos* through true reason.³⁸ Hence, Justin emphasizes that man has the mental capacity to think or act rationally, but Christ's ministry is necessary in that he represents the incarnation of the complete Rational Principal, and provides man the opportunity to acquire the totality of reason.

VI

The availability of complete reason places mankind in the middle of a cosmic battle between good and evil. Justin constantly describes this battle in terms of reason and irrationality, and believes it has serious implications for the future of the world. In *1 Apol.* 10, Justin explains, "For what human laws were not able to achieve, the *theios Logos* would have done, except the evil demons spread throughout many false and immoral accusations, taking as an ally the evil to every person and the complex desire in their nature."³⁹ Here Justin most likely uses *theios Logos* as 'divine word,' and is referring specifically to Christian teaching that remains in a constant struggle against demonic trickery. While the *Logos* has the potential to bring the peace and prosperity unattainable through human ordinances, demonic forces nonetheless prevent it from succeeding through an aggressive assault on the *Logos*' agenda.

To wage this assault, demons ally with irrational humans. Interestingly, Justin explains that the demons deceive their human allies "by *teaching* them [to offer] sacrifices, offerings and libations," which the demons required to satisfy their "lustful passions."⁴⁰ In this instance, Justin reasserts the constant battle between the Christian *Logos* and the demons by portraying the wicked beings as performing identical tasks to the *Logos*. Therefore, demons counter the *Logos*' objectives by mocking both its message and its didactic means of communication.

For Justin, the impact of the battle between the *Logos* and demons extends even to those who follow the *Logos*. In *2 Apology* 8, for instance, Justin claims that those who live according to reason will be especially susceptible to demonic attack: "For, as we indicated, the demons have always contrived that all those who even slightly strived to live according to the *Logos* and to flee evil be hated."⁴¹ Furthermore, Justin argues that those who lead especially rational lives experience the worst kind of demonic maltreatment: "And it is unremarkable that the demons are proven to cause those *who live by knowledge and contemplation* of the entire *Logos*, who is Christ, to be much more hated than those who lived according to a portion of the *Logos*-seed."⁴² Note here how Justin claims that demons persecute those who live "by knowledge and contemplation" [κατὰ...γνώσιν καὶ θεωρίαν], implicitly equating rationality and the *Logos* by portraying both as the enemies of demons. Furthermore, Justin claims that the extent to which you live by reason will directly determine the amount by which demons persecute you.

The Apologist again emphasizes this connection in *2 Apol.* 10, where he states that Socrates, the philosopher whom Justin claims was partially guided by the *Logos*,⁴³ "taught men to reject the evil demons and those doing what the poets had said⁴⁴...and he invited them to encounter the god who was unknown to them *by means of inquiry and knowledge*."⁴⁵ As we have seen before in *2 Apol.* 8, Justin claims that proper religious behavior lies in the rational investigation and contemplation of the existence of God, as exemplified in the philosopher Socrates, a figure well respected in the Greco-Roman world for his philosophical acumen. Through their similar experiences of persecution at the hand of wicked demons, Justin connects the ancient philosopher with the fledgling religion, and establishes the foundation for both their worldviews as the simultaneous rejection of demonic influence⁴⁶ and embrace of the divine through cognitive exertion. In this way, Justin further locates the identification of a true Christian and proper religious belief in individual rationality, and argues that the success or hindrance of the gospel depends upon man's susceptibility to submit foolishly to the instigation of evil demons. Finally, through his equation of the *Logos* with

reason and demons with irrationality, Justin establishes a cosmic dichotomy between the two principles. For Justin, this ongoing battle has ramifications for every man, as an individual's choice between the *Logos* and demonic influence is actually a choice between reason and irrationality.

VII

As established in the previous sections, Justin emphasizes rationality as the key foundation for Christian belief, and establishes a cosmic dichotomy between reason and irrationality through the *Logos*-demon battle. This raises the issue of where Justin acquired this understanding of rationality, as well as the framework through which he would have thought about reason and irrationality. To address these questions, I argue that Justin's depiction of the battle between the *Logos* and demons, when understood within the framework of Platonic psychological discourse, is actually an allegory for the ongoing battle between reason and irrationality in the soul. As part of his exposure to Middle Platonic philosophy, Justin no doubt encountered discussions concerning Platonic psychology. The composition and nature of the human soul garnered lengthy debate within ancient and Hellenistic philosophy.⁴⁷ As Fred Miller notes, the Greek term *psyche*, usually translated as 'soul,' frequently carries connotations similar to those associated with the modern 'mind.'⁴⁸ Plato sees the soul as the natural ruler of the body, and the part of man's nature that can restrain him from unnecessary desires.⁴⁹ Furthermore, in *The Republic*, Plato argues that the soul is composed of three parts: reason, spirit and appetite.⁵⁰ The rational part naturally controls the soul, commanding obedience from the spirit and appetite.⁵¹ However, while the rational should remain in control, Plato frequently depicts the soul's components contending for their various desires.⁵² In the *Timaeus*, Plato elevates the rational part of the soul even further. Beyond distinguishing it from the spirit and appetite, the philosopher claims that reason is the immortal part of the soul, located in the head, while the spirit and appetite are mortal and found in the chest and abdomen, respectively.⁵³

Middle Platonism's reception of Platonic philosophy often included synthesis and modification, and thus it is important to understand how Plato's psychology was received prior to and concurrent with Justin's writings. The basic doctrines of Plato's psychology, including the partitioning of the soul and the existence of rational and irrational parts, have survived without extensive alteration in Middle Platonism.⁵⁴ The writings of Philo of Alexandria (b. ca. 20 BCE) provide important evidence that Platonic psychology maintained a place within Hellenistic philosophy, but with noticeable differences. Philo argues for a bipartite (in contrast to Plato's tripartite) division of the soul into 'rational' and 'irrational' parts.⁵⁵ While this

seems to diverge from Plato's psychology, Philo nonetheless continues Plato's emphasis on dividing the soul into rational and irrational parts, an obvious transmission of the Platonic framework that Justin likely encountered in his philosophical instruction. Following Philo, the philosopher Plutarch (ca. 45-119 CE) continued this bipartition of the soul, framing the two sides simply as rational and irrational.⁵⁶ Therefore, Philo and Plutarch demonstrate that Plato's rational-dichotomized psychology has survived into Middle Platonic philosophy, despite slight variations between Plato's tripartite division and the bipartite that predominated in Middle Platonism.

As noted previously, Edwards places Justin within the Middle Platonic tradition of Numenius. Hence, while Justin never explicitly discusses his own psychological position, the Apologist's psychology is likely at least to have been influenced by Numenius. Dillon explains that Numenius holds several traditional Platonic tenets, including the division of the soul into rational and irrational components.⁵⁷ Furthermore, Dillon notes that Numenius' psychology presents an extreme dichotomy between the rational and irrational components, asserting that these two parts are two distinct souls, rather than two parts of one.⁵⁸ Hence, while Numenius does not represent a precise continuation of Platonic psychology, he nonetheless maintains the division of the soul into rational and irrational parts. Furthermore, Numenius' strong dichotomy between the rational and irrational components aligns nicely with Justin's depiction of the cosmic battle between the *Logos* and demons.

If we are to extrapolate Edwards' connection between Justin and Numenius, then we can be sure that Justin was at least exposed to rational-dichotomized Platonic psychology in his philosophical education. Furthermore, based on a recent study by Winrich Löhr, Justin may have also been *instructing* philosophical students using similar psychological doctrines. In his article, "Christianity as Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives of an Ancient Intellectual Project," Löhr states Justin Martyr's Roman school stands in a tradition of Christian philosophical schools that attempted to establish Christianity as a superior philosophy through formalized philosophical training. This movement flourished from the beginning of the second to the early fourth century,⁵⁹ but struggled to maintain momentum in the fourth century due to changes in the Christian reception of philosophy.⁶⁰ Within Origen's school in third century Alexandria, Löhr asserts that psychology was "the focus on all levels of instruction, it is by attending to the soul that the disciple is led to the goal of fully realizing his human potential, his rational essence."⁶¹ Löhr notes the continuation of rational psychology in the philosophical schools, where the soul of the student "is to be led from the outside

to the inside, to...the rational part of the soul."⁶² As their overall aim, Löhr claims that early Christian philosophical schools "aimed at transforming the disciple's self into a wholly rational and virtuous being."⁶³ Based on Löhr's study, we can reasonably assert that Justin not only received psychological instruction, but furthermore instructed his pupils in a similar curriculum.

Understood within this context, Justin's depiction of the cosmic battle between the *Logos* and the demons takes on new meaning. When the Apologist situates the struggle as one between rationality and irrationality, he is using the terminology prevalent in psychological discourse. Hence, Numenius' depiction of the internal struggle between the rational and irrational now looks eerily similar to Justin's representation of the *Logos*-demon battle. Annette Reed recognizes this connection, noting that Justin, by equating the *Logos* with reason and demons with irrationality, "projects the cosmic battle between the demonic and the divine into the human *psyche*."⁶⁴ Justin's argument that man must act rationally as opposed to irrationally in order to make good decisions directly parallels Numenius' discourse concerning the two warring souls, where the rational soul must hold supremacy over the irrational in order for man to maintain proper psychological arrangement. Therefore, Justin's frequent emphasis on reason, intelligence, and awareness not only places rationality as an essential component of religious choice and behavior, but also situates the proper internal arrangement of the soul as a prerequisite for Christian belief. Justin's portrayal of the battle between the demons and the *Logos*, then, is not merely a description of the Apologist's cosmology, but also an allegory for the ongoing battle within the soul.

VIII

In *2 Apol.* 6, when Justin states that the destruction of demons was one of the primary reasons for Jesus' earthly ministry, it might surprise the audience that Justin believes demons were such an important motivation for Jesus' incarnation. Indeed, despite the persistence of demons in popular belief, these evil spirits wane in importance for later Christian writers, and are scarcely mentioned in the formation of orthodox doctrine. Nevertheless, Justin wrote the *Apologies* in a world where demons were all too real, and the Apologist viewed these beings as essential to understanding the aims of Christianity. Justin's belief in the existence of demons is rooted in the worldviews that surrounded him, namely, Greco-Roman, Jewish and Christian demonologies. From early Christian demonology, Justin adapts narratives concerning demonic physical possession and switches to an emphasis on psychological manipulation. In his description of the demonic influence over man, Justin constantly equates demonic activity with irrational-

ity and, conversely, the work of the *Logos* with rationality. This dichotomy between reason and irrationality closely resembles the internal dichotomy expounded in Platonic psychology. Justin likely received instruction and even trained pupils in the Platonic psychological tradition, thus providing good reason to understand his views of reason within this context. When we understand him within this framework, Justin's depiction of the *Logos*-demon battle is actually an allegory for the internal struggle between rationality and irrationality in the soul.

If we understand a major theme of the *Apologies* as an extended allegory, then the question arises: for what purpose is Justin using this allegory in the *Apologies*? The answer to this question, I argue, demands a reassessment of the purpose and genre of the *Apologies*. Scholars have previously understood the *Apologies* as straightforward defenses of Christianity, pleas for Roman toleration, and/or treatises on the philosophical superiority of Christianity.⁶⁵ However, the extended allegory and context in which the *Apologies* were written imply that Justin likely intended the *Apologies* to serve as pedagogical texts. Allegory had an extensive history in Greco-Roman philosophical instruction. Perhaps the most famous example is the Allegory of the Cave from Plato's *Republic*, where the author uses a fictional scene to elucidate the enlightenment of philosophers and their desire to instruct the populace. In such a way, Plato uses an illustrative story to explain a more complex facet of his worldview. Similarly, Justin uses the cosmic conflict between the *Logos* and the demons in order to provide a personified example of the ongoing battle in the soul. Understood in this way, then, allegory is a preferred method in philosophical circles of instructing students. Thus, Justin is using the allegory pedagogically to instruct his students in Middle Platonic psychology.

The pedagogical nature of the *Apologies* lies not just in the presence of an extended allegory but also in the philosophical context in which Justin composed them. According to church tradition and various martyrologies, Justin established a small school in Rome shortly after his conversion.⁶⁶ The Apologist operated this school in Rome up until his death ca. 165 CE. It was during his years in Rome that Justin is believed to have composed the *Apologies*. Therefore, Justin wrote the *Apologies* while simultaneously operating his philosophical school. As noted earlier, Justin likely used a psychagogic curriculum in his instruction, and thus the majority of his teachings would have aimed at the reform of his pupil's soul. Furthermore, Justin addresses *1 Apology* to the Emperor Antoninus Pius, a Roman ruler famous for his interest and expertise in philosophical discourse. With both of these points in mind, we can see that Justin likely intended the *Apologies* to act as a pedagogic text in that they instructed the audience in the way of rational-

ized psychological discourse. The main teaching lies in the recognition that just as there is an ongoing battle between reason and irrationality in the cosmos, there is a parallel battle raging in the soul. However, Justin does not merely expect his students to recognize this struggle. Instead, just as God compelled Jesus to defeat the demons, Justin calls man to use reason in overcoming irrationality, and thus defeat the demon within his soul.

The recognition of the pedagogical nature of the *Apologies* has important ramifications for our understanding of Justin and the early Christian community. Concerning Justin, the pedagogical element within the *Apologies* provides insight into his role within the church aside from that represented by his extant literature. Scholars have long known that Justin maintained a philosophical school in Rome. However, because of his writings and association with Greek philosophy, most scholars have investigated Justin as both a defender of Christianity and an example of an early Christian philosopher. Lost in this portrayal is any mention of what occupied Justin the most in his years at Rome: teaching. If we trust the traditional account, then Justin spent the remaining years of his life operating a small school of philosophy and training other Christian philosophers. If we recognize the pedagogical nature of the *Apologies*, then we can better appreciate the instructional role that Justin played in early Christianity.

Finally, viewing Justin's *Apologies* as part of an early Christian philosophical curriculum reveals the important role philosophical instruction played in early Christianity. As Winrich Löhr asserts, philosophy maintained a significant role within the early Church, and Christian schools such as Justin's demonstrate early attempts at modeling the Christian community after philosophical schools. Thus, Justin's *Apologies* provide a glimpse into those schools by revealing the worldview of a prominent Christian pedagogue. With this understanding, future scholarship can interpret Justin's *Apologies* through their pedagogical nature, and thus yield fresh insights into the world of Justin Martyr and the second century Christian community.

Appendix: Justin's Demonology and Cosmology in the Locative/Utopian Framework

I

While Justin's demonology provides a glimpse into philosophical instruction in the second century, it also provokes questions concerning Justin's conception of Christianity and its relationship to wider religious trends of the Roman Imperial and Late Antique periods. In order to explore these questions, I will examine Justin's demonology and cosmology in light of the locative/utopian framework as

defined by J.Z. Smith and Peter Brown. When understood within this construction, Justin's *Apologies* demonstrate the Apologist's attempt at negotiating competing religious trends in order to define his own tradition. Ultimately, I argue, Justin establishes Christianity as a highly mobile, utopian-style religion, but only temporarily. In Jesus' Second Coming, Justin fully expects a reestablishment of a religious center through the Jewish Temple at Jerusalem, and, thus, a reassertion of locative religion.

I begin examination with a discussion of the locative/utopian framework, including its historical formulation, fundamental concepts and a revelatory example. Building upon this theoretical foundation, I discuss Justin's demonology and cosmology with regards to locative/utopian concepts through three areas: demons as an identity category, the demonic and utopian cosmology, and, finally, rational psychology as the creation of mobilized sacredness. Through this discussion, I propose three main points: Justin uses demons to construct Christian identity; he incorporates a diverse mixture of locative and utopian concepts into his cosmology; and, finally, Justin's rational psychology demonstrates his belief in a temporary utopian cosmology that would be usurped by the reassertion of locative religion through the *Parousia*.

II

When studying religion of both the Roman Imperial and Late Antique time periods, ancient authors and modern scholars alike agree: religions in the Mediterranean were in a time of great social, political and cultural flux. Religious norms that had endured for centuries were now facing important changes that reflected the volatile socio-political atmosphere of Greco-Roman society. In response to this extreme fluidity, scholars in the twentieth century proposed new frameworks to explain Late Antique religious trends. Perhaps the most compelling (and heavily scrutinized) of these proposed frameworks is the one championed by J.Z. Smith and Peter Brown, who explain changing trends in Late Antique religion through a binary categorization using the terms "locative" and "utopian." The former term, Smith and Brown argue, represents the traditional structure of ancient religion, where a central, fixed location operated as the religious nexus for a tradition. Two examples typify this sort of arrangement: the temple of the Greek world and the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, both of which operated as sacred foci for their religious traditions. Surrounding these central sacred locations was a cosmic order that helped define the basic purpose of ancient Mediterranean religion. J.Z. Smith, using a framework developed by Cornelius Loew, explains that ancient religion was rooted in a belief in cosmic order, where human society should imitate divine order, and the main responsibility of religious and politi-

cal leaders is to “attune human order to the divine order.”⁶⁷ Smith consolidates Loew’s framework into five precepts:

- (1) There is a cosmic order that permeates every level of reality, (2) This cosmic order is the divine society of the gods, (3) The structure and dynamics of this society can be discerned in the movements and patterned juxtapositions of the heavenly bodies, (4) Human society should be a microcosm of the divine society, and (5) The chief responsibility of priests and kings is to attune human order to the divine order.⁶⁸

Peter Brown, in his work *The World of Late Antiquity*, notes that temples accommodated this obsession with imitative order, and ancient religion “revolved around great temples...their ceremonies assumed a life in which the community, the city, dwarfed the individual.”⁶⁹ Hence, the fixed locations of temples allowed religious leaders, including priests and kings, to construct a worldly order that imitated the divine.

However, over time, ancients and scholars alike noticed that the religion of Late Antiquity was moving away from centralized sacred locations. Plutarch bemoaned the deteriorating state of Greek oracles in his first century *Delphic Dialogues*, and by the mid-second century CE Jews will have abandoned any hope of renewed temple sacrifice. J.Z. Smith provides one political explanation for this transformation, noting that the disintegrating political structure of the Near East cast doubt upon the effectiveness of cosmic attunement, as well as deprived them of native kings, who frequently acted as religio-political leaders.⁷⁰ Additionally, Smith notes that the increasing reality of diasporic religiosity⁷¹ had divorced many from their native locality, and, thus, severed the *diaspora* community’s ties to their sacred nexus.⁷² Thus, communities turned to new methods of gaining access to the divine in lieu of their fading (or estranged) sacred locales. In a seminal piece written in 1971, Peter Brown argues that religions of Late Antiquity turned to a new religious figure, deemed the “holy man,” for both access to the divine and supernatural protection against external hostilities:

The idea of the holy man holding the demons at bay and bending the will of God by his prayers came to dominate Late Antique society. In many ways, the idea is as new as the society itself. For it places a man, a ‘man of power,’ in the centre of people’s imagination... In the fourth and fifth centuries (A.D.)...the individual, as a ‘man of power,’ came to dwarf the traditional communities.⁷³

Smith adds that the holy man provided a readily available and highly mobile divinity unavailable through fixed sacred locations.⁷⁴ In contrast to Brown, however, Smith identifies this figure as a religious “entrepreneur,”⁷⁵ and contends that

holy men had originated well before the 4th and 5th Centuries, perhaps even as early as the 2nd Century BCE.⁷⁶

Intimately connected to this new religious figure was a new religious goal; rather than attempting to attune this world to the divine order, religion now offered salvation in the form of escape from this world to another cosmos.⁷⁷ To identify this shift, scholars refer to the new emphasis as part of a “utopian” (Greek *utopos*, lit. ‘no place’) religious system, both because of its disconnection from a central location and the associated expectation of an otherworldly salvation.⁷⁸

Scholars frequently point to the Jesus movement and early Christian communities as appropriate examples of “utopian” religious traditions. Outside of a tenuous relationship with the Jewish Temple prior to its destruction, these communities remained relatively unconnected to any religious location. As Christian churches would not develop into established religious centers until the 4th and 5th centuries under the patronage of the Emperor Constantine, early Christians frequently gathered in the homes of their local leaders. As seen especially in the ministry of Paul, Christianity celebrated its status as a pan-Mediterranean missionary religion, and had no qualms about remaining in a perpetual *diaspora*. In addition to its decentralized orientation, early Christianity also looked to holy individuals for religious authority, as evidenced in both the ministry of Jesus and the missionary work of Paul. Finally, the early Christian movement adopted a utopian soteriology, looking forward to Jesus’ return as well as a future resurrection as their reward for religious devotion.

III

The ongoing shift towards utopian cosmology in the Roman Imperial and Late Antique periods triggered an accompanying change in the perception of the demonic. Because of its obsession with ordering this cosmos after the divine, locative religion recognized a sacred nexus as the cosmological and geographic center of the world. Hence, anything that fell outside or distant from this sacred order was termed “chaotic” or “liminal” and considered a threat to the maintenance of cosmic harmony. Within this framework, locative religions considered demons part of this uncivilized space, and thus set the evil spirits in opposition to the established religious order. Despite their location outside the normative cosmology, demons nevertheless continually interacted with humans. However, as J.Z. Smith notes, any demonic transgression of the cosmic boundaries represented a threat to religious order.⁷⁹ Therefore, if a demon entered human realms for the sake of influencing human events, most likely through demonic possession, then the duties of religious leaders required them to expel the demon. With the process of demonic exorcism, humans

reasserted their control over this cosmos by relegating the demon to the outer boundaries of the world.

The shift toward utopian religion dramatically changed the conceptions of the demonic and its relationship to religious cosmology. As part of a reaction to the political destabilization and the decrease in native control over civic and religious space, utopian systems deemphasized the need to control and organize this cosmos. Closely related to the largely negative view of non-native kingship, demons now represented the ruling powers, both political and religious, of this world. These evil spirits were no longer relegated to the outer reaches of the cosmos, but instead maintained a pervasive presence. To counter the growing demonic presence, people now looked to charismatic holy men to ward off these evil spirits.⁸⁰ Furthermore, because of demonic infiltration, humans, rather than demons, were actually out of place in this world.⁸¹ In addition their associations with the evil rulers of the world, demons came to represent illegitimate religious practice, and, thus were utilized as a negative labeling term. Smith provides one example in Christian Apologetic literature, where 'demon(s)' was often substituted for foreign deities.⁸² In a related trend, Late Antique thinkers associated archaic rituals such as a blood sacrifice with demonic influence, best evidenced by the neo-Platonic topos asserting such rituals as demonic inventions.⁸³

Justin clearly relies on utopian cosmology when constructing his demonology, seen especially in his description of the evil spirits' activity. According to the Apologist, demons and their collaborators maintain a pervasive presence in the world, affecting all areas of second century life. The demons' most obvious sphere of influence is in the Roman Imperial government, where Justin claims demons have been secretly instigating unwarranted persecution against Christians.⁸⁴ Similarly, Justin claims demons have established laws in line with their own wickedness,⁸⁵ an indication that the Apologist believes the evil spirits have infiltrated the legal system. Regardless of any underlying political commentary, Justin's denouncement of the demon-inspired Emperors and laws reveals a cosmology that views this world as demonically-controlled. This kind of demonology-cosmology closely resembles that found in the Pauline corpus, where Paul encourages his recipients to "put on the full armor of God" so as to fight against the "principalities and powers" of this world, a likely reference to Roman Imperial authority.⁸⁶ However, demons have not limited their influence to governmental rulers. Justin also believes that demons lie at the root of Greco-Roman sacrifice, Christian heresy, and the persecution of Christians. The belief that demons lie behind so many societal evils, as well as evil people, shows that, in Justin's thought, demons now control this cosmos and force the Christian to resist their omnipresent power.

IV

While Justin's cosmology may have relied on a utopian framework, another aspect of his writings, namely apocalyptic anticipation, indicates an expectation that the current utopian arrangement is only temporary, and that the locative would be reestablished with the return of proper religious order. Nevertheless, Justin still maintained the ongoing presence of the utopian framework, even if he expected it would be short-lived. As discussed previously, Justin situates internal psychological organization as the key to proper religious belief and practice. Conversely, locative religion viewed external organization of earthly institutions as the key to gaining access to the divine. Therefore, Justin internalizes locative religion's organizational concept by synthesizing it with a Greek philosophical framework. To elaborate, the Platonic emphasis on organization of the internal soul parallels the locative emphasis on ordering the worldly order after the divine. Justin adapts this idea to his Christian concept, and incorporates the *Logos* as the ideal ordering principal. As the epitome of rationality and logic, the *Logos* is a divinely-ordered entity after which all Christians must model their souls. With this internalization, Justin has created a highly mobilized, de-localized sacred center, a development especially indicative of utopian religion.

Nevertheless, while Justin's belief in the pervasiveness of demons and the mobility of sacred space reveals a utopian cosmology, Justin's apocalyptic soteriology may actually reveal a deviation from utopian expectation. Within the typical utopian concept of an evil-controlled world there is the continual hope that there waits a reward for the religiously devoted. For Justin, however, the reward may not be eternal life in heaven, but instead the *Parousia*, or Second Coming, of Christ. Justin never explicitly mentions heaven in his *Apologies*, but instead states Jesus will return to earth "from heaven with an angelic host."⁸⁷ Thereafter, Justin claims, Jesus will cast evildoers "into eternal fire with the wicked demons,"⁸⁸ presumably referring to both the evil beings and their earthly collaborators. Furthermore, in the *Dialogue*, Justin claims that the Apostle John foretold that Christians "would live in Jerusalem for one thousand years."⁸⁹ Justin here explicitly refers to the Revelation of John, where the return of Christ is accompanied by an eventual reestablishment of the Temple and the founding of a New Jerusalem.⁹⁰ Therefore, while Justin incorporates the utopian concept of salvation anticipation into his cosmological structure, he nevertheless maintains *this* earth (and Jerusalem, specifically), rather than heaven, as the physical space where the redemption will ultimately occur. This construct represents an alteration of the typical utopian ideal and incorporates Christian messianic concepts into the locative/utopian framework.

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- 1 2 *Apol.* 6. The exact identity of the “believing men and women” is unclear, though it’s safe to assume Justin was referring to Christians. However, if Justin meant to refer to those who lived prior to and concurrent with Jesus’ incarnation, then it seems he is anachronistically claiming that there were Christians prior to Jesus’ birth. However, as evidenced in other sections of the Apologies, Justin firmly believed that man could grasp reason and live a pious, if nevertheless flawed, life without exposure to the Gospel. This is best evidenced in the figure of Socrates, whom Justin claims was a kind of pre-Christianity Christian (Cf. 2 *Apol.* 10).
- 2 Ibid
- 3 *Dialogue with Trypho*, 2. The state of philosophical schools is difficult to determine but nonetheless an important topic in our study of Justin. According to Long & Sedley (1987), Peripateticism, the Aristotelian school of philosophy, nearly died out in the Hellenistic period (ca. 323-31 BCE), but experienced a revival in the Roman imperial period (2).
- 4 Ibid, 3-8.
- 5 As detailed in Barnard’s introduction to his English translation of the Apologies, scholars have proposed several theories regarding the relationship of 1 and 2 Apology. Proposals include 2 Apology as an appendix to the first, an unrelated independent work, and a fragment of a larger (now lost) book (Barnard, *Apologies*, 1997, 10). More recently, R.M. Grant, in his work *Greek Apologists of the Second Century*, argues that both Apologies are actually part of one cohesive composition and 2 Apology appears separately only due to its response to a specific occasion (Grant 1988, 54-55).
- 6 Justin Martyr, *The First and Second Apologies*, trans. Leslie William Barnard (New York: Paulist Press, 1997), 7, 11.
- 7 Justin Martyr, *The Dialogue with Trypho*, trans. Thomas B. Falls, ed. Michael Slusser (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), xv-xvi. In the introduction to his edition of Thomas B. Fall’s translation, Thomas P. Halton notes that while “the details of the discussion may be fictitious, the broad outline appears to have been founded in fact.” Halton furthermore states scholars know little about Trypho, though the text claims he was a Jewish resident of Corinth and a refugee of the Bar Kochba Revolt of 132 CE. The conversation purportedly took place shortly after the Revolt, ca. 135 CE.
- 8 Martyr, *Apologies*, 3. For the account of Justin’s martyrdom, scholars rely on the *Acta Martyrium*, a later anthology of various sources detailing Christian martyrdoms.
- 9 In 2 *Apol.* 3, Justin writes, “I therefore am expecting to be plotted against and fixed to a rack...perhaps by Crescens, that lover of bravado and boasting.” Justin apparently feuded with Crescens over the Cynic’s uninformed anti-Christian statements: “For the man is unworthy of the name of philosopher who publicly bears witness against us in matters which he does not understand.” Justin furthermore claims to have confronted Crescens and, having questioned him thoroughly, determined that “he truly knows nothing.”
- 10 Cf. Mark 1:39, Acts 10:38, Matt 4:23.
- 11 Likewise, in the Gospel of Luke, Jesus’ first miracle is an exorcism.
- 12 Edward Langdon, *Essentials of Demonology: A Study of Jewish and Christian Doctrine, Its Origin and Development* (London: Epworth, 1949), 222.
- 13 Though Acts is not typically understood as part of the Gospel tradition, scholars nonetheless identify it as a second installment in Luke’s (the author of the Synoptic Gospel that bears his name) address to Theophilus, and thus in this instance we can consider Acts as part of the Gospel demonological tradition.
- 14 Acts 19:11-20.
- 15 Mark 5:4-5.
- 16 Ibid. 5:15.
- 17 1 *Apol.* 5. “ἀλλὰ ἀλόγῳ πάθει καὶ μάστιγι δαιμόνων φαύλων ἐξελαυνόμενοι ἀκρίτως κολάζετε μὴ φροντίζοντες.”
- 18 1 *Apol.* 12. “δαιμόνων φαύλων, οἱ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀλόγως βιοῦντων αἰτοῦσι θύματα καὶ θεραπείας.” Interestingly, Justin here echoes Middle Platonism’s association of demons with the reception of sacrifice. Within Middle Platonism, demons transmitted sacrifices from humans to the gods, and thus played an essential part in Greco-Roman religious sacrifice. Here, however, Justin gives a negative valence to the demons’ reception of sacrifice, perhaps revealing an underlying negative attitude toward sacrifice in general. Furthermore, Justin could be echoing a thought found in Apuleius’ *De Deo Socratis*, “there are some divine beings of this class who take pleasure in various sacrifices, ceremonies, and rites... with comparative joy or sorrow” (148). Cf. Apuleius, *De Deo Socratis* for a Middle Platonic discussion of demons’ role in sacrifice as well as Smith (2008) for a more extensive discussion of demonic participation in sacrifice and corporeality.
- 19 1 *Apol.* 26. “προεβάλλοντο οἱ δαίμονες ἀνθρώπους τινὰς λέγοντας ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι θεοῦς... Σίμωνα μὲν τινα Σαμαρεῶνα... Μένανδρον δὲ τινα... Μαρκίωνα δὲ τινα Ποντικόν.”
- 20 Ibid. “διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐνεργούντων δαιμόνων τέχνης δυνάμεις ποιήσας μαγικὰς” and (referring to Menander), “ἐνεργηθέντα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμονίων καὶ ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ γενόμενον πολλοὺς ἐξαπατήσαι διὰ μαγικῆς τέχνης οἶδαμεν.”
- 21 1 *Apol.* 58. “ὅ πολλοὶ πεισθέντες ὡς μόνῳ τάληθῆ ἐπισταμένῳ... ἀλλὰ ἀλόγως ὡς ὑπὸ λύκου ἄρνες συνηρασμένοι βορὰ τῶν ἀθέων δογμάτων καὶ δαιμόνων γίνονται.”
- 22 1 *Apol.* 14. “Προλέγομεν γὰρ ὑμῖν φυλάξασθαι, μὴ οἱ προδιαβεβλημένοι ὑφ’ ἡμῶν δαίμονες ἐξαπατήσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀποτρέψωσι τοῦ ὅλως ἐντυχεῖν καὶ συνεῖναι τὰ λεγόμενα.”
- 23 2 *Apol.* 14.2. “διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τὸ ἄγνωστοικὸν καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ...” Cf. Edwards, Justin’s Logos, 276.
- 24 1 *Apol.* 28. “καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν νοερὸν καὶ δυνάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ ἀληθὲ καὶ εὐ πράττειν τὸ γένος τὸ ἀνθρώπινον πεποιήκεν, ὅ στ’ ἀναπολόγητον εἶναι τοῖς πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις παρὰ τῷ θεῷ λογικοὶ γὰρ καὶ θεωρητικοὶ γεγέννηται.” Justin, in 1 *Apol.* 52: God “will send those of the wicked, eternally conscious, into eternal fire with the wicked demons.”
- 25 2 *Apol.* 9. “καὶ νόμους διατάξασθαι τῇ ἑαυτῶν κακία ὁμοίους τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀγγέλους ἐπιστάμεθα, οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ ὅμοιοι γενόμενοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος παρελθὼν οὐ πάσας δόξας οὐδὲ πάντα δόγματα καλὰ ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν φαῦλα, τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ.” Interestingly, Justin here uses the same word he often uses to describe demons, φαῦλα, to describe evil doctrines.

- 26 G.W.H. Lampe, Ed., *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), s.v. I.A.1; I.C.2; I.B.3; I.B.1, respectively. This is certainly not an exhaustive list of the meanings of this dynamic word, as seen in the discussion of the term's use in specific contexts.
- 27 Ragnar Holte, "Logos Spermatikos: Christianity and Ancient Philosophy According to Justin's Apologies." *Studia Theologica* 12 (1958), 120.
- 28 Cf. 1 *Apol* 39.
- 29 Mark J. Edwards, "Justin's Logos and the Word of God." *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 3.3 (1985), 268. Cf. 1 *Apol* 46, 2 *Apol* 8.
- 30 Cf. 1 *Apol*. 14.
- 31 Ibid., 270. Cf. Barnard, *Apologies*, 14 and 2 *Apol*. 8.
- 32 2 *Apol*. 6. "ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκείνου... ὁ λόγος πρὸ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ συνῶν καὶ γεννώμενος"
- 33 R.M. Price, "'Hellenization' and Logos Doctrine in Justin Martyr." *Vigiliae Christianae* 42.1 March 1988), 20. Price notes that Justin received this language through both the Septuagint and the writings of Philo.
- 34 Edwards, "Justin's Logos", 272. Edwards argues for the Johannine Gospel and the Book of Psalms as the primary traditions that informed Justin of his Logos theology. Cf. Grant (1988): 60. Grant argues that for his Logos theology, "Justin's fundamental basis is biblical. He implicitly refers to Proverbs when he says that the Logos was the 'first thing generated by God.'" Grant furthermore argues that Justin certainly knew the Gospel of John (Grant (1998): 58), while Blunt claims such a knowledge is uncertain, though supported by his treatment of the *Logos* (Blunt (2006): xxxvi).
- 35 Ibid., 276.
- 36 C.J. de Vogel, "Problems concerning Justin Martyr: Did Justin Find a Certain Continuity between Greek philosophy and Christian Faith?" *Mnemosyne*, Fourth Series Vol. 31, Fasc. 4 (1978), 369.
- 37 Martyr, *Apologies*, 14.
- 38 Annette Yoshiko Reed, "The Trickery of the Fallen Angels and the Demonic Mimesis of the Divine: Aetiology, Demonology, and Polemics in the Writings of Justin Martyr," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 12:2 (2004), 162.
- 39 1 *Apol*. 10.6. "ὅπερ γὰρ οὐκ ἠδυνήθησαν οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι πρᾶξαι, ταῦτα ὁ λόγος θεῖος ὦν εἰργάσατο, εἰ μὴ οἱ φαῦλοι δαίμονες κατεσκεδάσαν πολλὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἄθεα κατηγορήματα, σύμμαχον λαβόντες τὴν ἐν ἐκάστῳ κακῆν πρὸς πάντα καὶ ποικίλην φύσει ἐπιθυμίαν."
- 40 2 *Apol*. 5. "τὰ δὲ διὰ διδαχῆς θυμάτων καὶ θυμιμάτων καὶ σπονδῶν." In this instance, Justin reveals a remnant of Middle Platonic demonology in that he ascribes human-like "lustful passions" to demons.
- 41 2 *Apol*. 8. "ὡς γὰρ ἐσημίναμεν, πάντα τοὺς κἄν ὀπωσθήποτε κατὰ λόγον βιοῦν σπουδάζοντας καὶ κακίαν φεύγειν μισεῖσθαι αἰεὶ ἐνήργησαν οἱ δαίμονες."
- 42 Ibid. "οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστόν, εἰ τοὺς οὐ κατὰ σπερματικοῦ λόγου μέρος, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς λόγου, ὃ ἐστὶ Χριστοῦ, γνῶσιν καὶ θεωρίαν πολὺ μᾶλλον μισεῖσθαι οἱ δαίμονες ἐλεγχόμενοι ἐνεργουῦσιν." Emphasis mine. As seen with Socrates in 1 *Apol*. 46, Justin believed that even non-Christians could gain partial access to the Logos, whether through divine guidance, remnants of the divine law in human law, or partial exposure to biblical and Christian teaching.
- 43 See 1 *Apol*. 46 for Justin's claim of Socrates (and others') special access to the Logos. For Justin's discussion of Socrates persecution and its relationship to contemporary Christian persecution, see 1 *Apol*. 5.
- 44 Here, Justin most likely echoes an idea seen in Maximus of Tyre, a contemporary Middle Platonic philosopher. In *Oratio* 8, Maximus argues the gods that Homer describes were actually demons, hence Justin here states that Socrates taught men to reject those "doing what the poets had said" (*Oratio* 8.6, trans. Trapp).
- 45 2 *Apol*. 10. "ὁ δὲ δαίμονας μὲν τοὺς φαῦλους καὶ τοὺς πρᾶξαντας ἃ ἔφασαν οἱ ποιηταὶ... παραιτεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐδίδαξε, πρὸς θεοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἀγνώστου αὐτοῖς διὰ λόγου ζητήσεως ἐπίγνωσιν προὔτρεπετο." Emphasis mine.
- 46 The terminology is troublesome here, as Socrates claims to have been influenced by a personal *daemon*. However, Justin reinterprets Socrates' *daemon* as a portion of the *Logos* present in the philosopher. Justin understands 'demons' as purely evil beings, and thus alters terminology in order to connect his own tradition with that of Socrates.
- 47 Lorenzen (2008).
- 48 Miller, Fred D., "The Platonic Soul," in *A Companion to Plato*, ed. Hugh Benson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 278.
- 49 Ibid. 283.
- 50 Ibid. 278. Plato, *Republic* 435d-441c2.
- 51 Ibid. 286.
- 52 Lorenzen (2008): 256.
- 53 Plato, *Timaeus*, 69a-70b. Cf. Miller, The Platonic Soul, 288.
- 54 John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), 102. Antiochus of Ascalon (b. 130 BCE) provides one alternative: he rejected both the tripartite division of the soul and the assertion that there were rational and irrational parts of the *psyche*.
- 55 Leg. All. II 6; Spec. Leg. I 333. Cf. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 174.
- 56 Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 212.
- 57 Ibid. 375.
- 58 Ibid. 376-77.
- 59 Winrich Lohr, "Christianity as Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives of an Ancient Intellectual Project." *Vigiliae Christianae* 64 (2010), 170-71.
- 60 Ibid. 160.
- 61 Ibid. 165.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Ibid. 169.
- 64 Annette Yoshiko Reed, *Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 170.
- 65 Cf. Martyr, (trans. Leslie William Barnard), *First and Second Apologies*, for an introduction to the various proposed purposes of the Apologies as well as a good summary of the issues surrounding Justin and his writings.

- 66 Lohr, "Christianity as Philosophy", 171.
- 67 J.Z. Smith, "Towards Interpreting Demonic Powers in Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity." *Aufstieg Und Niedergang Der Romischen Welt* II.16.1 (1978), 5, 13.
- 68 Ibid. 160.
- 69 Peter Brown "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity." *The Journal of Roman Studies*, Volume 61 (1971), 102ff.
- 70 Jonathan Z. Smith, *Map is Not Territory*, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 186. Smith argues that the main reason for the disintegration of 'locative' religion is "almost total cessation of native kingship and sovereignty in the domains of Alexander's successors" (186).
- 71 Ibid., xiv. Smith even proposes that the diaspora communities were the originators of the utopian concept that emphasized that their religious home was in another place, not of this world: "Projecting the group's diasporic existence into the cosmos, he discovered himself to be in exile from his true home (a world beyond this world), he found his fulfillment in serving the god beyond the god of this world and true freedom in stripping off his body which belonged to this world and in awakening that aspect of himself which was from the beyond."
- 72 Ibid. xiv.
- 73 Brown, *The Rise and Function*, 102ff.
- 74 Smith, *Map is Not Territory*, 189.
- 75 Ibid. 187.
- 76 Ibid. Jesus of Nazareth provides the prototype for the holy man. Scholars also look to the increased importance of messianic figures in Second Temple Judaism, such as Simon bar Kochba as an example of the significance of holy men. Furthermore, Apollonius of Tyana, as depicted in *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by Philostratus, was a Greek Neopythagorean holy man and contemporary of Jesus. For his earliest instance of a holy man, Smith (1993) points to Joseph, son of Tobias, as described in V. Tcherikover's work, "*Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews*," 186.
- 77 Smith, *Map is Not Territory*, 161.
- 78 Ibid. 162.
- 79 Ibid. 428-9.
- 80 Smith, *Map is Not Territory*, 170.
- 81 Ibid. 438.
- 82 Ibid. 426. Cf. Polycarp, Phillipians 7.1, Irenaeus Adv. Haer. III.4 and Justin's 1 *Apology* 58
- 83 Ibid, 428. Cf. Porphyry.
- 84 1 *Apol.* 10.
- 85 2 *Apol.* 9.
- 86 Ephesians 6:11-16.
- 87 1 *Apol.* 52.
- 88 Ibid.
- 89 *Dialogue* 81.4
- 90 Cf. Revelation 3, 12.

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Sharing a Borrowed History: American Literary Nationalism and the Pull of the Orient, 1850s-1880s

Laura Soderberg

Abstract: During the mid-nineteenth century, Americans began to travel to the Middle East, transforming it from an idealized construct – long treasured for its blend of exotic and spiritual associations – into an uncomfortably tangible and political reality. I examine how authors from the 1850s to the 1880s attempt to reconcile their attachment to their fantasy of the Orient with their desire to assert their patriotism by rejecting foreign influence. From this study of works including George William Curtis' Howadji series, Mark Twain's *Innocents Abroad*, and Lew Wallace's *Ben-Hur*, I argue that authors gradually ceased to see the Orient as a threat to their national identity and, instead, seized upon their imagined connection to it as a means of distancing themselves from Europe.

By many scholarly accounts, the American interest in the Middle East long predates any sustained contact with it; indeed, properly speaking, it predates Americans. That is to say – whether one begins, as Fuad Sha'ban does, with John Winthrop's comparison of the settlers departing Europe to the Israelites departing Egypt¹ or, as Timothy Marr does, with the three Turkish heads emblazoned on John Smith's coat-of-arms² – images of the Middle East permeated the rhetoric of some of the earliest English settlers and, as both Marr and Sha'ban argue, helped to shape the way Americans imagined themselves as a nation.³ As Sha'ban discusses, identification with the idealized symbol of the Israelites coming to the promised land repeatedly served to assure settlers of their status as a “chosen people” with divine sanction, a sanction that gradually developed into the concept of manifest destiny.⁴ During much the same period, as Timothy Marr shows, elaborate depictions of Oriental despotism allowed Americans to reaffirm their own commitment to political liberty.⁵

Yet these types of rhetorical self-definition took place almost entirely in the abstract, against a region so little visited by Americans that the reality of its existence rarely intruded upon their fantasies of it. Aside from the hostilities of the Barbary Coast, few Americans were able to travel so far abroad. John Ledyard, an early travel writer who had already sailed the South Pacific under Captain Cook and crossed Siberia as leader of his own expedition, did so in 1788, only to die within five months of his arrival in Cairo.⁶ After this failure, American missionaries, driven jointly by a desire to proselytize and a millenarian interest in the restoration of the Jews, arrived in Smyrna in 1819 and eventually established headquarters in Beirut.⁷⁸

On the whole, though, the Orient was little more than an abstraction to most Americans, a fantasy with little need to correspond to a physical place.

During the mid-nineteenth century, however, the material reality of the Middle East grew harder to ignore, as technological developments and political shifts gradually made the voyage more accessible to travelers. As historian Michael Oren explains, in 1838, steamships began running from New York City to Istanbul and Alexandria, passages also left more affordable by a growing economy,⁹ so that “by mid-century, the United States was second only to Britain in the number of its citizens visiting Egypt each year, and in Syria it was unsurpassed.”¹⁰ Moreover, upon their arrival, these travelers met with a far weaker Ottoman Empire than the one demonized by their forebears,¹¹ which led, in turn, to an increased willingness to romanticize its faded power.¹² What had been a prolonged and genuinely dangerous expedition gradually joined the standard tourist circuit. In 1850, *The New York Evangelist* marveled that it was now possible even for “American ladies [to] travel over the hills of Palestine and the desert to Egypt [...] with comparative safety and in quite a reasonable period of time.”¹³ Although the number of Americans actually able to make this trip remained a sliver of the overall population – from 1830-1860, the American consulate in Alexandria recorded an average of sixty visitors per year¹⁴ – the writings by these travelers conferred a sense of familiarity with Egypt and Palestine to the non-traveling public, enough so as to prompt an 1851 reviewer to satirize the intimacy with the sights of the Middle East presumed even by those who had never seen them:

The pyramids are quite so-soish; old Memnon's statue is an everyday acquaintance; and as for the

questions about the Dead Sea or the Holy Sepulchre, why they are talked of and discussed much as one might speculate about Mr. James's 'last.'¹⁵

Weary as this author sounds of self-appointed experts, even he promises to welcome any new work "that tends to promote a spirit of inquiry in respect to the lands far away, where our holy religion took its beginning" and that might provide truer observations of what he calls "the East." His complaint is that Americans feel far nearer to the Orient than they are – that "everybody nowadays knows all about the matter, or at least thinks he does" – and that what they need is more direct knowledge of it. Americans seemed to have agreed, and in the years following the Civil War, the sixty Americans per year in Alexandria became almost five hundred, and the publication of works written about the area continued to flourish.¹⁶ Even with this broader set of travelers, popular views on the Orient continued to be shaped by a relatively narrow viewpoint that was Protestant, primarily male, and overwhelmingly white.¹⁷

At the heart of this interest lay the biblical associations of the Holy Land, an area whose borders shifted from author to author but which always centered on Jerusalem. Yet romanticized visions of the broader Orient, with their attendant associations of the exotic and the prurient, could never be fully removed from even the most sanctified vision of the Holy Land. Nor could the Orient ever be completely detached from religious associations, for each was far too apt to bleed into the other. When Melville saw the pyramids, he wrote of them as the place where "the idea of Jehovah [was] born,"¹⁸ and, when George William Curtis climbed down into the Grotto of the Nativity in Bethlehem, he imagined himself to be entering Aladdin's cave.¹⁹ According to the mood of the observer, Arab shepherds could as easily become living dioramas of biblical patriarchs as they could become menacing savages, and Damascus could suggest Paul's conversion as much as Mohammed's refusal to enter. In some ways, this inseparability is the source of the precise conflict this paper considers: the Holy Land was too closely tied to the Christian identity to dismiss, and the Orient was too foreign to the American identity to accept. Unfortunately, their interrelation also complicates labeling the regions. As a general rule, I will try to call the physical region "the Middle East" and the imaginative construct connected to it "the Orient," reserving "the Holy Land" for the places whose primary association is biblical. As that distinction is, of course, wholly contingent on the work being discussed, my terminology will follow each author's as much as possible.

As they began to have greater contact with the Middle East, Americans reluctantly began to acknowledge that the region to which they imagined themselves closely tied, both as a spiritual homeland and as the metaphor for their sense

of national covenant, was in fact both physically real and deeply foreign. This grudging acknowledgment produced a series of shifting approaches by which authors tried to reconcile this connection to the outside with the desire to be culturally autonomous. I begin with two works of mid-century traveler George William Curtis, *Nile Notes from a Howadji* (1851) and *A Howadji in Syria* (1852), suggesting that Curtis represents a new willingness to place his nationality at a distance, yet also that, by giving himself over to the Orient, Curtis seems to have strayed too far for the comfort of his contemporaries. Caught between these two extremes, there seemed to be no way to allow for closeness between the U.S. and the icons of the Orient without threatening the integrity of the American identity. I then examine a broader set of popular works written after 1865, including Mark Twain's 1869 *Innocents Abroad* and Lew Wallace's 1880 *Ben Hur*. These works assert a new relationship between themselves and the Middle East, in which the ancient Orient could, symbolically at least, be reimagined into an American pre-history, giving the post Civil War nation a stabilizing sense of continuity and distancing the influence of the more politically potent Europe. In this approach, fascination with the Orient became an almost patriotic endeavor, and visits to the Middle East took on an air of self-congratulatory nostalgia. These authors sublimated their admiration for what they once would have seen as alien into an admiration for the roots of their own culture. From the negotiation of this connection to the outside, we can see a reflection of the changing stability of the American national identity as these authors increasingly abandoned their claims to absolute independence from the Old World in exchange for the security of a longer history.

"Oriental Intoxication": George William Curtis and the Hazards of Travel

In the nineteenth century, travel writing was a practice rooted in patriotic contrast, for voyages allowed American travelers to affirm and define their own culture by marking its difference from the cultures they observed. As Larzer Ziff writes, "defensively conscious of their want of national traditions yet aggressively proud of their new ways, [Americans] maintained a particularly strong interest in measuring those ways against the manner in which other societies met the problems of living the daily life."²⁰ From these contrasts, travel books reassured readers that they should be proud of their nationality and, in so doing, helped to secure among its readers the sense of a shared identity. Still, even this venture past American borders held the uncomfortable suggestion that the United States had somehow not been enough for the traveler. As Terry Caesar writes, "How far to go? It is an incessant theme, in the most literal ways, in American travel writing, because anywhere abroad may be

too far. And yet it is still necessary to go in the first place, if only because the measure of home does not fully suffice.”²¹ Whereas British writers write from within an unshakeable sense of Britishness – of one writer, Caesar says, “although he has been away from home, it has not been away from him” – American travelers, he argues, must learn about their identities by seeing themselves through the eyes of others, but they risk returning to a home that they no longer recognize.²² In compensation, Americans never cease to remind themselves and their readers that they are American, that their view of the world is uniquely American, and, as a general rule, that they would much prefer to be back in America.²³

George William Curtis walked this narrow line between cosmopolitan and patriot in his heavily stylized travel books, *Nile Notes of a Howadji* and *The Howadji in Syria* (both published in 1852). A fairly successful writer, Curtis’s first book, *Nile Notes*, went through a first edition run of twenty-five hundred books, within six months of publication.²⁴ After the two howadji books, Curtis took up the lecture circuit and took his place among the literary society of New York, a circle that included Longfellow, William Cullens Bryant, and Washington Irving.²⁵ Curtis’ preference for atmosphere over information helped him stand out from the other travel writers of his day; as Brian Yothers writes, “Curtis seeks, perhaps more than any of the other American Holy Land travelers of the mid-nineteenth century, to record the affective side of his Oriental journeys.”²⁶ Yet, Curtis also serves as a useful anomaly who, against the backdrop of wary travelers outlined by Caesar, stands out as a writer who initially proclaims himself eager to cast aside his nationality in exchange for a deeper communion with what he saw as the spirit of the Orient. Between his first and second books, however, Curtis creates a more detached relationship with his howadji persona, signaling the pressure that he was under to stay closer to home. While Timothy Marr analyzes “the vogue of the American ‘howadji’” – a fad of the mid-nineteenth century of travel writers assuming the guise of the Oriental travelers based on the Arabic term for traveler – as “the celebration of romantic liberty that signified the emergent power of the nation and its citizens as global players,” I suggest that the transition from provincial citizen to global player was not without its risks.²⁷ Curtis, in the depth of his cultural immersion, tested and at times exceeded the extent to which Americans felt comfortable borrowing from the Orient.

As a measure of how far Curtis departed from the typical, it is helpful to compare his approach to that taken by another author, whom Marr groups with Curtis as part of the howadji trend, John Lloyd Stephens. Published in 1837, Stephens’ *Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea, and in the Holy Land* was far from being the first piece of Ameri-

can travel writing, but its particular style of adventurous machismo led the work to great success, promoting the Near East as a destination for travel and helping to dictate the style in which those travels would be recorded.²⁸ As Larzer Ziff writes, “In the popular press [Stephens’] name and the epithet, ‘The American Traveler,’ became interchangeable.”²⁹ In terms of purely geographic destinations, *Nile Notes* and *Incidents of Travel* have a fair amount of overlap; both Curtis and Stephens make a trip from Cairo up the Nile to the cataracts, stopping at the major temples along the way. Stylistically, however, the two authors take wildly different approaches. For a brief illustration, the following are the opening sentences of chapters written about approximately the same location on the Nile, as the two travelers near the city of Asyut. Curtis exclaims:

Sherbet of roses in a fountained kiosk of Damascus can alone be more utterly oriental to the imagination and sense than the first interior view of many-minareted Asyut.³⁰

Stephens, meanwhile, presents a somewhat more concrete situation:

January 13. In the morning, the first thing I did was shoot at a flock of ducks, the next to shoot at a crocodile.³¹

Each author is in his own way self-centered. Curtis’s exuberant prose, unabashedly romantic, creates a landscape based on interior reaction; rather than describing Asyut itself, he describes the purely personal vision of “sherbet of roses in a fountained kiosk” which the city evokes to him. Stephens’ landscape is demarcated by his actions and by the encounters that he has at each site. Far from the internalized reveries of Curtis, Stephens draws a sharp distinction between his inner thoughts and the external world so that he leaves his travels essentially unchanged by them. This observation predicates a more fundamental difference in how the two travelers portray the nature of properly American interaction with the Orient.

Incidents of Travel presents travel in the Orient not as the merging of American and Oriental but as an adversarial confrontation. Even before Stephens arrives in regions threatened by Bedouin raiders (where violence might be understandable), he displays a marked aggression towards the landscape and its monuments. Beyond leisurely shooting at pigeons and crocodiles, Stephens excavates mummified birds only to describe taking the “puny birds whose skeletons we were now dashing at our feet,”³² his focus explicitly directed more at destroying monuments than gathering them. At the temple of Dendera, Stephens spots a stone bird atop a carving of Isis, only to marvel that the target “could not have been finer if the temple had been built expressly to shoot pigeons from” and to savor how “the shot went smack into the beautifully sculptured face of the goddess, and

put out one of her eyes.”³³ His violence keeps the allure of the Orient at a distance; he seems constantly compelled to demonstrate his immunity to the appeal of Isis.

In fact, it is precisely at moments when the Orient appeals to Stephens’ sentiment that his destructive tendencies are most likely to emerge. Standing at the peak of Mt. Sinai, he feels himself “lifted above the world” and “almost hurried into the wild enthusiasm”³⁴ that inspired local hermits; he recalls, “strange as the feeling may seem, my very soul cleaved to the scene around me.”³⁵ He immediately continues, “Blame me not, reader, nor think me impious, that, on the top of the holy mountain of Sinai, half-unconscious of what I did, I fired at a partridge. The sound of my gun, ringing in frequent echoes from the broken and hollow rock, startled and aroused me.”³⁶ The shot acts as a defensive response, pulling Stephens from the draw of the “wild enthusiasm” that blurs the line between American traveler and Oriental ascetic. Stephens writes that the echoes “aroused” him from his fantasy of joining the anchorites and so recalled him to his true identity.

Curtis maintains no such impunity from the land he sees, presenting himself as helplessly under the sway of the Orient, overwhelmed by its seductive foreignness. Traveling down the Nile, he declaims with an enthusiasm that is typical of the work’s tone that “Sumptuous is the South – a Syren singing us ever forward to a bliss never reached; but with each mile won she makes the pursuit more passionate.”³⁷ Though at times he, like Stephens, stages the encounter between East and West as a conflict, Curtis finds his primary delight in his Americanism being utterly overcome by the Orient. He boasts early in his voyage that “we are nothing on the Nile if not Eastern”³⁸ and – though he despises the actual Egyptians around him as “the last lees of what was a nation [...] sunken into imbecility”³⁹ – professes himself profoundly changed by the influence of Egypt itself: “Once in Egypt, you are so far removed from things familiar, that you wish to unsphere yourself entirely, to lose all trace of your own nationality, and to separate yourself from the past.”⁴⁰ Curtis quickly finds accomplices to this goal from the landscape around him. A simple palm tree becomes the beacon of a conquering empire: “The first palm undoes the West. [...] What the golden house of Nero was to a Briton contemplating a Roman soldier, is the East to the Howadji first beholding a palm.”⁴¹ The Egyptian sun becomes an equally transformative experience, stripping him of the rationality so central to the typical Western explorer’s self-image; Curtis effuses that “it melts the sterner stuff of your nature. The intellect is thawed and mellowed. Emotions take the place of thought. Sense rises into the sphere of the soul.”⁴² Eventually he abandons the Western ideals of progress entirely and “glides gently into the rear of all modern developments, and stands in the presence of

primitive feeling [...] and is an antique Arabian.”⁴³

This transformation seems still more radical when set against the background of Stephens, who as much as possible keeps his nationality in sight, at times literally. In 1852, *The Tribune* wrote of another popular travel writer that “like a good patriot [he] never slept without the stars and stripes floating above his tent,” and Stephens follows much the same model.⁴⁴ While sailing the Nile, he revels in the American flag that adorns his riverboat, where its ability to protect him from foreign harassment further fuels his patriotism. This trip, he notes, “was the first time I had myself ever raised the banner of my country, and I felt a peculiar pride in the consciousness that it could protect me so far from home.”⁴⁵ Perhaps because the United States’ ability to project its influence abroad was relatively novel, Stephens counts this chance to feel American power as one of the prime joys of traveling; among promises “of not shaving for two months, of washing your shirts in the Nile, and wearing them without being ironed,” he lures potential tourists with the pledge that “you sail under your own country’s banner; and, when you walk along the river, if the Arabs look particularly black and truculent, you proudly feel that there is safety in its folds.”⁴⁶ In Stephens’ method of travel, riverboats become small patches of sovereign soil, from whose security expeditioners can stare out with impunity at the foreign world passing by. His response to Caesar’s question “How far to go?” is to try never to leave his home.

Despite his declared readiness to abandon his identity as an American, Curtis too struggles to justify his travels to his audience. In *Nile Notes*, he is at least self-conscious enough about his motives to stage a mock debate with Emerson – whom he addresses as his “fat friend of the warm slippers” – over the dictum that “travel is a fool’s paradise”⁴⁷ and to defend Melville’s travel writings, declaring them “essentially American [...] although not singing Niagara or the Indians.”⁴⁸ His goal in each passage seems to be to reconcile the fascination that makes him want to “unsphere” himself with the duties of patriotism, and the details of each particular argument matter less than the fact that he felt obliged to make them at all. When he returns to the issue in *The Howadji in Syria*, it is with a fuller case for the necessity of forgetting oneself and one’s country when traveling, as he attempts to explain why the Song of Solomon should seem so much better at capturing the feeling of Syria than any book written by an English or American traveler:

The reason of this is, surely, that the permanent interest of various lands is intellectual. We like them for what they are to us, rather than for what they are in themselves. Yet we cannot know what they are, nor assimilate them to our own advantage, unless we are steeped in their spirit. We must be Egyptian, Syrian, Greek, Roman, or we shall

never know what Egypt, Syria, Greece, and Rome mean.⁴⁹

That he endorses becoming, at least in spirit, one with the lands he visits represents a fairly direct contrast to the usual travel writer who, as described by Caesar, “draws on their difference [abroad] like a fund” in order to create a domestic unity from the contrast.⁵⁰ Yet, the care that Curtis puts into explaining himself in both books also suggests that he expects his readers to object.

Indeed, Curtis’s true difficulty is how, having managed “to lose all trace of [his] own nationality,” he can regain it; nor is this a difficulty that he ever completely solved.⁵¹ His journey back to Cairo from the Cataracts is reluctant, and Curtis laments that “return is always sad, for return is unnatural.”⁵² The ending of *The Howadji in Syria*, in which he finally begins the voyage back to the United States, ends not with any mention of home, but with the regret that the Orient is now only memory and the fear that its memory will fade.⁵³ There are signs, though, that *The Howadji in Syria* was adapted to limit the self-abandonment of the howadji persona. Where Curtis identifies his traveling companion only by the nickname “Pacha” in *Nile Notes* and deliberately exoticizes his background by declaring, “it does not concern you, gracious reader, to know if he were Sicilian, or Syrian; whether he wore coat or kaftan, had a harem, or was a baleful bachelor,”⁵⁴ *The Howadji in Syria* straightforwardly labels him an American and sets him forth as a foil to the howadji romanticism. Thus, though the howadji narrator still lapses into eulogy, the sarcastic responses of his more practical companion make him something of a ridiculous figure more fit for the reader to deride than to imitate.⁵⁵ In place of the name “howadji,” Curtis increasingly borrows from the leader of his caravan the title “great American mogul,” an epithet that is both more flattering and more nationally specific.

Moreover, in his second book, Curtis restages the scene from *Nile Notes* in which he proclaims that the influence of the sun has made him an ancient Arabian but with far more conservative conclusion. This time, he wakes in the desert with “wild morning enthusiasm” and declares to his camel, “I will take some savage woman, she shall rear my dusky race.”⁵⁶ This resolution to give up American life for the freer life of the desert fades when Curtis fails to find any difference between tent-life and the lives of the biblical patriarchs. In imagining that stagnation, Curtis regrets his choice: “In that moment you have lost our birthright. You are Ishmael’s brother. [...] A child of the desert, not for you are Art, and Poetry, and Science, and the glowing roll of History shrivels away.”⁵⁷ If the moral were not clear enough, Curtis explains it explicitly: “So the grim Genius of the desert touches every stop of romance and of life in you [...]. Yet warm and fascinating as his breath, it does

not warp your loyalty to your native West.”⁵⁸ Where *Nile Notes* likens the East to the “song of the Syren [...] seductive, sweet,”⁵⁹ the new alliterative spirit of the land is the “grim Genius,” a much less tempting masculine figure from whom recoil is a natural response.

Despite this increased distance Curtis places between himself and the foreign world, the responses of contemporary critics to *The Howadji in Syria* and a subsequent travel book, though generally positive, remain unsure about the state of his loyalty. One explains Curtis’s infatuation away with the belief that anyone who “travels Eastward” becomes “intoxicated” by the Orient, until “even the brave Yankee head, generally firm as a knot under all circumstances, becomes agitated and wags up and down and to and fro, like a genuine Chinese mandarin.” He comments that “one of the most thoroughly seized and orientalized is the Howadji himself,” echoing Curtis’s own suggestion that he has been conquered by the Orient.⁶⁰ Another, in a tone of moral redress, rebukes Curtis for overindulging in Orientalism, writing that “after reveling long amid flowers and Syrian dreams, one aspires for the chill and stern, but pure, invigorating mountain air. We would not make our home in the warm south, where Howadji delights to dwell.”⁶¹ Still another, reviewing a travel-book set in the United States tries to redeem Curtis’s patriotism but is quickly forced to qualify his words: “American as he is, to the core, he by no means contends that the home-scenery he depicts is entitled to ‘whip creation.’ Indeed, both implicitly and explicitly his creed in this respect is a little independent of the stars and stripes.”⁶² Perhaps best summing up the difficulty is a curt suggestion attributed to Nathaniel Hawthorne that Curtis might do better to keep his writing a little closer to home: “Even the brilliant Howadji might find as rich a theme in his youthful reminiscences of Brook Farm, and a more novel one, – close at hand as it lies, – than those which he has since made so distant a pilgrimage to seek, in Syria, and along the current of the Nile.”⁶³

Whether they welcome it or not, both Curtis and his audience seem to see the Orient as having a corrosive effect on an American’s nationality, in part, because it was simply too far away to sustain a nationality still dependent on geography. Yet, what made it still more dangerous lay in its being too close – in the false familiarity that it held out to travelers like Curtis long enticed by the romances they had read of it. The arrival of the Civil War prevented most travelers, but after its end, Americans poured into the Orient with a new urgency. In my next section, I consider the nature of this urgency, arguing that the need for historical stability overcame Americans’ mistrust of the foreign and led them to strengthen the ties that first drew Curtis abroad. Where Curtis found himself slipping into the guise of the “Antique Arabian” seemingly against his will, authors following the

Civil War began to lay claim to that figure as a cultural progenitor, a sort of non-biological ancestor who could provide a reassuring tie to a deeper vein of tradition than American history could itself provide.

Writing an American History of the Middle East



Illustration from *Innocents Abroad* showing Mark Twain's travel party inspecting an Egyptian sarcophagus.
(Taken from Project Gutenberg)

An early example of this interest in the Orient as a historical repository came in July of 1865, when an unsigned column entitled “The Meeting of the West and the East” appeared in *The American Quarterly Church Review and Ecclesiastical Register*. The article opens with a fairly standard discussion of what was then a popular subject, a sorting of the races into the tribes of the three sons of Noah: Ham, Shem, and Japheth. To Ham, it attributes groups including the Cushites and Ethiopians; to Shem, the groups still sometimes known as Semitic; and to Japheth, groups including Armenians, Persians, and Teutons. It claims that the history of human civilization is based in three waves of migrations caused when each of these groups arose in the Middle East and spread outward. The author then begins the second paragraph with a more pertinent point, asking “but what is all this to us in the United States?”⁶⁴ Thus positioned, the carefully considered history of the rise and subsequent fall of each race appears to be a relic from the Old World, a tradition severed by the Atlantic and offering no clear status for the United States. By so presenting themselves as cut off from European notions of history, this columnist and the other authors in this section struggled to rewrite history in order to accommodate their nation.

In addition to “The Meeting of the West and the East,” I draw primarily from four texts: Mark Twain’s *Innocents Abroad, or The New Pilgrims’ Progress* (1869), Lew Wallace’s *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ* (1880), Joaquin Miller’s *The Ship in the Desert* (1875), and Cyrus R. Newcomb’s *The Book of Algonah* (1884).⁶⁵ In form and genre, they have little to

do with one another, ranging from swashbuckling romance to a fringe theory of Native American history; yet, their responses to the Orient are, by and large, in striking accord. Though perhaps first drawn by the exoticism of the Middle East, they are most struck, not by its opulence or its harems, but by its age. This fascination certainly includes the basic contrast between “Old” and “New” Worlds, but these authors create a more subtle imaginative geography than a simple hemispheric divide. Rather than reveling in the novelty and promise of the New World, they seek to embed their national identity in the more permanent framework of Old World history, but they do not lay claim to tradition indiscriminately. Already possessing a sense of familiarity from its biblical associations, the Middle Eastern Orient became a reassuring touchstone for American culture that served as a means of shifting the origins of the nation from simply existing as an offshoot of Europe to representing the inevitable culmination of a history begun far earlier.

As these authors imagined a connection between the United States and the Middle East, they began to sense strange echoes of the American in the Middle Eastern. When Mark Twain wrote the Middle Eastern portion of the Mediterranean circuit which he records in *Innocents Abroad* (1869), he likened Bedouins to Digger Indians, the pyramid of Cheops to bluffs over the Mississippi, and the sea of Galilee to Lake Tahoe.⁶⁶ As Hilton Obenzinger remarks, Twain’s “Holy Land ends up in California.”⁶⁷ Obenzinger analyzes this trend in *Innocents Abroad* as a symptom of the imperial fervor of westward expansion – a projection of what he calls “the core narrative of settler dominance in a colonizing society that must will itself into existence constantly” onto the biblical narrative of the Jewish settlement of Israel.⁶⁸ For Obenzinger, the major concern that Twain faced the Middle East was American assertion of authority, so this appropriation of the Orient becomes the imaginative counterpart to the invasion of the West. Obenzinger’s argument spends little time, though, on the discomfort which these authors seemed to feel upon leaving the hemisphere to which they felt entitled and arriving in one in which the label “American” carried far less weight. He seems to disregard the sway which European influence held over how these authors presented their relations to the rest of world and how uneasily they sought to establish a culture separate from Europe’s. Likewise, Obenzinger focuses on the half of *Innocents Abroad* set in the Orient, almost entirely passing over Twain’s time in Europe, and certainly excluding the possibility that these two halves might be related.

These authors, though they may have ascribed to the nationalist grandeur of Manifest Destiny, show keen awareness of their nation’s relative insignificance. In *Innocents Abroad*, Twain recounts his fellow tourists’ pride, wryly proclaiming that “we always took care to make it understood

that we were Americans—Americans!” but continues to say that they learned that “a good many foreigners had hardly ever heard of America, and that a good many more knew it only as a barbarous province away off somewhere, that had lately been at war with somebody.”⁶⁹ Despite this deflation, Twain concludes:

Many and many a simple community in the Eastern hemisphere will remember for years the incursion of the strange horde in the year of our Lord 1867, that called themselves Americans, and seemed to imagine in some unaccountable way that they had a right to be proud of it.⁷⁰

Insistent upon being patriotic, Twain nevertheless inspects his countrymen from the outside, anxious about the impression they make and defensive lest the “strange horde” be looked down upon. Where Obenzinger’s approach to what he labels the “Holy Land mania” focuses upon the way that Americans used the story of the Israelites’ covenant with God to back their belief in Manifest Destiny, I argue that the connection which authors created between the United States and the Middle East was directed not only westward in asserting their right to expand, but also eastward with an eye to Europe, asserting their right to exist.

This image of Americans as a “strange horde” of upstarts has especial potency when placed alongside the Middle East’s authority as a symbol of supreme antiquity. Twain rhapsodizes that “to Damascus, years are only moments, decades are only flitting trifles of time,” for “she measures time, not by days and months and years, but by the empires she has seen rise, and prosper and crumble to ruin. She is a type of immortality.”⁷¹ The history has a dizzying effect on Twain, who complains “how it wears a man out to have to read up a hundred pages of history every two or three miles” of his journey in Palestine and “how wearily, how bewilderingly [historical sites] swarm about your path!”⁷² The very stability that Americans perceived in the Middle East had a destabilizing effect upon their vision of their nation, a sobering dose of the relative unimportance of the United States in the scale of global history. The monuments of Pompeii lead Twain to wonder how much an encyclopedia from the year 5868 would remember of U.S. Grant – he proposes that it will list a “Uriah S. (or Z.) Graunt” as a “popular poet of ancient times in the Aztec provinces of the United States of British America” who “was a contemporary of Scharkspyre, the English poet” – a humorous moment, until Twain concludes, “These thoughts sadden me,” and turns away from a joke that has become maudlin.⁷³

Twain observes in, or projects onto, his traveling companions a similar obsession with history, though theirs is of a more straightforwardly acquisitive nature; any ancient monument that the group visits becomes fair game for

souvenir collectors. As Twain recounts, they “broke off fragments from Noah’s tomb; from the exquisite sculptures of the temples of Baalbec; from the houses of Judas and Ananias, in Damascus; from the tomb of Nimrod the Mighty Hunter,” even “hacking and chipping these old arches here that Jesus looked upon in the flesh.”⁷⁴ Yet this urge exists almost exclusively in the Orient; the Louvre, the Uffizi, and St. Peter’s all escape unscathed. The ardency of the tourists in the Middle East underscores their preference for it over Europe, a point which Twain makes explicit during his summary of the tour, writing that “we had cared nothing much about Europe.” But of the Holy Land, he says, “it was easy to see that that was the grand feature of the expedition,” because, “well, we were at home in Palestine.”⁷⁵ A boast perhaps, but a revealing one given the range of discomfort and loathing which Twain directed to most of its residents, for somewhere among the “vermin-tortured vagabonds” he found a history which he is more willing to claim than all the art of the Renaissance.⁷⁶

A similarly selective history lies at the heart of *Ben-Hur*. A historical romance about the parallel lives of the title character and Jesus, its first section, logically enough, is devoted to a lengthy portrayal of the nativity, but this is not the opening scene of the novel. Before shifting his view to the birth itself, Wallace imagines a heavily allegorical meeting of the three wise men. Each of the three men personifies one of the three cardinal virtues (faith, love, and charity), and each represents one of the three civilizations that Wallace considered foundational to the world’s history. Gaspar the Greek, as the boyish delegate of the youngest tradition, speaks first for the place of his nation as “a land which may never be forgotten; if only because the world is too much its debtor” because of its perfection of writing.⁷⁷ The next speaker, Melchior, a Brahmin exiled from India, politely argues that, “ages before [Gaspar’s] people were known,” it was his people who were “the first to walk in the fields of knowledge, first to divide them, first to make them beautiful.”⁷⁸ But Balthasar the Egyptian speaks last and most decisively:

There are many distinctions I might claim for my race [...] but I will content myself with one. History began with us. We were the first to perpetuate events by records kept. So we have no traditions; and instead of poetry we offer you certainty. [...] Older than the Vedas of Para-Brahm, or the Up-Angas of Vyasa, O Melchior; older than the songs of Homer of the metaphysics of Plato, O my Gaspar; [...] oldest of human records are the writings of Menes, our first king.⁷⁹

Balthasar presents this earliest Egypt as a nation still in what he calls its “purity,” both religiously and racially.⁸⁰ He explains that, while originally monotheistic, Egypt eventu-

ally adopted the “rude faith” of Ethiopians who “quieted [their] souls by the worship of animals, birds, and insects” and laments the “deep debasement” into which “the sons of the Aryan fell.”⁸¹ Thus Wallace begins his historical romance with a discussion of history itself and to whom it belongs, depicting the Near East as, though fallen, the wellspring, not only of civilization in general, but of history itself.

Much like Twain’s declaration of Palestine as “the grand feature of the expedition,” Wallace’s focus on the Orient undercuts conventional narratives of European superiority. That the chief villains of the story are Roman – the bulk of Ben-Hur’s story lies in his attempts to avenge a betrayal by a Roman friend and to overthrow Roman authority as whole – naturally aligns the reader with Judea and against the civilization often claimed as the predecessor for modern Europe. To some extent, this reflects traditional interpretations of the Gospels, but Wallace allows almost no moral ambiguity to his Romans, preferring to dwell instead on the depth of their corruption.⁸² The other possible ancestors for Europe fare no better. When they do appear, it is as primitive savages such as “red-haired savages from Hibernia”⁸³ or Thord the Northman, “a low-browed, yellow-haired Saxon, of such brutalized face as to attract a second look from Ben-Hur,” who is “scarred with the wounds of many battles, and imbruted by ferocious passions.”⁸⁴ His vague anthropological interest simply groups them as pagans alongside countless other civilizations, without preference or distinction:

In the oak-woods of Britain the Druids held their followers; Odin and Freya maintained their godships in Gaul and Germany and among the Hyperboreans; Egypt was satisfied with her crocodiles and Anubis; the Persians were yet devoted to Ormuzd and Ahriman, holding them in equal honor; in hope of the Nirvana, the Hindoos moved on patient as ever in the rayless paths of Brahm; the beautiful Greek mind, in pauses of philosophy, still sang the heroic gods of Homer; while in Rome nothing was so common and cheap as gods.⁸⁵

There is nothing the least bit exalted about the ancestors of the British or the French, nor any predecessors to contemporary Europe with the exception of the Greeks, whose civilization Wallace discusses elsewhere as entrancing but overly sensual.⁸⁶ Far from even honoring Europeans as fellow Christian nations, Wallace ultimately credits the very survival of Christianity to his Oriental hero as the builder of the catacombs that sheltered it from them.⁸⁷ Passages such as the one above act as a sort of historical leveling, a refusal to give special status to the ancestors claimed by European history, unless it is as central villains.

Though these two texts would likely have had the

broadest impact – *Innocents Abroad* sold a half a million copies by 1910 with an additional audience from its first appearance as newspapers columns,⁸⁸ and *Ben-Hur* sold 1.2 million copies by 1901⁸⁹ – the urge to claim Oriental history extended to a number of lesser known authors as well. Amid the nineteenth century’s craze for Egyptology, for instance, the anonymously published work, *The Book of Algoonah* – set out on its title page to be “a concise account of the history of the early people of the continent of America, known as Mound Builders” – proceeds to trace the history of the Mound Builders from their exile from a region called Gehalehmot, located between Egypt and Assyria, to their discovery and settlement of a land across the sea. The imagination of the author represents a response, if an extreme one, to more general concerns. Much as the authors discussed throughout this paper have done, Newcomb forges a pseudo-biblical history that weaves the allure of the Middle East into an acclamation of American grandeur. In his introduction, Newcomb sets forth parallels between the monuments of Ancient Egypt and the mounds of the United States, concluding that – though the mounds of the United States have deteriorated more because they were subject to greater humidity and, more importantly, because they are “very much older” than those of Egypt – sufficient similarity remains to establish the “perfection of design” and its associated “mystery deep and almost unfathomable.”⁹⁰ Not only does he claim to have discovered a historical record linking the American continent to the ancient Middle East, and in fact rivaling its antiquity, but Newcomb also literally rewrites history to include the United States itself; upon his deathbed, a “spirit of futurity” seizes Algoonah, the king of the Mound Builders, and prompts him to prophesy both the rise of his own people and that of a subsequent nation:

Lo, I see a nation renowned and great, and they spread from one end of the land even unto the other; and the workmanship of their hands shall tell their history unto another nation, who shall abide in this land; and this other nation shall be mighty and strong and shall stand forever; for their government shall be founded on the everlasting principles of truth and justice.⁹¹

The actual content of the propaganda, that the United States would be “mighty and strong and [...] stand forever” through its propensity to “truth and justice,” reveals rather less than Newcomb’s decision to include it. The extreme anachronism of the declaration not only forges a powerful tie between the American nation and the Holy Land but also rewrites the history of the Holy Land itself as a teleological progression which leads inevitably to the establishment of the United States. Far from lacking a national history, the United States in *The Book of Algoonah* is intrinsic

to the most ancient of stories.

Though it is less blatantly done, *The Ship in the Desert* deploys a similar strategy of pairing the United States of the nineteenth century with the Orient of ancient times, so that shifts between Arabian and American desert become as much temporal as spatial. More atmospheric than plot-driven,⁹² the poem centers loosely on a legend of a pirate's flight across the Western desert to the Pacific. Though Miller opens with a series of what are now conventional frontier scenes – “a skin-clad trapper,” “a tawny chief of Shoshonee,” “bearded miners, gray and old, / and resolute in search of gold” – the Americana soon slides into a decidedly Oriental strain.⁹³ The comparison is sometimes based in the straightforward similarity of terrain, as when Miller speaks of “parched lands like Syria, dust, and ashes, and alkali,” but more often, the link is far from obvious: the dew “lie like manna” on the ground; travelers who learn the night skies are like “Chaldean shepherds”; Native American lodges become “strip'd pyramids of painted men”; a Native American himself is deemed to be “the tawny Ishmaelite”; and the American settlers are “each man notable and tall, / A kingly and unconscious Saul.”⁹⁴ This fixation cannot be explained by any spiritual impulse, for Miller never calls upon religion; his transposition of the Holy Land trades upon purely secular history, upon the physical signs of the Holy Land. Instead, his landscape itself seems unstable, shifting constantly between the two deserts.

Indeed, the most unifying element of the poem's various strands is the figure from which the title was drawn, an ancient ship, full of gold, stranded in the desert. As an unnamed miner explains, it is a relic, not only from biblical times, but from biblical kingdoms:

'Tis from some long-lost ship,' he said,
‘Some laden ship of Solomon
That sail'd these lonesome seas upon
In search of Ophir's mine, ah me!
That sail'd this dried-up desert sea.’⁹⁵

This imposition of Solomon upon American soil lends the land a sense of history, much in the way that Newcomb's stories of the mounds provided a version of Native American tradition with which Americans were more willing to identify themselves. Yet Miller declares far more explicitly that the action is a defensive reflex. When speaking of the United States as “That old, old land which men call new, / That land as old as time is old,” the focus falls on the dismissive note of the men from the Old World who deny the Americas' history by labeling them the New World and on Miller's determination to correct them.⁹⁶ His eagerness to deflate the notion that the civilization radiated out from Europe alone forms itself into a questioning of those worshippers of Europe:

Who shall say:
My father rear'd a pyramid;
My brother clipp'd the dragon's wings;
My mother was Semiramis;⁹⁷
Yea, harps strike idly out of place;
Men sing of savage Saxon kings
New-born and known but yesterday,
And Norman blood presumes to say...⁹⁸

Miller never reveals just what Norman blood presumes to say, presumably being unwilling to provide it with even an indirect podium, yet the point is clear: the United States may be a young country but, relative to the Orient, so is Europe. Moreover, in linking themselves to the Orient, Americans were able to trade rhetorically on that antiquity.

To return to “The Meeting of the West and the East,” the racial history presented in its opening appears at first to be a familiar example of the West's self-serving racial hierarchies. The body of the piece unfolds a far different picture. What the article's opening mentions fairly casually, that each of the three supposed races had their origins in the Orient, arises again more pointedly. There, the declaration that “Asia is the mother of the human race” is paired with an acerbic riff on the folly of Europe's self-satisfaction:

All the arts we used to read of in our boyhood
as invented by our European ancestors, all, in
the germ or perfected, came from Asia. Through
[...] many a channel, the East conferred its arts
and sciences upon Europe. And then, one man,
forsooth! invented Gunpowder; [...]; another, Ar-
tesian wells; – and Europe sang triumphantly the
genius of her sons.⁹⁹

The author taunts the European self-satisfaction to which he and his compatriots have been exposed since their youth. This role takes on so much preeminence that Asian inventions hold importance only in so far as they detract from the list of European inventions; the author strips Europe of all of its signs of civilization, “all the arts we used to read of in our boyhood,” and so transfers that sense of superiority to the Orient.

This strain of the Orient as the true source of American culture repeats throughout the column. The author notes, while the history of his biological ancestors in Europe is “obscure, nay, unknown, for thousands of years,”¹⁰⁰ “Shinar, Nineveh, and Babylon are household words, known and familiar to our childhood.”¹⁰¹ He declares the history of the Jewish people, a group which he labels as “an Asiatic tribe,” to be the “central current of all history” (280). The article dwells on the centrality of the Middle East to Christianity, noting that, of its foundational figures, “all were Shemites, speaking the Aramean or Syriac tongue! And none of them were of the Roman race; – none spoke Latin as their

vernacular.”¹⁰² He exhorts readers to reexamine their traditions, telling them to “look again at the Scriptures” and to heed the origin of biblical characters: “Job, the Idumean Prince; Moses, born by the ancient Nile; Samuel, and Solomon, and Isaiah, from Jerusalem; Daniel, from Persia [...]; and Jeremiah, from Babylon, – all these form and frame our ideas from childhood.”¹⁰³ This recurrent emphasis on childhood makes the Orient into an almost domestic entity, suggesting that it has been bred into his readers from the beginning.

All of this maneuvering is directed at explaining the article’s answer to its own question, mentioned earlier: “But what is all this to the United States?” The article immediately responds to itself, declaring that it is “this, that WE are the last result of that emigration that began from Hindu Koosh, in the grey dawn of time. We are the ultimate form which the Indo-Germanic race has assumed, in its last and final abode [emphasis in original].”¹⁰⁴ For the author, the Orient’s power lies less in any qualities intrinsic to it, than in its ability to destabilize European boasts and more firmly establish those made by Americans. By beginning his national history with the Orient, he is able to establish a trajectory in which the American nation is the culmination of a teleological progression, instead of a transient offshoot of Europe. True, this progression may have involved what he calls a “sojourn in Europe”¹⁰⁵ but that time is negligible when compared with the mission to found the United States positioned at the “grey dawn of time” in Hindu Koosh.¹⁰⁶ Thus, we cannot fully understand the draw of the Holy Land to these authors without considering its place as an alternative to Europe, one offering the United States a way to recast their history so that it had origins beyond a colonial past. When Americans connected themselves to the history of the Orient, that imagined tie had the effect of distancing them from European history – much as Miller displaced the European claim to have discovered America with his inclusion of Semitic explorers from the age of Solomon. Moreover, the Holy Land offered Americans access to a time when Europe did not have dominance over the world and, thus, allowed them see that dominance as an impermanent status, not proof of absolute superiority.

Afterword

In the long run, the tendency of the United States to fall back to the history of the Orient proved to be a temporary measure as the nation set about the business of constructing a historical narrative based on its own soil, signified by places unquestionably their own. Most prominently, on July 4th, 1884, the capstone was set to what was then the tallest building in the world – an obelisk built on the National Mall to honor the country’s first president. As a contemporary describes the connotations of such a structure, “the

obelisk is the symbol of the perpetual past, holding in its changeless unity, as in its carved sides, the memories of former ages.”¹⁰⁷ Under this interpretation, the Washington Monument represented a claim to a self-contained history, an absorption of Egyptian form into domestic symbolism that allowed Americans to journey to a marker of their collective past, their “changeless unity,” without leaving their borders. I would not want to overemphasize its importance, but the Washington Monument does represent a powerful assertion of an increased American confidence sprung partially from the prosperity of the Gilded Age and partially from the sense of a greater history that any nation earns by the mundane process of aging. As the nation matured and gathered sites like the Washington Monument, the need to look to the Orient for historical anchors became less pressing.

This does not mean that the image of the Orient vanished from American minds. Though its spiritual associations never disappeared – even today, tours of the biblical sites of Israel draw on the same representations of the Holy Land as the “Fifth Gospel” that was common to writers of the nineteenth century¹⁰⁸ – as Vogel notes, the decline of Protestantism as a social force led to a subsequent decline in the level of general familiarity with biblical geography.¹⁰⁹ In its place, the Middle East increasingly became a site of American trade and tourism, so that starting around the turn of the century, when Americans went to the Middle East, they went with a sense of themselves as representatives of a world power.¹¹⁰ Where Twain wrote in 1869 that his group “found that a good many foreigners had hardly ever heard of America, and that a good many more knew it only as a barbarous province away off somewhere,”¹¹¹ the traveler Henry van Dyke wrote in 1908 of a Lebanese town so “full of Americanism” that he can hardly escape it:

At almost every street corner some young man who has been in the United States or Canada salutes us with: “How are you to-day? You fellows come from America? What’s the news there? I voted for McKinley. [...] America free – good government – good place to live. Gee whiz! I go back quick, you bet.”¹¹²

Even taking into account Twain’s deliberate self-deprecation, there is a clear difference in the relationship the authors see between the United States and the Orient. In van Dyke’s account, the foreignness has dropped out and, with it, the risk that the Americans will somehow lose themselves to the Orient. Likewise, in another scene, when he writes of the obligatory “bronzed Arabs of the desert, in striped burnoose and white kaftan,” he also introduces a new figure to the scene: “Between them lies their latest purchase, a brand-new patent carpet-sweeper, made in Ohio, and going, who knows where among the hills of the

Bashan.¹¹³ By the time van Dyke was writing, he seemed to believe that the flow of culture had begun to reverse; where once Americans had needed the Orient to define themselves, Americans were becoming more interested in showing themselves shaping the world of the Middle East. Hence, gradually, the anxiety of outside influence seems to have become less immediate than the desire to project themselves outward.

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- 1 Fuad Sha'ban, *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: The Roots of Orientalism in America* (Durham, North Carolina: The Acorn Press, 1991), 3.
 - 2 Timothy Marr, *The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3-5.
 - 3 John Davis' *Landscapes of Belief* and Lester I. Vogel's *To See a Promised Land* also make similar arguments about the importance of the Holy Land in American culture. Davis, like Sha'ban, argues that images of the Holy Land were linked with images of the New World rhetorically staking North America as a "Promised Land" granted by God. Vogel presents a broad, historical overview how the inflated expectations that Americans held for the Holy Land shaped their experiences with the place itself.
 - 4 Sha'ban, *Islam and Arabs*, 1-27.
 - 5 Marr, *Cultural Roots*, 21-56.
 - 6 Larzer Ziff, *Return Passages: Great American Travel Writing, 1780-1910* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2000), 17-57.
 - 7 Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2007), 92-96.
 - 8 Jerusalem, the first choice, was deemed too politically unstable. Even from the relative security of Beirut, however, their educational efforts had greater permanence than their religious endeavors; as Ottoman law banned the conversion of Muslims, missionaries resigned themselves to the conversion of other sects of Christians to Protestantism – a task which they saw as necessary but rather less urgent (Oren 92-96).
 - 9 Oren, *Power, Faith* 152.
 - 10 Oren, 160.
 - 11 Lester I. Vogel, *To See a Promised Land: Americans and the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 169-172.
 - 12 Marr, *Cultural Roots*, 266.
 - 13 "Traveling to the Holy Land," *New York Evangelist*, July 11, 1850 (American Periodicals Series Online), 110.
 - 14 Oren, *Power, Faith* 152.
 - 15 "The Lands of the Moslem," *The Literary World*. Apr 19, 1851 (American Periodicals Series Online), 314.
 - 16 Oren, *Power, Faith* 228.
 - 17 Vogel, *To see a Promised Land* 36.
 - 18 Jay Leyda, ed., *The Melville Log: A Documentary Life of Herman Melville, 1819-1891*, Vol. 2. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951), 542.
 - 19 George William Curtis. *The Howadji in Syria*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1852), 170.
 - 20 Ziff, *Return Passage*, 7.
 - 21 Terry Caesar, *Forgiving the Boundaries: Home as Abroad in American Travel Writing*, (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1995), 43.
 - 22 *Ibid.*, 41.
 - 23 *Ibid.*, 39-40.
 - 24 Edward Cary, *George William Curtis*, (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1899), 59-60.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, 81-84.
 - 26 Brian Yothers. *The Romance of the Holy Land in American Travel Writing, 1790-1876*, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 74.
 - 27 Marr, *Cultural Roots*, 265.
 - 28 *Ibid.*, 268.
 - 29 Ziff, *Return Passage*, 59.
 - 30 George William Curtis, *Nile Notes of a Howadji*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1851), 86.
 - 31 John Lloyd Stephens, *Incidents of Travel in Egypt, Arabia Petraea, and the Holy Land*, (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 50.
 - 32 *Ibid.*, 133.
 - 33 *Ibid.*, 70.
 - 34 *Ibid.*, 190.
 - 35 *Ibid.*, 189.
 - 36 *Ibid.*, 190.
 - 37 Curtis, *Nile Notes*, 204.
 - 38 *Ibid.*, 34.
 - 39 *Ibid.*, 165.
 - 40 *Ibid.*, 74.
 - 41 *Ibid.*, 148.
 - 42 *Ibid.*, 96.
 - 43 *Ibid.*, 97.
 - 44 "Review 3," *The International Monthly Magazine of Literature, Science and Art*, April 1, 1852 (American Periodicals Series Online), 558.
 - 45 Curtis, *Nile Notes*, 40.
 - 46 Stephens, *Incidents of Travel*, 135.
 - 47 Curtis, *Nile Notes*, 112.
 - 48 *Ibid.*, 201.
 - 49 Curtis, *Syria*, 82.
 - 50 Caesar, *Forgiving the Boundaries*, 45.
 - 51 Curtis, *Nile Notes*, 74.
 - 52 *Ibid.*, 210.
 - 53 Curtis, *Syria*, 304.
 - 54 Curtis, *Nile Notes*, 15.
 - 55 *Ibid.*, 48.

- 56 "The Howadji in Syria," *The Literary World*, May 15, 1852 (American Periodicals Series Online), 61.
- 57 Curtis, *Syria*, 62.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Curtis, *Nile Notes*, 96.
- 60 "The Howadji in Syria," 343.
- 61 "Untitled Review," *The Universalist Quarterly and General Review*. January 1853 (American Periodicals Series Online), 2.
- 62 "George William Curtis," *The Eclectic Magazine of Foreign Literature*, November 1853 (American Periodicals Series Online), 349.
- 63 Ibid., 350.
- 64 "The Meeting of the West and the East," *American Quarterly Church Review, and Ecclesiastical Register (1858-1870)*. July 1865 (American Periodicals Online), 274.
- 65 The book itself is unsigned, but as the copyright is secured to a Cyrus R. Newcomb and Co., I will, for the sake of simplicity, designate the author by that name.
- 66 Mark Twain, *Innocents Abroad, or the New Pilgrims' Progress*, (New York: Signet, 1966) 394, 456, 365.
- 67 Hilton Obenzinger, *American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and the Holy Land Mania*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 193.
- 68 Ibid., xiii.
- 69 Twain, *Innocents Aboard*, 469.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 Ibid., 327.
- 72 Ibid., 385.
- 73 Ibid., 242.
- 74 Ibid., 338.
- 75 Ibid., 471.
- 76 Ibid., 363.
- 77 Lew Wallace, *Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ*, (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1953), 19.
- 78 Ibid., 22, 21.
- 79 Ibid., 26.
- 80 Ibid., 19.
- 81 Ibid., 20, 21.
- 82 The two most sympathetic Roman characters are Ben-Hur's adoptive father, a sea-captain who wishes to free Ben-Hur from the galley in order to train him as a gladiator, and the chief villain himself, who was a childhood friend of Ben-Hur while living in Jerusalem but who becomes morally bereft after studying in Rome.
- 83 Ireland.
- 84 Wallace, *Ben-Hur*, 142, 376, 384.
- 85 Ibid., 272.
- 86 Ibid., 202-203.
- 87 Ibid., 559-560.
- 88 Obenzinger, *American Palestine* 165.
- 89 "Is There a New Literary Centre?" *Current Literature*, April 1901 (*ProQuest Historical Newspapers*)
- 90 *The Book of Algonab: Being a Concise Account of the History of the Early People of the Continent of America Known as Mound Builders*, (St. Louis, Missouri: Little & Becker, 1884), 4.
- 91 Ibid., 351.
- 92 Miller, in fact, apologizes that there should be any plot at all. Addressing his parents in the preface, he writes, "You [...] will pardon the thread of fiction on which I have strung these scenes and descriptions of a mighty land of mystery, [...] for the world will have its way, and like a spoiled child, demands a tale" (ix).
- 93 Joaquin Miller, *The Ship in the Desert*, (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1875), 13, 14, 19.
- 94 Ibid., 99, 75, 64, 16, 65.
- 95 Ibid., 20.
- 96 Ibid., 102.
- 97 Semiramis is a mythological queen associated with Babylon. The meaning of the previous line ("clipp'd the dragon's wings") may originate from a Christmas play, which William Sandys included in an 1833 collection of Christmas material. In the play, St. George, who is presented as the "only son and heir" of the King of Egypt, boasts that he "will clip [the dragon's] wings" (175). If this is truly the intended reference, then Miller's appropriation of England's patron saint to demonstrate England's inferiority makes his comparison even more pointed.
- 98 Miller, *The Ship* 124.
- 99 "The Meeting of the West and the East," 278.
- 100 Ibid.
- 101 Ibid., 279.
- 102 "The Meeting of the West and the East," 281.
- 103 Ibid., 280.
- 104 Ibid., 274.
- 105 Ibid.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 Hugh Macmillan, "A walk to church in Rome, *The Sunday magazine*, vol. 6 (London: Daldy, Isbister and Company, 1877), 478.
- 108 Compare, for instance, the promotional material for former Gov. Mike Huckabee's 2010 tour of Israel and the introduction to Jesse Lyman Hurlbut's 1900 *Traveling in the Holy Land through Stereoscope*.
- 109 Vogel, 219-220.
- 110 Oren, *Power, Faith*, 308.
- 111 Twain, *Innocents Abroad*, 505.
- 112 Henry van Dyke, *Out-of-Doors in the Holy Land: Impressions of Travel in Body and Spirit*, (New York: Charles Scribners' and Sons, 1908), 305.
- 113 Ibid., 12.

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Biographies for the Authors of *Slideshow*



Greg Allen is a senior Kling fellow graduating with a degree in Political Science. He is originally from Overland Park, Kansas, where he developed an early interest in International Affairs that he has continued in college. His main research interests now focus on the intersection of bureaucratic organizations and individual psychology. He would like to thank his mentor, Andrew Rehfeld, whose guidance has been instrumental at every stage of this project.



Robin Ashley Meyer's curiosity about languages and the thoughts of the people who speak them led her to pursue majors in Anthropology and Spanish and a minor in Applied Linguistics. Questions raised in her Language across Cultures and Language and Politics classes regarding issues of identity and language use in communities with more than one official language served as the inspiration for her project on bilingualism in the Basque Country, which focuses on ideologies of language and how they impact language policy and the use of Euskara in the region. She would like to say "*Eskerrik asko!*" "Thank you!" to all of her mentors who have helped and inspired her at various stages of her project, especially those in St. Louis, MO; Boise, ID; Manteca and Riverside, CA; Madrid, Spain; and San Sebastian in the Spanish Basque Country. In addition to the Fellowship, Robin has participated in Flute Choir and worked with freshmen as a writing mentor, peer advisor, and teaching assistant while at Washington University. Robin plans to spend a year or two outside of academia before entering a language and culture-related Ph.D. program.



Travis W. Proctor is a Senior Religious Studies major and Classics minor. His research interests include Christian origins, Greek Patristics, demons in Late Antique religion, and Christian-Muslim relations in history. Travis plans to pursue a Ph.D. in Ancient Mediterranean Religions at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill following graduation. After graduate work, he aims to continue his research and teaching through an academic career in Religious Studies. In addition to academics, Travis remains active in several campus activities, including the Phi Delta Theta Fraternity, Theta Alpha Kappa Religious Studies Honorary, Eta Sigma Phi Classics Honorary, and the Overflow Greek Life Small Group. Travis is originally from Fort Scott, KS, where he attended and graduated from Fort Scott High School.



Laura Soderberg, from Little Rock, Arkansas, will complete her undergraduate degree with a double major in English Literature and Physics. For the past few years, she has been active in the campus's Writing Center and with the service organization APO. Her research interests center on how American authors position their national identity in relation to the rest of the world, with particular interest in periodicals and popular fiction of the nineteenth century. In the fall, she plans to begin a doctoral program in English literature.

The Inquiry



foreword

We [the American people] can, within a ten-year span, provide decent housing for every family, make adequate jobs available for every able-bodied person, provide the kind of education that each child is able to absorb, make accessible medical care for all, abolish poverty and malnutrition, and permit each man to advance on his merit without his being penalized because he is black.

President John F. Kennedy could predict that in ten years we would place a man on the moon, and his prophecy came true [...]. If we can set a timetable to get to the moon [...] God knows we can set a timetable to build a more just society. It's a matter of national will and commitment. It is also a matter of individual responsibility.

Dr. Benjamin E. Mays

Several years ago, our program took on the name of Dr. Benjamin E. Mays (1894-1984), who was for many years the distinguished president of Morehouse, the renowned historically black college for men in Atlanta, Georgia. Reading Dr. Mays's words, we can see that he possessed a clear vision for American society, a vision forged as he struggled against the country's oppression of its black citizens. Though his particular experiences as an African-American man shaped his definition of a "just society," the passage above indicates that the reach of his vision was universal, extending to everyone—"every family" deserved a good home; good health care was a necessity "for all," and

so on. It is entirely fitting that our program bears the name of Dr. Mays as a tribute to his commitment to equity and justice.

The Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship Program provides college juniors and seniors, particularly those from underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, with the opportunity to explore what it means to be a college professor. Working on their own independent research projects with expert faculty mentors, the Fellows form an intellectual community in a special seminar that they attend for the two years they are in the program. They give presentations, offer each other feedback on their writing, and hear from guest speakers who provide information about everything from how to apply to graduate school to networking in an academic environment. It has been my honor to serve as one of the instructors for the seminar for the past several years. I cherish working with the Fellows not only because they are talented, motivated, and intellectually independent but also because they embody the spirit of Dr. Mays. Their research projects are based in a host of disciplines, but a unifying theme is their commitment to social justice and equity, a commitment of the sort that enabled Dr. Mays to inspire generations of young Morehouse men to seek meaningful and transformative work in the world.

Briefly, here are some of the specifics of our seniors' research projects, as represented by the articles in this volume. In her essay, Tiffany Johnson interprets the critically-

acclaimed HBO series *The Wire* through the lens of social theory, in order to analyze the show's depiction of the education of black boys in impoverished urban neighborhoods. Drawing upon serious research that she performed in Italian archives, Selam Kidane explains how the Italian government utilized the Eritrean Orthodox Church to help control its Eritrean colony during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Applying the theoretical framework of discourse analysis, Latasha Kinnard's article contends that racial and ethnic minorities should not have to conform to the linguistic and behavioral norms of the dominant culture to be successful. Based upon his own original fieldwork, Tim Shaw's novel research employs social capital theory to explore the relationships formed between volunteers for and clients of the Appalachia Service Project. Finally, Marley Williams's thought-provoking article examines the history of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, attempting to understand the ways in which it both represents a "culmination of centuries of activism and protest" and also is a catalyst for future indigenous activism in the arena of international law.

We may not yet have achieved Dr. Mays's vision for the nation or the world, but I am encouraged that young people such as our Mellon Mays Fellows, who are capable of producing this caliber of work, are on the case.

1 Benjamin E. Mays, *Born to Rebel: An Autobiography*. With a Revised Foreword by Orville Vernon Burton (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 321.

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Finding a Voice Amid the Silence: An Analysis of Social Reproduction Theory in *The Wire*

Tiffany A. Johnson

Abstract: *The purpose of this research is to analyze the role of schools in shaping the experiences of Black male youth in impoverished, urban areas in America. Using the HBO series The Wire as a cultural case study, I argue that the boys' work ethics and aspirations, family situations, and performance in schools all play critical roles in contributing to their prospects for the future. Jay MacLeod's social reproduction theory, which identifies barriers to social mobility that prevent an individual from achieving American ideals of success, provides the framework for my research. By examining the attitudes of two adolescent males—Michael Lee and Namond Brice—toward school and their attempts to mitigate societal pressures, I conclude that schools are pivotal because they can either reinforce or abate said pressures.*

“You can tell the days by their faces. The best day is Wednesday. That’s the farthest they get from home...from whatever’s going on in the streets... you see smiles then. Monday is angry. Tuesdays, they’re caught between Monday and Wednesday, so it could go either way. Thursdays...they’re feeling that weekend coming. Friday...it’s bad again.”¹

Mrs. Sampson, *The Wire*, Season 4

Many veteran teachers, like Tilghman Middle School’s Mrs. Sampson from *The Wire*, believe that schools provide students with an escape, if only temporarily, from the reality of broken homes and violent streets. Although that argument seems logical and almost intuitive, it assumes that students create a utopian ideal of their schools and a degenerate view of their homes. Furthermore, the view fails to acknowledge students’ attitudes toward the spaces in between. In order to further complicate Mrs. Sampson’s assessment, we must examine the ways students conceptualize and approach learning, paying particular attention to the role that teachers and administrators play in creating a classroom environment that either promotes or stifles learning.

Introduction

Korina Jocson, professor of education at Washington University in St. Louis, discusses the different ways students express themselves and engage with learning both inside and outside the classroom, particularly in terms of writing poetry, in her chapter in *Beyond Resistance*, “‘The Best of Both Worlds’: Youth Poetry as Social Critique and Form of Empowerment.” She argues that a disparity exists in students’ attitudes toward school-based (non-voluntary) and non-school based (voluntary) learning and expression. According to Jocson, this disparity results from teachers’ pedagogical strategies and the overall “silencing” nature

of schools, a far cry from Mrs. Sampson’s statement in the epigraph. “Silencing” refers to an experience of marginalization, which makes it difficult for youth to effectively express themselves in the classroom and fails to acknowledge the literacy development they participate in outside the classroom.² In reality, school and non-school are more fluid than many educators acknowledge. In this paper, I will assess the effects of different forms of “silencing” in shaping Black boys’ experiences and conceptualizations of learning inside and outside of school. I will then demonstrate how those experiences and conceptualizations impact their opportunities for advancement and provide practical implications for reforming urban education, using the HBO series *The Wire* as a cultural text and a case study.

The Wire as a Case Study

The Wire, a dramatic television series that many critics have deemed “surely the best TV show ever broadcast in America,”³ uses its fourth season to explore the nuanced intersections between academic and non-academic learning in the lives of four young Black boys. According to journalist Jacob Weisberg, the Dickensian drama—characterized by intensely impoverished conditions and intense plot twists—is set in Baltimore, Maryland, and has created a genre of its own: the urban procedural.⁴ Each of the five seasons deals with a different facet of urban life. The first season focuses on the drug ring, the second the ports, the third city politics, the fourth schools, and the fifth the print media, maintaining a common thread to highlight similarities among the sectors.

Although the show never achieved major commercial success, scholars in various disciplines hold *The Wire* in high regard for its ability to shine a light on complex social issues ranging from educational disparities to the ill-conceived war on drugs. They hold the series in such high esteem

because of its exploration of topics such as urbanization, de-industrialization, the queer thug, hip-hop, and aspects related to the urban Black experience. Increasingly, top university professors are teaching courses about the relevance of the show.⁵ *The Wire*'s producers and writers, particularly Ed Burns and David Simon, were actively involved in law enforcement, education and journalism prior to working on the show, which has contributed to the show's widespread credibility in academic circles.⁶

In addition to academic credibility, *The Wire* has garnered critical acclaim for courageously tackling controversial issues related to age, sex and sexual orientation, often blurring the lines between what we typically consider responsible and delinquent behavior. In terms of policy and cultural critique, individuals who deal with issues specific to urban areas credit the show with significantly enhancing their understanding of challenges related to urban inequality. According to author and critic J. M. Tyree season four of *The Wire* is "an extraordinarily honest depiction of the gravitational pull of the streets and drug 'corners' for a generation of African American inner-city youth with few other prospects and opportunities."⁷ This "gravitational pull of the streets" often comes at the expense of the youth's education and prospects for future legal employment possibilities. The honesty that Tyree observes seems to resonate with various educational scholars' theories and interpretations of education and schooling in America. Educator Harry Brighouse argues that the representations of schooling and family structures in *The Wire* lend themselves to the following interpretation: "Schools are increasingly expected to make up for the failures of other social institutions."⁸ Society places this burden on schools and schools have yet to meet the challenge, which results in the further marginalization of our most precious commodity—our children.

By drawing interesting parallels between schools and other social institutions, *The Wire* contextualizes the burden placed on schools and their inability to effectively carry the burden and satisfactorily provide educational equity⁹ for all students. The assertions and conclusions to follow reflect an analysis of the lives and paths—both school and non-school related—of two of the series' central characters, Michael Lee and Namond Brice. First, I will provide a theory that considers barriers in the lives of youth.

Social Reproduction as a Framework

Social reproduction theory, as presented in Jay MacLeod's *Ain't No Makin It*, will provide the major framework for my analysis. My central arguments focus on issues of "silencing" within the lives of Michael and Namond, assessing how the lessons they learn in the classroom act in relationship to the lessons they learn outside school and vice-versa. I have chosen MacLeod's social reproduction

theory because of its accuracy in reflecting how poor, urban youth with few prospects for upward mobility mitigate the societal pressures they endure both inside and outside of schools. Furthermore, the lives of the subjects in MacLeod's ethnographic study strongly mirror the lives and circumstances of Michael and Namond. According to MacLeod:

Social reproduction theory identifies the barriers to social mobility, barriers that constrain without completely blocking lower- and working-class individuals' efforts to break into the upper reaches of the class structure.¹⁰

MacLeod's outline of social reproduction theory takes root in both academic research and an ethnographic study that he conducted in the Clarendon Heights low-income housing project with a group of white boys, the Hallway Hangers, and a group of Black boys, the Brothers. I plan to rearticulate aspects of his theory while drawing from the sociological (as presented by MacLeod and others) and cultural (as presented in *The Wire*) representations of Black male achievement.

I situate MacLeod's arguments within the sociocultural context of *The Wire*, by examining Michael and Namond's aspirations and work ethic, familial situations, and school performance. This paper is predicated on further complicating MacLeod's assertions about social reproduction theory while exploring the race and gender components in more detail. Although MacLeod recognizes the racial component, his discussion of social reproduction theory focuses primarily on the socio-economic component and privileges the constraints of class over those of race. While socio-economic status plays an important role in the theory, I have drawn more links between socio-economic status and race, particularly as presented in *The Wire*. I chose to apply this theory to a cultural product to examine how the media constructs and depicts social reproduction theory.

Social reproduction manifests itself in the fictional coming of age story of Michael Lee and Namond Brice, two adolescent Black males who live in a neighborhood that a mayoral candidate in the series, Thomas Carcetti, refers to as "fucking Falluja" rampant with "tank traps."¹¹ Carcetti's description of the neighborhood points to the prevalence of violence and policing in the form of military occupation throughout West Baltimore. For the vast majority of the series, the boys are confined to a radius of only a few miles. MacLeod posits that the physical boundaries youth live in define their worlds.¹² Thus, the space in which they live constrains them in the same way as other aspects of their lives, such as their schools, the prevalence of the drug trade, the impositions of law enforcement officials and sometimes their families. Michael Lee is the son of a woman whose drug addiction forces Michael to raise himself and his little

brother, Bug. He stops at nothing to ensure that he and his brother have the basic necessities and make it to school everyday. Namond Brice is the son of two parents deeply entrenched in a life of drugs. His father, Roland “Wee-Bey” Brice, dropped out of school in sixth grade to start dealing drugs, gaining prominence in the Barksdale Drug Empire. His mother, De’Londa Brice, uses Wee-Bey’s last name even though the two never married, and maintains a lavish lifestyle funded by the man’s criminal involvements. Namond has severe behavioral problems in school as he attempts to mitigate the pressures and expectations of his parents and peers.

Beside the fact that *The Wire*’s creators decided to highlight the educational paths of Black male youth, I chose to study Black male youth largely because of the bewildering role they occupy in America’s social consciousness. Pedro Noguera, a New York University professor of education, grapples with this role in his book *The Trouble With Black Boys and Other Reflections on Race, Equity, and the Future of Public Education*.¹³ Noguera claims that American society has a complicated fetish with the Black male that begins at their youth and continues throughout their lives. This role is strongly reflected in the school-to-prison pipeline—a modern phenomenon that focuses on the ways that schools act as breeding grounds for prisons—that disproportionately impacts Black males. He also discusses educational failure among Black males becoming so pervasive that it no longer raises alarm or cause for concern. He points to these issues as indicators of Black males’ overrepresentation in discipline referrals, dropout rates and grade retention.¹⁴ Consistent with depictions in *The Wire*, Noguera posits that educational reforms, like No Child Left Behind, are “overemphasizing testing, treating teachers like technicians rather than creative professionals, humiliating schools that serve poor children rather than providing them with the support and resources they need,” which leads to the disproportionate failure rates of Black males.¹⁵

Cultural Representations of Black Male Youth

Noguera problematizes the unique role of Black male youth in American society, particularly in relationship to their schooling. According to Noguera, the trouble with Black boys also makes their stories so compelling and instructive for understanding their marginalization in society at large. Pervasive images of Black boys portray them as at risk, violent, streetwise, difficult to control and more interested in sports than education.¹⁶ Reevaluating representations of Black boys that view them from the deficit perspective is at the heart of my argument and the reason I chose to examine *The Wire*’s representations of Black boys.

The stories of Michael, Namond and their friends Duquan “Dukie” Weems and Randy Wagstaff provide

the core of season four. Randy Wagstaff is the sweet-faced business-savvy foster child of the group, most recognizable for his immutable smile. Duquan “Dukie” Weems is often the object of bullying and lives with a family of addicts known throughout the neighborhood for selling his clothes for drug money. The subtitle for the season “No Corner Left Behind” parodies former President George W. Bush’s widely criticized “No Child Left Behind” educational policy. In his article “*The Wire*: The Complete Fourth Season,” Tyree describes the complex ways the producers frame education and law enforcement in the series:

The schools are, like the police force, another ‘system,’ one based on playing the numbers rounding up phantom students twice per year for funding purposes and by abandoning even the semblance of education in order to prepare for bogus achievement tests required by the government.¹⁷

The show’s producers, Burns and Simon, provide nuance to the parallels between schools and the police force by juxtaposing teacher training sessions with police training sessions. Burns and Simon showcase the bureaucratic and structural impediments to educational equity by highlighting some of the major flaws in the implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act, emphasizing the lack of resources within the schools. For example, Namond, Duquan, Randy and Michael are in the classroom of failed policeman turned teacher Roland “Prez” Pryzbylowski, whom the students affectionately call “Mr. Prezbo.” Prez is a young white man who, toward the end of his law enforcement career, came under the watchful eye of the internal affairs department for unintentionally killing an undercover Black police officer in season three.

After this incident, the second major infraction of his career, Prez decides that law enforcement no longer suits him and chooses, instead, to become a teacher. This shift in paths is common among characters in *The Wire*, contributing to the Dickensian aspect. Redemption acts as a major trope throughout the series and causes the viewer to reevaluate and possibly dismiss his or her own notions of good versus evil. The show’s writers deliberately shape characters in a multifaceted manner that allows them to redeem themselves from prior indiscretions and to change their image from wholesome to deviant – or vice-versa – which occurs with both Michael and Namond. Prez and Howard “Bunny” Colvin, a former police commander who spearheads a research intervention, which includes students who have demonstrated discipline issues in their classrooms, act as links between the school and police force. Colvin retired from law enforcement because of his disillusionment with the war on drugs and its production of more deaths than measurable victories. The presence of former police officers, like Colvin and Prez, reflects an area of concern in the edu-

cation community, as the policemen leave the streets and instead police the schools. Both men attempt to provide the corner boys with the direction and consistency to make a meaningful impact on their growth and development.

Aspirations and Work Ethic

Although figures such as Prez and Colvin contribute to the boys' development, the boys have already developed very clear and strong ideas related to their future aspirations and work ethic. MacLeod discusses the relevance of aspirations and work ethic in great detail throughout his book. He argues, "Because aspirations mediate what an individual desires and what society can offer, the hopes of these boys are linked inextricably with their assessment of the opportunities available to them."¹⁸ This assessment of the significance of aspirations acknowledges an individual's agency in terms of understanding his situation and thereby determining his potential for future upward mobility. Aspirations reflect the relationship between an individual's dreams and perception of his or her reality. MacLeod argues the boys' attitudes toward the world of work are critical to our understanding of social reproduction as it relates to the reciprocal relationship between work opportunities and an individual's social class.¹⁹

Work ethic and aspirations resound as important motifs of season four, which begins with the corner boys—a term which refers to the youths' self-proclaimed occupation and projected role as members within the drug ring—preparing to enter the eighth grade. In the first episode, titled "Boys of Summer," the spotlight is on Namond who works as a drug runner for his father's friend and former colleague, Bodie Broadus, the last standing—yet fledgling—leader within the Barksdale Drug Empire. In one of Namond's first scenes, he sits on the stoop and reads a magazine while Bodie laments his lack of work ethic, "Youngins don't got a scrap of work ethic these days. If it wasn't for his pops, I wouldn't even bother." Bodie's assessment speaks to the prevailing narrative that young people are less competent than their hard-working parents and ancestors. MacLeod recognizes the pervasiveness of Bodie's sentiments, particularly among generations that believe that hard work will determine an individual's station in life. To those unfamiliar with the realities of urban housing projects, low aspirations seem to indicate laziness or an accurate assessment of his natural assets. Social reproduction theorists, however, credit the insularity of the housing and the youth's limited horizons for this outlook.²⁰ This insularity, I believe, is an important form of silencing as it contributes to the boys' marginalization in the society in which they live. Being confined to a neighborhood with such strict boundaries, the boys in *The Wire* have limited opportunities to gain exposure to and to attain certain lifestyles.

In another scene that juxtaposes the work ethics of Namond and Michael, a worker for Marlo Stanfield, the up and coming drug kingpin of the neighborhood, gives each of the corner boys \$200 for school clothes one day while they are hanging out on a stoop. Michael vehemently refuses. Marlo approaches and asks Michael why he will not accept the money, speculating that Michael had reservations about how Marlo makes his money. Michael confidently stares Marlo in the eye without cowering. He listens to every word that Marlo says then excuses himself. Later, when Namond asks Michael why he would not accept the money, Michael replies, "That ain't me, man...that owin' niggas for shit...that ain't me."²¹ Early on, Michael demonstrates a strong sense of pride and work ethic. He also astutely recognizes that he should not be in debt to Marlo because the terms of repayment might spur Michael's untimely entanglement in Marlo's world of drugs and violence.

While Namond is content to reap the benefits of other people's labor, Michael proves himself through his hard work. He goes to great lengths to ensure that anything he owns is the product of his own labor. This contrast is both ironic and compelling because Namond holds a relatively privileged status because of the lifestyle his father's former role as an influential drug dealer and killer in one of the city's leading drug rings afforded their family. Throughout the season, the emphasis on Namond's relative privilege manifests in a tension between Namond's legacy as an incumbent drug dealer and his aspiration to establish his own distinct identity.

After discussing Michael's financial concerns about buying school essentials for the approaching year, Namond and Michael approach Bodie to request a job as a corner boy for Michael. Bodie refuses, citing that he employs Namond only out of respect for his father. Namond, unscathed by Bodie's remark, suggests that Michael can take his job as a "runner"—the person responsible for making drug deliveries—until he gets enough back-to-school money. Bodie agrees, commenting, "If it works for y'all, it works for me."²²

Michael's substitution for Namond reveals that Michael has an incredible work ethic consistent with his serious and mature demeanor. In terms of aspirations and potential employment, Michael and Namond consider only the possibility of working as corner boys, inserting themselves into a life of drug dealing very early. Michael recognizes that he has to make sacrifices in order to provide for his little brother. When Michael substitutes for Namond as a drug runner, he is aggressive, forthright and unshakable. Bodie notices this and offers him a full time job. Michael declines and decides to focus his energies on school. A shocked Bodie mocks Michael's choice: "What the fuck you wanna go to school for? What you wanna be...an Astronaut, a dentist...a pay lawyer, nigga?"²³ Bodie's statement is in-

structive because it speaks to his aspirations and the way he conceptualizes schooling. He considers it useless and seems to have limited expectations for Michael's ability to attain a certain level of success as a young Black man. Michael seems unscathed by this statement and walks away, symbolically toward school and toward a brighter future. Social reproduction theorists would likely assess Bodie's rejection of schooling as contributing to class inequality in the lives of young Black men. Like Bodie, Namond aspires to rise through the ranks of the drug trade, advancing all the way to the position of drug kingpin, as he indicates when asked where he sees himself in ten years. This narrative is an important dimension of the series and the way the characters relate to education and schooling, which they often view as a silencing institution. Michael, however, provides a glimmer of hope amid pervasive rejections of school. He works hard and invests himself equally in classroom learning and in knowledge acquisition on the streets.

Familial Situations

In addition to aspirations and work ethic, one of the areas social reproduction theory examines closely relates to the boys' home situations and families. One of the main institutions that schools compensate for, in the series, is the family. MacLeod argues that understanding the familial structure of students plays an important role in understanding the role of social reproduction in their lives:

In describing the families of these boys, we must be attentive to a number of factors, such as the presence of a father in the household, the occupational histories of parents and older siblings, and the length of the family's tenancy in public housing.²⁴

This aspect of social reproduction deals with the individual's familial relationship and the debate about whether an individual inherits his social status or attains it himself. In terms of their paths, Michael and Namond diverge significantly in terms of their familial ties.

As his little brother's primary caregiver, Michael serves as a father figure in his own right, which places a heavy burden on him and prohibits him from fully enjoying his childhood in the same ways as his friends who have fewer responsibilities and more time for leisure. In a hopeful and powerful scene that sheds light on the possibility of countering social reproduction, Michael demonstrates his maturity and attentiveness to his younger brother. The scene begins with Michael and Bug entering their home after school to find their clearly strung-out mother and a friend watching television on the couch. As the boys enter, their mother passively asks the boys, "Y'all learn something today?" Michael does not respond until his mother repeats the question several times. In the other room, he encour-

ages Bug while doing his homework. Bug comments, "I like math." Michael motivates him by saying, "Yeah, you're good at it too."²⁵ He ensures that his brother gets home safely, gives him an afternoon snack then heads to the gym for boxing practice with his friends. Michael clearly makes caring for Bug a high priority. He attempts to balance handling his family's finances, caring for his younger brother and protecting his home with succeeding in school and spending valuable time with his friends. Although Michael and Bug share a loving relationship, children should not have to make sacrifices in order to provide for their families. Michael becomes so deeply invested in caretaking that he eventually drops out of school to work full time as a drug dealer, so that he can provide for Bug.

By way of explaining Michael's role as caretaker, his biological father never appears throughout the series. Conversely, Michael's stepfather reenters his life a few episodes into the fourth season after serving a jail stint for drug possession. The viewer soon learns that Michael hates his stepfather because the man has sexually abused Michael. The presence of his stepfather leads to a major shift in Michael's attitude and behavior. Bug begins to spend more time with this man, who is Bug's biological father. Already serious and subdued, Michael becomes increasingly angry and hostile in the presence of his stepfather.

The presence of Michael's stepfather also shines a light on Michael's resistance to building a relationship with his boxing coach, Dennis "Cutty" Wise. Cutty takes an interest in Michael after recognizing his exceptional boxing talent and goes to great lengths to mentor him. Michael resists Cutty's mentorship because his abusive relationship with his stepfather and his neglectful relationship with his mother have instilled in Michael a severe mistrust of adult figures. Michael's disenchantment with his stepfather comes to a head as he solicits assistance from Marlo's assassins, Felicia "Snoop" Pearson and Chris Partlow. In the same way that Snoop and Chris slaughter rival drug dealers and negligent addicts behind on their payments, they execute Michael's stepfather (Chris brutally beats the man with his bare fist). In reaching out to Snoop and Chris, Michael starts to form a relationship with the two that contradicts his earlier vow that he would never be indebted to another person, eventually giving rise to Michael's entry into drug trafficking and excessive violence. Before agreeing to kill Michael's stepfather, Snoop and Chris offer to incorporate Michael into their family. They had watched Michael for a while and recognized his strength, maturity and resilience: "We always in the market for a good soldier. When we see one we like, we take care of his situation. We take him in, school him, make him family. And if you with us, you with us just like we'd be with you...all the way." Michael appreciates their offer but initially resists, stating: "I already got a family..."

my moms, my little bruva.” Michael’s eventual decision to learn under the tutelage of Chris and Snoop signals the failures of the boy’s family and initiates his departure from formal schooling. Instead of continuing to learn in the classroom in which he initially thrived, Michael resists and opts for the more expedient schooling of the streets. In this regard, the failures of Michael’s family, rather than the failures of the school, play a silencing role in the boy’s life. The streets, on the other hand, provide him with a home and increase his influence and credibility among his peers in ways that excellence in the classroom cannot.

In contrast, Namond and his mother, De’Londa, go visit his father, Wee-Bey, in the penitentiary frequently. Wee-Bey is serving time for murder. The interactions between Namond and his father demonstrate that Namond actively seeks his father’s approval. Wee-Bey and Namond’s mother expect their son to follow in Wee-Bey’s footsteps and become a drug dealer to maintain the family’s street credibility and lavish lifestyle that includes flashy clothing, cars and jewelry. As a result, Wee-Bey often inquires about how things are going for him on the corner. Namond clearly demonstrates resistance to his parents’ lifestyle of working on the corner, but he fulfills his duty out of obligation to his mother and father. To a lesser extent than Michael, Namond experiences silencing from his family because they impose their expectations for his future on him without allowing the boy to exercise agency in determining his own path.

Namond endures excessive verbal abuse and pressure from De’Londa because she expects him to take up the responsibility of maintaining the lifestyle that his father’s drug dealing established. In contrast to Michael’s careless, drug-addicted mother, Namond’s mother is too aggressive and controlling, forcing Namond to be the man of the family in his father’s stead, noting that he is older than his father was when his father first went out on the corner. Namond tries to compromise with his mother and convince her that because he has to accept this additional responsibility, she should allow him to quit school. De’Londa responds by saying, “You ain’t quittin’ school...not yet.” This exchange between Namond and his mother provides insight into the family’s values and priorities, such as the social status, money and credibility associated with success as a drug dealer. Without regard for her son’s safety and only superficial regard for his educational pursuits, De’Londa demands that Namond establish himself in the drug game in order to maintain their current social status and ensure that she can continue to lead the lavish lifestyle to which she has grown accustomed. Unlike Michael, Namond receives pressure from his parents to continue attending school while simultaneously establishing credibility and acceptance among his peer group as a corner boy.

Although Namond has a considerable amount of influence and charisma within his peer group, he deals with several insecurities because he struggles to live up to the challenge of taking over his father’s role as a drug dealer. Other characters who have had a strong relationship with his father and know of Wee’Bey’s work ethic recognize the dissimilarities between the father and son. As previously mentioned, Bodie only provides Namond with work because of the alliance that Bodie and Wee-Bey built as members of the Barksdale Drug Empire. Cutty also notices the differences between the man and his son, noting that Namond has the “same blood but not the same heart.”²⁶ Whereas Namond’s family and community have great expectations that he will live up to the legacy of his father, Michael’s family and community – with the exception of Cutty – do not invest themselves in his successes or failures. Still, the work ethics that the boys demonstrate counter the expectations or lack thereof from their families. This interplay between familial expectations and actual work ethic serves as a method of foreshadowing. Ultimately, Namond, surprisingly, goes on to achieve traditional notions of success inside and outside the classroom, whereas Michael takes a completely unexpected route and chooses a path that seems very inconsistent with his initial demonstrations of promise, as I will describe in more detail later.

Getting “Schooled”

In addition to the familial relationships and aspirations of Michael and Namond, education ultimately plays a critical role in determining their life outcomes. According to MacLeod, social relations in schools mirror capitalist modes of production by reproducing social inequalities: “The school reproduces social inequality, but by dealing in the currency of academic credentials the school legitimates the entire process.”²⁷ As the current system of education in America stands, MacLeod’s assessment resonates very strongly. As previously mentioned, the Baltimore public schools, as represented in *The Wire*, operate as a system designed to meet arbitrary requirements assigned by the government through sanctions, such as No Child Left Behind. Thus, the system fails to benefit underprivileged students.

The Wire’s producers take no prisoners when highlighting the potentially silencing nature of public schooling in urban areas. Washington University’s Professor Garrett Albert Duncan, widely respected in the field of education, often shows one of the show’s most compelling scenes during his classes to demonstrate ways that school administrators do not properly allocate school resources because they assume that students will not utilize them properly. Episode seven of season four, titled “Unto Others,” shows Prez, the boys’ teacher, trying to make a breakthrough with his students by teaching them probability using dice, at the students’ re-

quest. Prez approaches the assistant principal, Marcia Donnelly, to inquire about additional teaching supplies. Donnelly meets his request with hesitation, warning him: “Stay on the curriculum, Mr. Pryzbylowski, or you’ll have an area superintendent on our backs.”²⁸ Prez then takes Dukie, whom he has begun to mentor, to search for supplies in the storage room where they find what appears to be a host of hidden treasures, including newer edition books, audio visual equipment and even a brand new computer. Although this scenario is incredibly disheartening, particularly in schools that we often conceptualize as underfunded, understaffed and generally lacking resources, it rings true. Rather than being allowed to help in determining the trajectory of their learning, the students are silenced and forced to learn for statewide examinations. Duncan often attests to the fact that he dealt with such situations when he taught in urban areas and continues to experience cases in which students suffer because school administrators subscribe to the narrative that poor students of color are violent and will vandalize new supplies.

MacLeod argues that this narrative also manifests in student-teacher interactions in other ways: “The different expectations teachers hold for their students of different social origins—the determination of what counts as knowledge, teacher-student interaction, the tracking of courses—serve to handicap the performance of the lower classes.”²⁹ In season four of *The Wire*, all of these issues resonate strongly. The teachers have different expectations for different types of students, impacting the interactions between the students and teachers. Similar to tracking, the teachers group students into two distinct categories: those who can learn versus those who cannot and cause disruptions during the class period, which makes it difficult for all students in the classroom to learn. Furthermore, teachers often fail to acknowledge and validate the learning that students experience outside the classroom.

In an episode titled “Alliances,” Howard “Bunny” Colvin, a former police commander, and David Parenti, a professor of sociology, set in motion an intervention program that attempts to reduce violent and delinquent behavior among youth. In explaining the impetus behind the program, Colvin divides the children into two types—the stoop kids and the corner kids—“You pretend to teach all the kids. But, in reality, you’re not teaching any of them. What if the stoop kids could be in a classroom with no disruptions? And the corner kids are the ones we are after. The trick for you is to actually come up with a program that addresses the corner kids.” According to Colvin, the stoop kids are the students who learn with little coercion, and the corner kids are the students who disrupt the class session in an effort to avoid learning. In this assessment, he points to some of the major flaws pervasive in urban schooling structures. Colvin sug-

gests separating the disruptive students from the students that seem eager to learn. Like Colvin, teachers often blame disruptive students for hindering the progress of other students rather than redirecting their lessons to the unique learning needs of the other students to keep them engaged. In reality, the students’ response to silencing is to act out, as Namond demonstrates. In the same scene, Parenti and Mrs. Sampson acknowledge the flaws in Colvin’s assessment, noting that the program could be in danger because members of the school system might view the separation as akin to tracking—or separating children into different classes based on their perceived academic abilities. As a result of tracking processes, schools often receive backlash for holding lower expectations for groups of students that they decide have learning challenges.

Despite Parenti’s and Mrs. Sampson’s concerns about receiving backlash for creating a program that tracks students, the intervention program is ultimately successful because Colvin and the researchers meet the students where they are. They acknowledge different forms and styles of learning, which can occur both inside and outside of the classroom. The students set the tone for the lessons by drawing from their own experiences, which cause them to engage with their learning more actively. Discussions in the classroom range from the students’ future aspirations to establishing rules for being successful as a “corner boy” and eventually a drug kingpin.

By actively engaging in these discussions in the program and on the streets, Michael and Namond subvert silencing by establishing their voices, showing that they are not passive victims. Rather, they astutely observe the realities of their situations and exert resistance while trying to navigate their circumstances. According to MacLeod, “Resistance theory examines the ongoing, active experience of individuals while simultaneously perceiving oppositional attitudes and practices a response to structures of constraint and domination.”³⁰ Although Michael and Namond follow considerably different paths, both boys perceive and respond to the constraints they encounter to the best of their abilities and with the resources available to them.

The school administrators identify Namond as one of “the corner kids,” so he participates in the behavioral observation program. Initially, Namond resists and demonstrates his irreverence for school by doing everything in his power to try to get sent home or suspended, like blurting out “fuck you” over and over in an exchange between Colvin and himself. Astute of terminology related to incarceration from his father, Namond immediately proclaims that the class is like solitary confinement, noting that he and his peers have been removed from the general population—or the regular classroom—and sent to the hole—or the program classroom. In this dialogue from the season’s sixth episode,

the writers allude to the school-to-prison pipeline, a likely consequence of the silencing nature of schools and, by extension, the silencing nature of society in the lives of Black males. Colvin agrees with Namond's analysis, which leads Namond to disrupt the class in an effort to get suspended. Namond claims that he finds more value in working on the corner and earning a living than he does in going to school until the corner class helps him to change his concept of classroom learning. Here, he establishes himself as a leader among his peers as the disparity in his attitude toward school and nonschool learning blurs to the point of non-existence. The following day, he brags about the discussion that occurs in the class to Michael and Randy. "Shit, you wanna know what we talked about in my new class today? Slingin. Yo, I'm not playing," he reported, "We talked about bidness, about putting shit on the damn street...It was like we was schooling them. Yo, my new class is the shit."³¹ Rather than silencing the students, the instructors place an emphasis on dialogue and encourage the students to use their voices while thinking critically about their lives. By making the students think that they are schooling the teachers, the structure provides the students with a sense of agency and leadership.

Throughout the process, Namond builds confidence and a strong mentoring relationship with Colvin. He slowly starts to relinquish his responsibilities as a corner boy and begins to invest himself more and more in the classroom. In the finale of the season, titled "Final Grades," Namond demonstrates that he has developed a new attitude toward the importance of school as he prepares to take the state examinations. In the meantime, Namond has nourished a bond with Colvin, who wields his influence in the police department to rescue the boy from spending a night in a juvenile jail. Colvin intervenes in Namond's life and offers to adopt and provide him with an opportunity for a different life. After serious resistance from De'Londa, Wee-Bey, convinces the woman to send Namond to live with Colvin. Wee-Bey tells her to let the boy go and give him an opportunity to live the life she cannot provide for him because of her association with a life of drugs. Wee-Bey clearly loves his son and wants the boy to have a family life that Wee-Bey could not provide, expressing great interest in Colvin's appeals: "Man came down here to say my son can be anything he damn please."³² Wee-Bey is referring to Colvin's appeal to provide Namond with a more stable family life, offering him opportunities that his father could never access. After Namond goes to live with Colvin, he starts a new life and becomes an outstanding high school student, honing his natural talent as an orator to become an award-winning high school debate champion.

By contrast, Michael demonstrates respect for schooling early on by making it a point to attend school regularly

and ensuring that his younger brother does the same. He remains in Prez's classroom when Namond enters the program. Prez engages Michael and the other students by attempting to decrease the disparity between school and nonschool learning, allowing them to practice math concepts while playing dice with monopoly money, which they regularly play on the corner. In episode seven, titled "Unto Others," Prez explains his strategy to Mrs. Sampson as she marvels at his remarkable progress as a new teacher: "You trick 'em into thinking they aren't learning, and they do."³³ This strategy proves very effective for most of the students, but alas it is not enough to compensate for the gravitational pull of the street and its appeal to Michael. Colvin foreshadows Michael's fate in these words: "We are giving them a fine education," he says sarcastically, "you know this right here, the whole damn school, it's training for the streets. The building's the system; we the cops."³⁴ Michael also views the role of the school and the law as deeply interconnected, literally responding to the patrolling and invasive institutions with silence. In a discussion with Randy, Michael advises Randy against opening up to authorities:

You know, the thing with the teachers and cops and whatnot, they always come at you like they got you by the ass. But you keep your mouth shut, ain't nothing they could do. So more times than that they go away.

Michael's understanding of teachers' and cops' communication approaches as misguided scare tactics helps to contextualize the lack of reverence he later demonstrates toward both groups. His tumultuous relationship with his mother and stepfather directly contribute to his disregard for adults as positive authority figures. He intimates this outlook during the same exchange with his friend Randy, who complains about the short leash his foster mother has him on. Michael responds, "At least you got a leash."³⁵

As noted earlier, Michael longs for the comfort and support of family and ultimately finds them in Marlo's assassins, Chris and Snoop. Early on, the two of them recognize Michael's strength and business sense. Similar to the argument Mrs. Sampson makes in the epigraph, Snoop comments that Michael is only going to school to get away from his chaotic home, so they target him as though he were prey: "Make a good run at that boy, he'll be on a corner...no problem."³⁶ Snoop's assessment, which seems off target at the time, ultimately proves to be correct. Once Chris and Snoop take Michael under their wing and begin to teach him the ropes of drug dealing and brutal killings, Michael increasingly disengages in the classroom and becomes a willing and receptive student of life on the streets. Ultimately, Michael drops out of school—moving himself and his little brother, Bug, out of his mother's home—and

becomes a full-time drug dealer and cold-blooded killer in Marlo Stanfield's drug organization.

The Trouble with Black Boys

As scholars, we must thoughtfully grapple with social reproduction theory in the context of society's view of Black males from a deficit perspective, which presumes that because of their social and economic status, students of color, particularly boys, achieve at lower rates than white students. MacLeod's social reproduction theory, while very strong, argues that the classroom acts only to reinforce social reproduction. I acknowledge that argument in the case of Michael, who could not disengage himself from a tumultuous home life, which ultimately drove him entirely out of school. However, schools also have the power to counteract social reproduction by meaningfully engaging students in ways that make learning in school resonate with the students' everyday lives, like Colvin and Parenti did in the case of Namond.

In addition to the transformative nature of school, one of the underlying premises that social reproduction theorists and *The Wire* seek to negate is the premise that "individuals do not inherit their social status – they attain it on their own. Because schooling mitigates gender, class and racial barriers to success, the ladder of social mobility is there for all to climb."³⁷ MacLeod refers to this idea as a Hollywood theme and goes on to debunk it within his book, citing meritocracy as a major impediment to education reform and equity. As a counter to meritocracy, MacLeod highlights the structural issues that cause an individual to reproduce the social and economic status of his family lineage.

Because of the structural failures of schools, Michael eventually becomes involved in a life that confines him to a small living radius and likely makes him a future statistic in the school-to-prison pipeline. Although Namond's ability to overcome the tenants of social reproduction seems like the exception to the rule, schools should be structured in such a way that Namond's situation becomes unremarkable. In terms of schooling, MacLeod recognizes the failures of schools, arguing that schools reinforce the narrative that poor and minority students are inferior because the larger society views and evaluates them from the deficit perspective.³⁸ While MacLeod's disagreement with meritocracy myths draws from very compelling evidence, he fails to acknowledge the role that resistance plays in helping youth to mitigate gender, class and racial barriers, placing more emphasis on the constraints of structures. In the case of Michael and Namond, resistance is a critical component of the youths' daily lives and allows them to exert agency over their situations rather than merely being victims of their circumstances. Furthermore, MacLeod overemphasizes the importance of class in constraining youth and pays very

little attention to the role of race in contributing to the effects of social reproduction. As *The Wire* and Pedro Noguera reveal, Black male youth endure an entirely different set of challenges that constrain their access to success in ways that their white counterparts will never experience.

Race and Inequality in a Post Civil Rights America

Although some might argue that the salience of the failures of Black men seems to lose some resonance in a post civil rights country whose president is a Black man, race still matters. The major issues that Black people face within the urban renewal agenda, as presented throughout *The Wire*, are not as obvious as those that prevailed throughout the Jim Crow south, such as brutal lynching and denial of access to public spaces. *The Wire* portrays today's injustices as occurring in the form of red-lining in housing, police brutality, prominent liquor stores as opposed to grocery stores, warehousing Black males, gang violence, educational disparities and rampant poverty.

The pervasiveness of poverty continues to plague the urban Black community, often acting as a hindrance to monetary and educational gains. An inability to access financial support and monetary resources often forces many Black male youth into a life of drug dealing to help them survive, as was the case with Michael. In the capitalist structure of the United States, money, educational attainment and power are often inextricably linked, and government agencies such as the Census Bureau readily attest to that fact. According the United States Census Bureau's report, *Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*:

Poverty rates in 2007 were statistically unchanged for non-Hispanic Whites (8.2 percent), Blacks (24.5 percent), and Asians (10.2 percent) from 2006. The poverty rate increased for Hispanics (21.5 percent in 2007, up from 20.6 percent in 2006).³⁹

When compared to the poverty rates of other racial and ethnic groups in the United States, the poverty rate for Black people is more than twice that of non-Hispanic whites and Asians. As MacLeod and other social reproduction theorists acknowledge, poverty, like oppression, is cyclical and difficult to overcome. American poverty translates into little or no access to many resources that are critical to survival, including sustenance, healthcare and education. The lack of these resources often causes many people to opt for delinquent, often illegal, occupations rather than pursuing an education.

An individual's level of educational attainment often plays a vital role in determining an individual's social and

economic status in America. In a report on educational attainment titled *Educational Attainment in the United States: 2007*, Sarah Crissey provides statistical data for the educational disparities that exist between different racial and ethnic groups in the United States. The disparity between Black people's rates of educational attainment and those of white people increases in direct proportion to the level of the degree. For high school or more, the white rate is 87 percent, and the Black rate is 80.1. For some college, the white rate is 56.6, while the rate for Black people is 45.8. For a Bachelor's degree or more, the white rate is 29.1, while the Black rate is 17.3. For advanced degrees, the disparity is huge, almost twice as much. The rate for white people is 10.7, while the rate for Black people is 5.8.⁴⁰ These statistics are not coincidental and do not reflect a lack of intelligence or personal deficiencies on the part of Black people. Rather, these statistics attest to the marginality that Blacks experience with regard to both economics and education in America. In the same report, Sarah R. Crissey assesses the benefits of an education in the United States in terms of the amenities that it provides:

One of the potential benefits of educational attainment is economic success; particularly through access to higher earnings...higher educational attainment was associated with higher earnings on average.⁴¹

As Crissey clearly indicates, economic success is almost inextricably linked to educational success. The aforementioned racial disparities that I have delineated in terms of education and poverty in the United States attest to the salience of race and issues of oppression as they impact members of the Black—often urban—community. All of these issues help shape the landscape that determines the outcomes and livelihoods of Black boys like Michael and Namond.

Amid high educational disparities, teachers and administrators, like those portrayed in *The Wire*, lack incentives to invest in so-called high-risk students, often sending the students back into broken and impoverished communities, creating a cycle of more violence. Rather than dealing with particularly challenging students, such as the corner kids, many schools opt to either implement tracking, warehouse the students into special education programs or expel them at very high rates. This phenomenon occurs as early as prekindergarten. In a study titled "Prekindergartners Left Behind: Expulsion Rates in State Prekindergarten System," William S. Gilliam argues that the patterns of educational disparity, even in terms of expulsion rates, begin very early. According to Gilliam,

Boys were over four times as likely to be expelled as girls, and African-American preschoolers were about twice as likely to be expelled as preschoolers

of European descent. Although a pattern of particular risk for expulsion with African-American students has been demonstrated during kindergarten through grade 12 (Holzman, 2004), the pattern of disparity appears to begin much earlier.⁴²

Gilliam says that Black boys are the most at risk group with regard to facing potential expulsion as kindergartners. The statistics that Gilliam presents in his article strongly resonate with the outcome that Michael experiences, testifying to schools' inability to fruitfully address the learning needs and differences of Black male youth. In order to more fruitfully address these challenges, schools need to be restructured in a way that helps students to take a more active and engaged role in expressing themselves in the classroom. By recognizing the value in the lessons that students learn outside the classroom, teachers and administrators can shape schools that empower rather than silence their students. If a quality education is going to continue to be a prerequisite for traditional success, we must ensure that all children, regardless of their race or gender, have access to strong educational resources.

Conclusion

These statistics, though grim, provide the landscape in which boys like Michael and Namond must thrive and overcome. Some "succeed" more than others as shaped by structural and social barriers in their lives. Still, we must maintain hope that Black boys, similar to Namond, can and will transcend their circumstances by continuing to exert resistance and with the support of their families and teachers. A hopeful story of the achievement possibilities of Black male youth emerges through the national news headline: "Every Urban Prep senior is college-bound: 100 percent of first senior class at all male, all African-American Englewood academy is accepted to universities."⁴³ In the case of the Urban Preparatory students, rigorous academics, early exposure to college, and strict uniforms are credited with helping the youth learn the discipline necessary to achieve. In the cases of other students, such as Namond, teachers who are genuinely interested in the students' well being and challenge them to succeed and live up to their potential by utilizing their words as a tool of expression and empowerment can also act as the key to helping students achieve. By exploring the complex roles and positions that Black males occupy in American society, we can make necessary strides toward ensuring that the Urban Prep headline is no longer remarkable but rather the norm because Black males have had the opportunity to break their silence.

1 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Refugees." *The Wire*. HBO. 8 Oct. 2006. Television.

- 2 Korina Jocson, "‘The Best of Both Worlds’: Youth Poetry as Social Critique and Form of Empowerment" in *Beyond Resistance! Youth Activism and Community Change: New Democratic Possibilities for Practice and Policy for America’s Youth*, ed. Shawn Ginwright, Pedro Noguera, and Julio Cammarota (New York: Routledge, 2006), 132.
- 3 Jacob Weisberg, "The Wire on Fire: Analyzing the Best Show on TV." *Slate*, 13 Sept. 2006. Web. 5 Jan. 2010. <http://www.slate.com/id/2149566/>.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Amanda M. Fairbanks "Deconstructing ‘The Wire.’" *New York Times*, 29 Dec. 2009. Web. 2 Jan. 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com>.
- 6 J.M. Tyree "The Wire: The Complete Fourth Season." *Film Quarterly* 61.3 (Spring 2008): 32.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Harry Brighouse. *On Education (Thinking in Action)*. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1.
- 9 Equity, as I will use it throughout the paper, refers to fairness and impartiality for the purpose of providing all students with a high quality education.
- 10 Jay MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2008), 6.
- 11 Tyree, "The Wire," 32.
- 12 MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It*, 149.
- 13 Pedro A. Noguera, *The Trouble With Black Boys And Other Reflections on Race, Equity, and the Future of Public Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008), xi.
- 14 Ibid., xix.
- 15 Ibid., xxvii.
- 16 Ibid., xxi.
- 17 Tyree, "The Wire," 60.
- 18 MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It*, 5.
- 19 Ibid, 149.
- 20 Ibid., 4.
- 21 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Soft Eyes." *The Wire*. HBO. 17 Sept. 2006. Television.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Home Rooms." *The Wire*. HBO. 24 Sept. 2006. Television.
- 24 MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It*, 49.
- 25 Burns and Simon, "Refugees."
- 26 Ed Burns and David Simon, "Know Your Place." *The Wire*. HBO. 12 Nov. 2006. Television.
- 27 MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It*, 12.
- 28 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Unto Others." *The Wire*. HBO. 29 Oct. 2006. Television.
- 29 MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It*, 100.
- 30 Ibid., 19.
- 31 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Margin of Error." *The Wire*. HBO. 15 Oct. 2006. Television.
- 32 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Final Grades." *The Wire*. HBO. 10 Dec. 2006. Television.
- 33 Burns and Simon, "Unto Others."
- 34 Ed Burns and David Simon, prods., "Corner Boys." *The Wire*. HBO. 5 Nov. 2006. Television.
- 35 Ibid.
- 36 Burns and Simon, "Refugees."
- 37 MacLeod, *Ain’t No Makin’ It*, 1.
- 38 Ibid., 9.
- 39 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith, *Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007*. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Washington, DC, 2008, 5.
- 40 Sarah R. Crissey. *Educational Attainment in the United States: 2007*. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Washington, DC, 2009, 3.
- 41 Ibid, 10.
- 42 Walter S. Gilliam, "Prekindergarteners Left Behind: Expulsion Rates in State Prekindergarten Systems" (New Haven: Yale University Child Study Center, 2005), 11.
- 43 Eldeib, Duaa. "Every Urban Prep Senior Is College-Bound: 100 Percent of First Senior Class at All Male, All African-American Englewood Academy Is Accepted to Universities." *Chicago Tribune*. 5 Mar. 2010. Web. 17 Mar. 2010. <http://www.chicagotribune.com>.

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Church and State:

The Relationship Between the Orthodox Church and the Italian Colonial State in Colonial Eritrea

Selam Kidane

Abstract: *This article explores the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Italian colonial state in Colonial Eritrea. In particular, it examines the case of Orthodox priests accompanying battalions of ascaris deployed to Libya during the Italian conquest of the territory. This article argues that the use of Orthodox priests in the Italian colonial army to maintain obedience and discipline in the colonial army illustrates the method of indirect rule used in the colonial administration in which the colonial state indirectly administered the colony through indigenous institutions of authority. However, as this article articulates, indigenous institutions of authority, in this case the Orthodox Church, entered into this working relationship not as pawns of the colonial state but as conscious actors striving to elevate their own power and status as individuals as well as the power and status of their institution as a whole.*

Four years have passed since I requested to be deployed to Libya as a priest confessor with a battalion. After submitting my request I waited in my home telling myself that the “Government will call me” because the rules are equal for everybody. I am hereby asking for a recommendation of the Italian government to help me in my prayer to be deployed.

Father Tesfamariam Haile

June 1918¹

I pray so that you will deploy me to Libya with the next battalion leaving soon. I also ask you to ask Meslenie and my cicca about my reputation and if I have ever been a litigious or trouble-making person. I am not going to Libya because I am hungry and disposed. Thanks to the Italian Government, I have everything I need, but I want to go so that I can pray and offer my services.

Father Uoldeabesgh Monguatu

December 1917²

From 1912 to 1932, the Italian colonial army continuously sent battalions of Eritrean *ascaris* to Libya to conquer the territory for the Kingdom of Italy and suppress Libyan resistance to Italian rule.³ Accompanying these battalions were Eritrean Orthodox priests such as Priest Tesfamariam and Priest Uoldeabesghi.⁴ The Italian colonial army, the Royal Corps of Colonial Troops, incorporated these priests into battalions of Christian Eritrean *ascaris* to perform various religious services for them. However, the incorporation of these priests also served as a means of maintaining obedience and discipline within the indig-

enous battalions while simultaneously presenting an image of being benevolent commanders concerned with the religious needs of their Eritrean soldiers.

At first glance, letters such as those written by Priest Uoldeabesghi and Priest Tesfamariam can seem to portray these priests as subjugated Eritrean clergymen eager to do the bidding of the Italian colonial regime, regardless of what effect it would have on them as individuals or their Church as an institution. However, closer readings of these letters combined with analysis of the nature of Italian colonial rule in Eritrea and the role of the Orthodox Church in highland Eritrean society complicates the image of submissive priests unquestionably playing their roles in the colonial framework. Rather, these priests were conscious actors in the colonial system constructed by the Italian colonial regime—conscious in the sense that they had the choice to accompany or not to accompany the indigenous battalions to Libya and decided to do so, or in some cases endeavored to do so, because of the benefits which their service would produce for them as individuals and for the Church as a whole.

The case of Eritrean Orthodox priests accompanying indigenous battalions of the Italian colonial army provides a useful representation of the relationship between the Church and the colonial state. Unraveling the complexities of this relationship is pivotal for understanding the overall nature of colonial rule in Eritrea and the specific functions of the colonial state. In many ways, the use of Orthodox priests in the colonial army mimics the use of Eritrean chiefs in the Italian colonial administration in that they both provided the Italian colonial state with a ‘traditional’ source of authority through which to indirectly channel their imperial commands, maintain order, and extract

wealth from the colony. At the same, however, these Orthodox priests, much like Eritrean chiefs, capitalized on the opportunities for increased wealth and power that partnership with the Italian colonial regime provided.

The use of Eritrean Orthodox priests in the Italian colonial army to maintain discipline and obedience in the indigenous battalions illustrates not only the nature of the relationship between the Italian colonial regime and the Orthodox Church but also, on a larger scale, the methods through which the Italians were able to effectively and efficiently rule Colonial Eritrea. In essence, the Italian colonial regime indirectly ruled Colonial Eritrea through what they regarded as pre-colonial institutions of authority and power, such as the Orthodox Church. However, the Orthodox Church consented to be part of the colonial framework because of the financial and prestige-related incentives provided by the Italian colonial regime, thus defining the relationship between the Church and colonial state as one in which both parties participated for mutually beneficial reasons.

In *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, Frederick Lugard articulated the systems of rule he believed were best suited for colonial rule in Africa. Lugard advocated for the implementation of colonial rule through “traditional” sources of authority because this system accomplished the dual objectives of colonial rule: provided the colonial power with both legitimacy and an affordable means of administration. This system—often referred to as indirect rule, despite being a British colonial policy imported from Colonial India—recurred in other European power’s colonial policies throughout Africa in various forms.

In the case of Colonial Eritrea, the Italian colonial administration adopted this common method of control by incorporating “traditional elite” members of Eritrean societies into their colonial administration.⁵ In this sense, “traditional elite” members of society refers to village chiefs and various other regional authorities who possessed political authority and were recognized by the indigenous populations as rightfully possessing that authority. However, in many instances, the Italian colonial regime appointed, or assisted in the appointment of, certain Eritreans who had been particularly helpful and beneficial to the colonial regime, thus bringing into question the validity of the term “traditional.” In addition to incorporating the political system established within highland Eritrea, the Italian colonial state, as demonstrated by the letters, also took advantage of a unique aspect of highland Eritrean society, the Orthodox Church, by incorporating the hierarchal and centralized structure of the Church into their administration as a means of ensuring compliance with Italian colonial rule among the Eritrean highland population and further legitimizing their rule in Colonial Eritrea.

From the onset of colonial rule, the Italian colonial state, through the use of monetary grants, enlisted the support of the Orthodox Church in addition to their assistance in the administration of the colony. In addition, the Church accepted this relationship because it provided an opportunity for them to maintain their power and authority within highland society, given the power change occurring, and also an opportunity to increase the status of the Church. As such, one should not simply label this relationship as one of passive obedience on the part of the Orthodox Church. In actuality, the Orthodox Church maintained a degree of autonomy, especially at the local level in regards to the day-to-day affairs of the Church. This relationship between the Church and the colonial state was illustrated by the Italian Colonial army’s use of orthodox priests in their indigenous battalions – specifically in their deployments to Libya. By examining the requests made by these priests to accompany the indigenous battalions to Libya we can better understand the nature of the relationship between the Orthodox Church and colonial state and the way the colonial state was run.

Colonial Eritrea

Beginning of Colonial Rule

Italian presence in Northeast Africa began with the purchase of the bay of Assab on the southern coast of the Red Sea by an Italian shipping company, *Rubantino Co.*, in 1869. Despite the early presence of the Italians, the Egyptian presence along the Red Sea claimed sovereignty over the entire African coast, hindering further Italian expansion into the region and resulting in a decline of interest in colonizing the area. However, increased communication between Italy and the Ethiopian state regenerated Italian interest in Assab in the 1880s, especially in regards to its importance as a future significant port.⁶ In July 1882, the Kingdom of Italy declared Assab an Italian colony, and with that declaration began the active colonization of the region. Beginning in 1885, Italy began to expand its territory north from Assab to Massawa and then into the interior highlands. With the Treaty of Wichale on May 2, 1889, Italy purchased territory in the central highlands from the Ethiopian Empire, which they consolidated with their previously acquired territories to form, on January 1, 1890, Italy’s first colony—Eritrea.

Italy’s acquisition of Eritrea occurred during a period commonly referred to as the “Scramble for Africa.” In the second half of the 19th century, European powers, each motivated by various reasons, divided up the African continent amongst themselves. Italy’s motivation for “entering the Scramble” was largely fueled by its desire to assert itself as a world power at a time when the other European nations

had already acquired colonies or were beginning to establish additional colonial territories. Unlike other European colonial powers at the time, Italy was a newly created nation, the result of the unification of the multiple kingdoms of the peninsula in 1861, and as such was not as established in the international arena as its European counterparts were. Furthermore, the increased colonial conquests of their European counterparts further prompted the Italians to act with the purpose of obtaining a colonial empire of their own.

The years preceding Italy's expansion in Eritrea were marked by successive failures and disappointments abroad in regards to foreign policy. Disappointments at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Italy was unsuccessful in gaining compensation for Austria's occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, coupled with humiliation from France's supported invasion of Tunisia despite Italy's powerful economic and strategic interests in the region, placed the Italian government in a precarious position.⁷ "Fears of encirclement" forced Italian foreign minister, Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, to "seize the opportunity" and deploy troops to Massawa when Great Britain expressed its desire to see it become an Italian colony despite not notifying parliament. For Italians, the conquest of a colony was a way to assert themselves as a colonial power, which was of significant importance given their position relative to other European powers at the time.

Nature of Colonial Rule in Eritrea

While the prestige or status that resulted from possessing colonies was a strong political incentive for obtaining colonial possessions, the political benefits of possessing a colony were not enough to warrant expending the large amounts of financial resources necessary to maintain a colony. Despite Italy's desire for a colony, possessing a colony had to be financially beneficial in order to justify to the Italian public expending Italian resources necessary for its acquisition and maintenance. In *A Short History of Eritrea*, Longrigg notes how the Italian government envisioned Colonial Eritrea as serving Italian interests and benefiting Italy by becoming a destination for Italian immigrants, a source of natural resources for Italian industries, and a base for further colonial expansion into Africa.⁸ In *Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941*, Tekeste Negash elaborates upon the policies of the Italian government, as described by Longrigg, in addition to what he describes as the "four distinct economic and non-economic functions expected of Eritrea."⁹ The success and continuation of these policies often depended upon whether or not they were financially beneficial for Italians directly profiting from these colonial ventures: the Italian state as well as policy makers. In some instances, policies that were financially draining

or not financially beneficial enough were amended or, more likely, discontinued.

The settlement policy serves as a perfect example of how financial costs dictated Italian colonial policy. From 1890 to 1895, the Italian government adopted a settlement policy in which they envisioned Eritrea serving as a resettlement option for the landless, impoverished peasants of Italy, thus solving one of Italy's serious social problems at the time. Despite the optimism of the Italian government for this policy and the promise it held, the overall costs of implementing it eventually resulted in the termination of the program. The cost of subsidizing settlement along with the cost of suppressing Eritrean peasant uprisings resulting from Italian confiscation of land proved to be too much for the weak Italian colonial administration to justify continuing with the settlement policy.¹⁰

Regardless of what specific vision shaped colonial policy in Eritrea, the fact remains that for the Italian politicians the sole purpose of Eritrea was to serve and profit the metropolis as well as the special interests of Italian policy makers and never be a financial burden, a common theme among colonial empires. This fundamental principle of the colony consuming the least amount of Italian human and financial resources while still profiting Italy shaped the nature of colonial policies and the colonial administration in Eritrea for the extent of the colonial period. Viewed through this lens, many of the policies and practices of the colonial state, not only in the bureaucracy but also in the colonial army, can be better understood and analyzed. Specifically, the incorporation of "traditional" institutions of power and authority into the colonial framework can be better understood from the viewpoint of the colonizing power attempting to limit the costs of maintaining the colony. In Colonial Eritrea, this focus on traditional forms to control costs is illustrated not only by the incorporation of the pre-colonial institutions of power but also by the incorporation of the Orthodox Church into the colonial framework.

Indirect Rule

The Italian colonial administration strove to implement colonial policies that would require the least amount of financial and human resources on the part of the Italian government but still yield the highest amount of profit for the colonial government. The Italian colonial administration utilized this principle when devising methods through which to administer their rule throughout the colony. To achieve this goal, Italian colonists relied upon indigenous sources of authority, or in some instances created them, to indirectly assert their control over the colony as well as extract wealth through the implementation of taxes. For Eritrea, these sources of control often were the "traditional"

elites—village heads or chiefs and religious figures. By relying on these pre-existing systems of authority, the Italian colonial government assured themselves that their authority would remain intact while still extracting the necessary amount of wealth for the colony to remain profitable to the Empire. Furthermore, this system allowed for the Italians to administer the colony without having to invest too many human and financial resources, therefore limiting the cost of maintaining the colony. In addition, the system of indirect rule also painted the colonial power as a benevolent ruler who was sympathetic to the traditions of its subjects and as such incorporated those traditions within the framework of the colonial state, thus providing the colonial power with legitimacy. This colonial system was not unique to Italian Eritrea; rather it was a common theme of colonial administrations throughout Africa and Asia at the time.

In Eritrea, the system of indirect rule played out in similar ways as in other African colonies. However, the Eritrean highlands presented a unique case due to the presence of pre-colonial centralized political and religious institutions, which historically had experienced an intertwined relationship in regards to political rule in the region. The Eritrean highlands historically had been a part of the Ethiopian Empire and were religiously affiliated with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. Italian colonialists, seeing this system already in place, sought a relationship with the Church after witnessing their relationship and failed attempts at converting the highland populations to Catholicism. As such, the Eritrean highlands were already integrated into a centralized political system, and as a result the Italians simply replaced the head of this system, the Ethiopian emperor. By retaining the pre-colonial political system but merely instating itself at the top, and most importantly, ensuring that all participants were in accord with the change of power and acquiescent with the new requirements placed upon them by the Italians, the Italian regime instated an administration that would be not only efficient but also in accord with their motives. Through this method, the Italian colonial administration established a system in which they could cheaply and effectively maintain their colony, but also could appease their supporters and present themselves as benevolent rulers who maintained the traditions and values of their subjects.

In addition to asserting their control through the already-in-place political system, the Italians took advantage of the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in furthering their control. The chiefs took care of political control, but the church offered a unique opportunity to assert moral control among the general highland Eritrean population.

The Orthodox Church

In the case of Colonial Eritrea, the Orthodox Church provided the Italians with a source of authority that was spread throughout the highlands of Eritrea and predated the presence of Italians in the region – a unique occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa. For the colonial administration, the Church proved to be useful in legitimizing Italian colonial rule at the onset of the colonial period, and it can be inferred that the Church also could have assisted in the day-to-day running of the colony, given its position as a conservative source of moral authority in Eritrean highland society. Furthermore, for the Church, the colonial state aided in increasing not only its wealth but also its power and influence within Colonial Eritrea and offered an opportunity for both low-level and high-level clergymen to maintain and in some ways increase their power and influence as well.

The Orthodox Church in Eritrea began in the fourth century CE when it was introduced and adopted by the Aksum Empire as the official state religion. Since then the Church has had an intertwined relationship with the Ethiopian empire and, as such, did not operate completely independently of the state. With the introduction of colonial rule in Eritrea, given the political nature of the Church, it can be inferred that the Church experienced a close relationship with the colonial administration and was used in the implementation of colonial rule, especially at the village level. As a source of moral authority, the Church most likely encouraged the passive acceptance of colonial rule as well as obedience to the Italian colonial regime. This was essential for the success of colonial rule, especially given the hostility that Italians encountered at the onset of colonial rule as well as the damaging Bahta rebellion.¹¹ However, emphasizing obedience and acceptance of colonial rule and domination was also necessary in the colonial army and again, the Church would be in the best position to implement those standards.

The Orthodox Church and Indirect Rule

As opposed to villages or other smaller political units, authority in the colonial army would have needed to come from a source equally revered or obeyed by all. In the Royal Corps of Colonial Troops, *ascaris* were assigned to battalions according to their religion—with battalions comprising either Muslim or Christian *ascaris*. In this case, because the main commonly shared identity among members of a single battalion was religion—the most effective source for this authority would be a religious figure. As such, the Italian colonial army employed indigenous priests and sheiks in the army to provide for the religious needs of their *ascaris*. While this served as the official reasoning for incorporating religious men into the colonial army, the true motives had more to do with implementing a method

to control and discipline their soldiers in a way that would incur the least possible costs for the colonial government.

Within the indigenous battalions, these priests often served as priest confessors for the *ascaris* in addition to performing various religious services (letter 1). As a priest confessor, the priest gave moral advice to those who came to seek his counsel. In the instance of *ascaris* in Libya, given the fact that these priests were sent by the Italian colonial state, they were also charged with the responsibility of enforcing the moral obligation of the *ascaris* to remain obedient to the Italian superiors in addition to maintaining the discipline of the indigenous battalions.

Agency of Priests

Although these clergymen were employed by the Italian colonial army to maintain discipline among the troops, the letters sent by the priests to the Italian colonial state demonstrate that these priests desired to be sent to Libya with the battalions and actively sought out the opportunity; the letters indicate that the priests had an incentive to go. According to information gleaned from these letters, the priests were handsomely paid for their services, which provided incentive enough for the priests to consent to use their religious status to maintain the discipline of the indigenous troops.

This mutually beneficial arrangement also reveals the true nature of the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Italian colonial state. It was not one in which the Italians manipulated the Orthodox Church to serve the state's own agenda, but rather one in which both the Italian colonial state and the Orthodox Church created an arrangement in which both parties benefited and furthered their own, respective agendas: effectively and efficiently administering their colony or colonial army in the case of the colonial state and increasing the wealth and power of the Church and individual wealth of the priests in the case of the Orthodox Church.

Prior to the Italian colonization of modern-day Libya, Turkish forces controlled much of the coast of this modern-day country. The invasion and the later war for conquest of Libya eventually became a religious war on the part of the Libyan Sanussis, who declared *jihad* on the invading Italians, and Eritrean *ascaris*.

Given the true nature of the relationship between the Church and the colonial state, historians must turn a critical eye towards the Italian conquest of Libya to determine the possible effects of the priests' presence on the war during their service in Libya with the colonial army. Analysis of the political and religious climate in Libya at the time of the war against the Italians lends itself to the discussion of the clergymen using their positions to further incite a

religious war against the Libyan Muslims.

Conclusion

Analysis of the role of clergymen in the Italian colonial army reveals the reciprocal and interconnected nature of the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the colonial state. This relationship was a byproduct of the limitations and constraints of the colonial state and the nature of indirect rule. Given the nature of the pre-colonial church and state relations as well as the role of the Church as a source of moral authority in the highlands of Eritrea, it is most likely that the inclusion of the Eritrean Orthodox priests into the indigenous battalions of the colonial army was mainly due to the desire to implement obedience and discipline. However, in the discussion of church and state relations in colonial Eritrea, it is important that we not forget that we are discussing individuals who, given the circumstances, had to abide by certain rules or regulations but were fully capable of carving a way to assert their own beliefs and agendas within that enforced role. In the case of Orthodox priests sent to Libya, they were sent with those battalions for specific reasons, most likely to maintain the discipline and enforce obedience, but the fact that they were given a specific role does not dismiss the possibility that they might have pursued their own agendas in those roles. Those agendas would differ, given the circumstances of the individuals, but among the many likely and possible agendas, the furthering of a religious war in Libya offers a unique opportunity to further understand the agency of Eritreans within the Italian colonial regime.

In this case, regardless of the motives of the Italian state, these priests decided to go to Libya for their own purposes. We must not ignore their control of their situation and, as such, we also cannot ignore the possibility of their acting according to their feelings while in these roles, roles similar to those of chiefs within the colonial administration. These priests were fully capable of responding, and most likely did respond to the situations they encountered based on their own desires and not the desires of the Italians.

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- 1 Letter written by priest in Tigrinya to the Italian colonial administration (language of the Eritrean highlands).
 - 2 Letter written by priest in Tigrinya. *Cicca* is the Tigrinya word for chief of a village. *Meslenie* is the Tigrinya word for the overseer of several *ciccas*.
 - 3 The term *ascari* refers to indigenous soldiers. In the context of this paper, it refers to Eritrean soldiers in the Italian colonial army – the Royal Corps of Colonial Troops.
 - 4 These priests were of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which will be discussed later in this article.
 - 5 The term “traditional elite” here refers to the Eritreans upheld by the Italian government as those legitimate to rule—in other words, Eritreans who were placed into the positions of

power set up by pre-colonial institutions of power as a reward or incentive for their participation with the Italian colonial government.

- 6 Tekeste Negash, *Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 1987), 1.
- 7 Duggan, Christopher, "Francesco Crispi and the 'New European Order,' 1887-91" in *The Forces of Destiny* (London: Penguin Books, 2007), 324.
- 8 Longrigg, Stephen, *A Short History of Eritrea* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), 112.
- 9 Negash, *Italian Colonialism*.
- 10 The Bahta rebellion led by Bahta Hagos against the Italians occurred in reaction to the confiscation of land for Italian resettlement.
- 11 The Bahta rebellion occurred in 1894 and was led by the Dejazmach of Akkele Guzay, Bahta Hagos. It was largely a revolt against the expropriation of land by the Italian colonial state. The rebellion was short-lived, with Hagos being killed in an attack only months after the beginning of the conflict. The rebellion was damaging, however, in that it illustrated to the Italians exactly how vulnerable their rule in Eritrea was.

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A Tale of Two Discourses: Coming Over to the "Better" Side

Latasha Kinnard

Abstract: A Discourse is an identity kit that includes tools, gestures, and the ability to put them together to create an identity. In society, we tend to value some Discourse over others. This can be seen when we consider the proper way to talk, dress, and act in professional or academic settings. Therefore, in order to achieve success, black students must conform to the standards of the dominant Discourse. I argue that this process entails an identity conflict that is often ignored in exchange for access to status, power, and money. In this essay, I will explore the conflict and contradictions that are present in the literature on culturally relevant pedagogy. In doing this, I hope to challenge the current scholarship to be more thoughtful about what happens when black students acquire the dominant Discourse, and more honest about the cost.

In 1963 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., told us the story of a little girl and a little boy. The boy was sitting on the stoop of a rat infested building while drunkards and junkies passed him by.¹ His mother was never around, working in someone else's house just to put food on the table.² Then he directed his attention to a young Black girl who was similarly perched in front of a run down shack. Like the boy, the girl's mother was not around, so she was forced to take on the role of mother herself.³ While they sat on their respective porches and looked out into the world, the picture that they saw was largely painted by circumstances beyond their control. With these images, Dr. King attempted to demonstrate *Why We Can't Wait*, and to rally the Black nation to action. After living in a world that had devalued "the negro" for so long, King decided and declared that the time for asking for change was over, and the time for demanding change was now. Black people could no longer wait to fight for their worth and the value of Black identity and its multiple meanings.

The picture that King paints is not unusual. What is truly remarkable is that in spite of the urgency in the title of his book, not very much has changed. Nearly 50 years later, some progress has been made, but the stories are much the same, sprinkled with exceptions that are often mistaken for the rule. Technically, minorities have gained access to institutions that were once denied to them, which gives them the opportunity to attain social and economic mobility. Universities promote diversity initiatives; the workforce is (somewhat) integrated; and Americans elected Barack Obama as the 44th president of the United States. However, in spite of these successes, 33.9% of Black children and 30.6% of Hispanic children live in poverty, compared to 10.6% of Caucasian children, which demonstrates a clear economic disparity.⁴ Additionally, 49% of Black teenag-

ers and 45% of Hispanic teenagers do not graduate from high school compared to 31% of their white counterparts.⁵ In light of such statistics, I began to wonder how minority students, Black students in particular, were so effectively denied access to the socioeconomic goods of society, even though they theoretically had the right to pursue and take advantage of them. But the answers are not hard to find.

Today, the ambitions and dreams that we give Black and other minority children are not completely unattainable, but are littered with caveats. We say, "Sweetie, you can do anything you want to do"-- as long as you speak proper English, or "Honey, you can go as far as you want to go"-- as long as you don't wear baggy pants. In essence, we tell Black children, "You can be anything you want to be, as long as you are not you," and somehow, we accept this denigration of one culture (or Discourse) as acceptable or even necessary for the protection and advancement of another. Language and clothing are just two examples of how Black ways of being are devalued in society. Because of the hostile reactions⁶ to Black culture, specifically in academic and professional settings, many choose not to fully participate within the mainstream culture and reap the economic and social consequences.

In this essay, I will first explore the work of James Gee, who created the theoretical framework for discourse analysis along with a comprehensive definition. Then, I will consider the work of Lisa Delpit, who considers the practical application of Discourse and who has been a major impetus in the formulation of my argument. Next, I will endeavor to problematize the legitimacy of a dominant Discourse while evaluating whether or not it holds up against notions of justice and equality. Finally, I will refer to William Nelson's article "The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth Century Constitutional Law," to promote the value of

multicultural equality and to show that it is antithetical to the existence of a dominant Discourse. I will also use Washington University as a case study to demonstrate how non-conformity to the dominant Discourse can inspire micro-aggressions in the “transgressor” and potentially present a barrier to achieving traditional notions of success.

Framing the Conversation

James Paul Gee is the preeminent scholar on discourse analysis. Gee examines the dialectical nature of Discourse and its function as a framework that is created by society, while simultaneously facilitating how social interactions take place.⁷ Language is a fundamental component of enacting a Discourse.⁸ In fact, of the many uses for language, Gee emphasizes its use to guide social activities and facilitate social interactions as among the most important.⁹ Through this socialization process, children learn skills that will allow them to become functional members of society and will enable them to gain access to the collective goods that it has to offer.¹⁰ Therefore, if language is the vehicle through which socialization occurs, and the language itself is infused with meaning, then acquiring language and Discourse is not a neutral process, but a process of learning behaviors, ideologies, and values that are representative of the mainstream culture.

Language is an important component of Discourse, but it is not the end of the story. A Discourse is as an identity kit that comes with the demeanor, language, tools, and knowledge of how to put them together to enact an identity.¹¹ A comprehensive view of Discourse considers an individual's entire state of being. For example, a person might wear baggy jeans and a long white T-shirt, speak hip slang, and use street gestures to enact a “thug” identity. Another person may wear a suit, carry a briefcase, and speak something closer to proper English to exude a “professional” identity. The difference between the first person and the second person is not predicated on language alone, but on his or her entire disposition.

The first Discourse that is learned in life is referred to as the primary Discourse. Primary Discourses are related to home and community identities and are learned through family and peer interactions.¹² Usually, people find that their primary Discourse is the most comfortable to use since it is learned first. Secondary Discourses are products of the larger society that people must interact with,¹³ such as the institutions, power structures, and social interactions outside the immediate community that people encounter on a regular basis-- church would be one example. A special type of secondary Discourse is the dominant Discourse. The dominant Discourse is simply a secondary Discourse that has cultural capital. Through acquiring the dominant Discourse, individuals have access to social goods such as

money, power, and status.¹⁴

Because the dominant Discourse is a secondary Discourse, no one is born into it. However, this does not mean that primary and secondary Discourses are unrelated. Individuals who are born into a Discourse that is more closely aligned with the mainstream culture have an advantage because primary Discourses are related to secondary Discourses that have a similar status.¹⁵ Consequently, it would follow that individuals who are born into a secondary Discourse that is closer in status to the dominant Discourse would undergo less conflict during the acquisition process and would more easily access the benefits that the dominant Discourse has to offer. This means that difficulty in acquiring the mainstream Discourse is not solely predicated upon race, but can be mediated by other factors, including socioeconomic status. However, in this paper I will focus on race.

Gee believes that Discourses cannot be taught through direct instruction.¹⁶ This assertion has serious implications for those who want to acquire a secondary Discourse, especially a Discourse of power. In particular, this presents a problem for individuals whose primary Discourses are marginalized and are looking for a way to break into the dominant society. But all hope is not lost. Although Discourses cannot be taught overtly, they can be learned through “cultural apprenticeships” in which individuals learn how to become competent members of another Discourse through real life interactions.¹⁷ However, while this does present some hope, it is still questionable whether members of the mainstream society would see it beneficial to help others enter.¹⁸ Gee emphasizes that Discourses cannot be taught because they are not just bodies of knowledge, they are ways of being.¹⁹ He believes that Discourses can only be acquired through a process of enculturation, and that by acquiring a secondary Discourse “some degree of conflict and tension...will almost always be present.”²⁰ Gee recognizes that Discourses are imbued with values and ideologies that can cause internal conflicts, and that this conflict of cultures can often lead to resistance in acquisition.²¹ Lisa Delpit does not fully agree.

Lisa Delpit is most noted for her work on teaching and learning in urban schools. She has received several accolades for her contributions to education, and her work on cross-cultural communication was cited when she received the MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship. In her work on literacy, Discourse, and language acquisition, she too draws upon the literature of James Gee. However, she qualifies his arguments that are central to understanding how members of marginalized Discourses can become integrated into the mainstream society. Delpit seems to write in opposition to those who would question their duty to empower Black students with the skills they need to gain access to the domi-

nant Discourse.²² By succumbing to the belief that “the acceptance of self-deprecatory values is inevitable in order for people of color to acquire status Discourses”²³ teachers may fail to adequately prepare Black students to achieve success in the world that they live in.²⁴ Thus, she identifies two points of contention with Gee. While Gee believes that Discourses cannot be learned through overt instruction and that acquiring a secondary Discourse cannot be done without some discomfort to the individual, Delpit sees these ideas as a potential threat to the advancement of Black students. Through analyzing the descriptive anecdotes that she uses to advance her argument we can better understand the reason for her dissent. Additionally, we can explore the tension that exists when fighting for culturally relevant pedagogy within a narrative that encourages Black students to assimilate to the mainstream.

To prove that Black students are capable of acquiring the dominant Discourse, Delpit uses real life success stories. First, we learn about the inspiring story of Clarence Cunningham. Clarence began his life in a poor neighborhood where most of the adults had not even attended high school.²⁵ In spite of his circumstances, Clarence was able to rise above his situation and become the Vice Chancellor of one of the largest historically Black institutions of higher education.²⁶ Clarence shares a picture of his childhood friends with Delpit, listing their accolades and successes in different cities around the country. In reference to this picture Delpit remarks, “Almost all of the children in the photo eventually left their home community, and almost all achieved impressive goals in life”.²⁷ Her distinction that these successful students left their home community exposes her silent suggestion that students of color who do not leave their community are less likely to succeed. This implicitly suggests that distance from the home community—which often translates into distance from one’s primary Discourse and acceptance of the dominant Discourse—is a necessary prerequisite for success. Admittedly, leaving one’s home community does not equate to acceptance of the dominant Discourse; however, as Delpit uses Clarence as an exemplar for what Black students can achieve, she made a choice to emphasize his distance (and that of his colleagues) from his home community and the success that followed. Her emphasis leads me to believe that she sees this distance as one possible explanation for his success.

Next, Delpit shares the story of E. Franklin Frazier, a Black student who went on to become a professor at Clark University where he challenged aspects of the institution’s oppressive system.²⁸ Frazier, like Cunningham, was born into poverty, to parents who had no education to speak of. But this did not deter him from achieving great accomplishments. In fact, Delpit says that “he learned his lessons so well that his achievements provided what must be the

ultimate proof of the ability to acquire a secondary dominant Discourse, no matter what one’s beginnings.”²⁹ As a demonstration that he had been fully integrated into the dominant Discourse she adds a remark from the University President, along with her own commentary:

When he received his degree from Clark, Frazier also received a reference from its President, G. Stanley Hall, who gave Frazier what he must have thought was the highest praise possible in a predominantly white university in 1920: ‘Mr. Frazier...seems to me to be quite gentlemanly and mentally white’ (quoted in Platt, 1991, p. 15).³⁰

It seems that Delpit employs the use of sarcasm to negatively cast the President’s remarks when she says, “what [Hall] *must have thought* was the highest praise possible...”³¹ but I do not think that sarcasm or other covert forms of disapproval are enough to acknowledge the racist undertones of the comment. Delpit uses this instance as a positive example of how Black students can acquire a secondary Discourse. In doing so, she finds it important to combat negative valuations that would make it appear as if white ways of being are superior. Unfortunately, Delpit herself falls into the trap of using language that differentially values Discourses.

Delpit fervently argues that Black students are capable of navigating multiple Discourses, a point on which we agree. She says that teachers who are successful in helping their students acquire access to a different culture insist that they “speak and write eloquently, maintain neatness, think carefully, exude character, and conduct themselves with decorum”.³² When analyzing the value judgments inherent in her statement, we can see the damaging subtext. She implies that the culture to which these students already belong does not encourage them to “think carefully” or “exude character”. Delpit’s assessment is problematic because she uses language that positively values the dominant culture, which affectively devalues the students’ own culture. Instead, she could have acknowledged that the students’ primary Discourse valued skills that did not align with those necessary to compete in the dominant Discourse and that successful teachers helped students learn the skills that would allow them to achieve success within the mainstream society. In this way, Delpit could have avoided using value statements that put one Discourse above another.

Although Delpit is a champion for culturally relevant pedagogy, she also believes that students must learn how to become members of the larger society. Unlike Gee, Delpit is more concerned with the practical application of theories relating to Discourse. Therefore, much of her motivation comes out of a desire to see all students succeed, and of course, success is traditionally achieved through participation in the dominant Discourse. As such, it is to her benefit

to promote theories that convey that all children are capable of learning the dominant Discourse in a way that does not cause inner conflict. However, based on the examples that I have explored so far, there is a clear tension between Delpit's theoretical framework and its practical application.

In her book *Other People's Children*, Delpit elaborates on the culture of power. Within this framework, she recognizes that “the rules of the culture of power are a reflection of the rules of the culture of those who have the power”.³³ Delpit acknowledges that those who have the power create the rules of the culture, and in order to gain access, everyone else must fall in line. She says:

Success in institutions—schools, workplaces, and so on—is predicated upon acquisition of the culture of those who are in power. . . . The upper and middle classes send their children to school with all the accoutrements of the culture of power; children from other kinds of families operate within perfectly wonderful and viable cultures but not cultures that carry the codes of the rules of power.³⁴

Because success is predicated on the acquisition of status Discourses, Delpit believes that educators are doing Black students a disservice when they do not teach them the skills that will give them access to the dominant Discourse. She believes that Black students should learn to value skills that they have while also learning to harmonize with the rest of the world.³⁵ Therein lies the tension. Theoretically, Delpit believes that all Discourses are “perfectly wonderful,” but when she articulates her argument for encouraging students to acquire the dominant Discourse, she cannot do so without differentially valuing Discourses in ways that disparage Black ways of being. Her language exposes this disconnect. I agree with Delpit that teachers must empower students to gain access to the culture of power, but we cannot deny that in doing so they are giving up a part of themselves. We would be remiss if we did not recognize the “harmonizing” that Delpit speaks of as a euphemistic way to say that Black students must suppress the beat of their own drum to play someone else's tune.

Similar to Delpit's, my work is built upon the fundamental question of whether or not students should have to integrate into mainstream society in order to achieve traditional success. Delpit positions herself within discourse limbo by suggesting that Black students can navigate multiple Discourses with no affront to their identity. I recognize why it is advantageous to hold such a belief, but I also must recognize it as naïve and unrealistic. As Gee tells us, discourses are embedded with ideologies, and those ideologies often cause conflict and turmoil when held within the same vessel. Just like a cop who goes undercover, it is easy to lose one's self when navigating between competing realities.

To be clear, I agree with Delpit that Black students should acquire the dominant Discourse; however, I argue that this process entails an identity conflict that is often ignored in exchange for access to status, power, and money. While Delpit articulates her belief that Black students can acquire the dominant Discourse, I will attempt to further this discussion by examining whether or not such assimilation or “harmonizing” holds up against theories of justice and equality, not just practicality. Also, I will draw on the work of other scholars to demonstrate that acquiring a secondary Discourse does cause personal conflict to the individual, and that because of this conflict, it is not just or fair to require individuals to conform. As I seek to accomplish these goals, I will also explore the conflict and contradictions that are present in the literature on culturally relevant pedagogy. In doing this, I hope to challenge the current scholarship to be more thoughtful about what happens when Black students acquire the dominant Discourse, and more honest about the cost.

Exploring Conflict and Contradiction

In my sixth period high school literature class, Ms. Mulden introduced us to the concept of African American Vernacular English. The class was intensely rapt on her every word, interested in hearing about the language that she claimed was a product of the Black community and had remnants of African grammar. However, the enchantment did not last long. Hoping to stumble upon new information that would give unprecedented validity to words in our everyday speech, we instead realized that the “language” Ms. Mulden referred to was what we usually called Ebonics or slang. Or at least this is how we simplified it. Our understanding of AAVE was very basic. To us, Ms. Mulden had simply given us a new name for something we already knew.

After her explanation, she proceeded to address the class with a question: “Is African American Vernacular English a real language that can be legitimately used in formal conversation?” She received a resounding and unwavering “NO!” Due to our formal training in the classroom (including hers), we were unable to imagine how anything besides the English we learned in grammar books could be called legitimate. Growing up, most of us had been rigorously corrected by adults who translated our melodious slang into proper English. So, when Ms. Mulden asked her question, it was unlikely for her to receive any other response. We had been given the answer long before we had a chance to formulate an opinion of our own. Delpit uses a similar example of Black students and parents denouncing the legitimacy of African American Vernacular English. She uses this to prove that Black students and parents want to learn Standard English so that they will have access to

the dominant Discourse. However, the larger question is: Should cultural capital be linked to technicalities that make it difficult for all people to achieve success?

In his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* Paulo Freire discusses the internalized oppression of minority groups. It is not by chance that Black people vehemently argue against the inclusion of their very own culture by rigorously correcting slang and forcing their children to wear polos and khakis instead of white t-shirts and baggy jeans. Freire says, “The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom.”³⁶ With this in mind, we can see possible reasons for why parents and students would take issue with a teacher who was not teaching Standard English. Standard English is related to a culture of power, and Black vernacular is not. The parents and students were responding to a desire to have access to the Discourse of power, instead of being critical of the manner in which power is distributed. Therefore, according to Freire, we are complicit in our own oppression.³⁷ The degree to which marginalized groups have internalized such implicit oppression that is perform present in the dominant Discourse is startling. We convince ourselves that we are not “acting white” or disowning our primary Discourses but that we are simply working within the existing power structures to achieve success. But as we can see, they are sometimes the same thing.

The issue of a multicultural society has implications for the way educators approach teaching in the classroom. Pauline Lipman is an advocate for culturally relevant pedagogy that validates what students already know. Lipman believes that by acknowledging the experiential knowledge that all students have, teachers can build on what students know, while helping them learn even more.³⁸ Importantly, Lipman notes that a true culturally relevant approach emphasizes the political nature of schooling and helps students understand their place in the larger world.³⁹ In this way, Lipman addresses the tension that exists in trying to validate students’ culture while simultaneously encouraging them to acquire a status discourse.⁴⁰ Students should be taught to be critical of the world that they live in, while simultaneously understanding that the only way to make change is to learn the rules of those who are in power. In this way, students are encouraged to value their culture even when others do not, and are empowered with the skills to make change in society. But even this will not shield them from the conflict that occurs when acquiring a Discourse that devalues parts of their identity, and it does not shield Lipman from differentially valuing discourses herself.

In her article “Bringing out the Best,” Lipman outlines general practices of successful educators. Successful educators have high expectations for students, believe in their ability to succeed, and “[bring] out the best in them”⁴¹

by tapping into their culture. These teachers teach what “educated people”⁴² say, which helps the students learn how to navigate Discourses. The language Lipman uses has the affect of implying that the students do not have a knowledge base of their own or that it is not the knowledge of “educated people” and is therefore inadequate. Similar to the language of Delpit, such arguments are problematic. The underlying assumption is that by acknowledging what students already know, educators can bring out good things that are not already present in their primary Discourse. Such value judgments make it clear that the dominant Discourse is valued above the students’ own. This leads me to believe that acquiring or interacting with the dominant Discourse inspires some level of internal conflict. What is most interesting is that like Delpit, Lipman’s language betrays her ideology. Even while trying to validate her students’ culture, by forcing them to learn another Discourse in order to gain access to the social goods of society, it is easy if not necessary to use disparaging language. This demonstrates that despite Lipman’s good intentions, these value judgments and beliefs are deeply embedded in our thought processes and are hard to escape even when we try.

Ana Celia Zentella has a similar view of culturally relevant pedagogy, but takes it even further by suggesting that communication should be a two way street.⁴³ In her book *Building on Strength*, she beseeches educators across the spectrum to be more sensitive to the cultural differences between immigrants and Americans. As the title of the book suggests, Zentella frames the knowledge that students and families already bring to the table in a positive light. She emphasizes that immigrants should not be judged by the same standards as those who are born and raised in America because they have completely different value systems that need to be acknowledged in the realm of education.⁴⁴ Zentella says, “To be successful, alliances between educators and Latino families must be based on mutual respect for our cultural differences...increasing globalization requires that everyone cross cultural boundaries, not just immigrants.”⁴⁵ In this statement, Zentella gets to my main point that in a multicultural society we should assume a shared responsibility for fluent communication, instead of expecting people to fully assimilate to the dominant Discourse. However, before the paragraph is complete she reverts back to the traditional arguments saying that if we acknowledge “their [immigrant students’] ability to learn new skills and ways...[they] will grow to their full capacity,”⁴⁶ which is the same idea that we have encountered, time and time again. In this instance, we can see Zentella struggle with her theoretical beliefs and their practical application. Although she believes that communication is a shared responsibility, when she talks about Latino students acquiring a status Discourse, her language

does not convey this conviction. If Latino students do not acquire the dominant Discourse, they will be less likely to achieve an Americanized ideal version of success. However, I challenge the idea that simply by not participating in a Discourse that someone else has deemed more valuable, the students are not reaching their full potential.

While Zentella brought us closer to a world that values different Discourses, Gloria Ladson-Billings will take us further still. Ladson-Billings defines culturally relevant pedagogy as a “pedagogy of opposition that recognizes and celebrates African and African-American culture. It is contrasted with an assimilationist approach to teaching that sees fitting students into the existing social and economic order as its primary responsibility.”⁴⁷ Although several terms and theories exist on the benefits of a culturally relevant approach to education, Ladson-Billings argues that these theories are not largely applied in classrooms across the country.⁴⁸ Instead most educators and administrators fail to support a curriculum and a school environment that recognizes the culture that Black students bring to the schoolhouse as valid⁴⁹. They even frame Black student Discourses in ways that are hostile to the classroom.⁵⁰ Oftentimes there are rules against baggy jeans and the like that make Black students feel as if school is not a place where they belong. Gloria Ladson-Billings believes that educators’ refusal to support a curriculum that recognizes the culture that Black students bring to the classroom is a testament to the belief that Black people do not have a distinct culture that is built upon something other than poverty and a legacy of slavery. She believes that this suggests a conviction that Black student culture is simply a variation of the dominant white culture.⁵¹ Ladson-Billings is a true advocate for the equal acceptance of minority Discourses. Not only does her theory suggest that culturally relevant pedagogy is important, but her language is also consistent with this goal. Additionally, she recognizes minority participation in the dominant Discourse as an important part of effecting change in society.

Many educators are recognizing the active role that minorities play in deciding what they will and will not learn, and Herbert Kohl is one of them. Kohl analyzes the role of assent in the ability of individuals to learn to become part of the mainstream culture. He finds that some individuals make the conscious choice not to learn from a person who does not value their primary Discourse or will not learn information that conflicts with the values of their primary Discourse⁵². Kohl gives the example of an elderly man, Wilfredo, who refuses to learn English. When asked his reasoning, the man explains his belief that “families and cultures could not survive if the children lost their parents’ language” and that “learning what others wanted you to learn can sometimes destroy you.”⁵³ Wilfredo clearly ar-

ticulates his belief that his language is an important part of his identity and the identity of his grandchildren and that he is not willing to sacrifice that part of himself in order to become integrated into the mainstream culture.

Based on similar examples, Kohl states, “Not-learning tends to take place when someone has to deal with unavoidable challenges to her or his personal and family loyalties, integrity, and identity.”⁵⁴ Essentially, Kohl is saying that students may choose not to learn because of the internal identity conflict that occurs when interacting with the dominant Discourse. Why would students feel compelled to participate in a Discourse that demeans and devalues them by implying that their own Discourse is not good enough and that in order to achieve success they must become something different from what they already are. In the end, Kohl courageously takes the step that many academics and researchers fail to take. He says, “I began to understand the inner world of students who chose to not-learn what I wanted to teach. Over the years I’ve come to side with them in their refusal to be molded by a hostile society and have come to look upon not-learning as positive and healthy in many situations”⁵⁵ I do not interpret this to mean that Kohl does not want his students to learn. On the contrary, he outlines strategies to advance the studies of his students and uses techniques to get them more interested in acquiring the culture of power. Instead, I believe that this demonstrates his understanding of how asking students to participate in a Discourse that is not their own can be detrimental to their self-image.

One Washington University Professor, Robert Williams, exposes the pluralistic nature of American society and the impediment it presents to a true multicultural society in which all cultures are equally valued. Williams realizes that there are cultural differences that make it more difficult for Black students to perform well on standardized tests, attend college, or become successful in the real world.⁵⁶ In his article “The BITCH⁵⁷-100: A Culture-Specific Test,” Williams uses the test “to determine the test taker’s ability to function symbolically or to think in terms of his own culture or environment.”⁵⁸ The creation of such a test demonstrates his belief in the different ways of being that are experienced within individual cultures, and shows how these differences may have adverse effects on a Black student’s ability to be successful.⁵⁹ The test shows that Black students can “think critically” when asked to do so within a framework that makes sense to them, with words and ideas that they encounter at home. Williams points out that “since the American society is pluralistic on the one hand and racist on the other, it would be virtually impossible to conceptualize an instrument which would be fair to all people.”⁶⁰ And by extension, it is equally difficult to conceptualize a society that, for those very same reasons, could

be fair to all people. While I am more optimistic than Williams, I agree with his main point. That is, different cultures have different ways of being, but only a few have access to the culture of power. This is a common sentiment shared by many scholars, but Williams and Kohl explicitly recognize it as unfair.

Examples from Washington University

At Washington University, I believe that Black students and other minorities are expected to conform to the dominant Discourse in order to achieve success. While I was unsuccessful at fully decoding what the university Discourse consists of, my observations did produce clear examples of what is not aligned with that Discourse. Instead of exploring the full range of my findings, I will specifically focus on the relevant ideas and opinions expressed in *Student Life*, both in print and online. By analyzing *Student Life* (StudLife), the University's main student publication, I hope to gain insight into the thoughts of the typical Wash U student or at least to better understand issues that members of the student body felt were worthwhile to share.

At the beginning of the spring 2010 semester, six Black males at Washington University were purportedly discriminated against on their senior trip to Chicago.⁶¹ The Senior Class council made arrangements with the Original Mothers bar to accommodate Washington University students on their weekend trip. The bar denied entry to six Black males on the grounds that their pants were too baggy.⁶² In an experiment to determine if the decision was racially motivated, one of the Black men switched pants with a shorter white male⁶³ who was readily admitted into the bar despite his attire. The allegations received local and national coverage, including coverage in the *Chicago Tribune*, and the incident was heavily discussed through campus forums and on the StudLife website. Some students expressed their belief that this was a clear incidence of racism that needed to be addressed, while others thought that it was simply a matter of dress code and that students should stop "pulling the race card."⁶⁴ On the StudLife website, there were more students who supported the race hypothesis than the dress code hypothesis, almost 2-1.⁶⁵ But most of the conversation did not acknowledge how the dress code policy is by nature discriminatory and geared toward a certain type of person within a certain Discourse.

In discussions, issues of race, socioeconomic status, and social standing were at the forefront. Many students could not understand how Black males who attended one of the best institutions in the nation could be treated like everyone else. But before the bouncer could see the young men's private school education, he saw the color of their skin, which also plays a part in activating a Discourse, or stereotypes related to a Discourse. Thinking back to our

explanation of Discourse, recall the example of the "thug" and the "professional." Within the tool kit, there are several stereotypical indicators that help us identify what Discourse an individual belongs to. In the case of the Original Mothers bar incident, when the bouncer saw the student's Black skin, it may have linked him to stereotypes of Black men as violent thugs who idolize hip hop culture. This could have increased his expectation that these men would indeed have been wearing baggy jeans. On the other hand, white students are not linked to such a Discourse; therefore, the visual appearance of the white male did not trigger a Discourse in which baggy pants would be a likely consideration. One of the commenters on the StudLife article validates this point with the following:

White people, for the most part, aren't racist against 'brown people,' they're racist against 'gangster' and 'ghetto' and the like...and anything remotely associated with the idea. As should everyone be... the brown gangster is associated with violence, as it rightfully should be. Throw in a little 'brainwashing' and this scares the lights out of people (and by people, I mean me) to the point that 'Black man, baggy jeans' means someone's getting shot tonight...or at least beat up... nobody wants that. The difference though: 'white man, baggy jeans'...somebody's frontin', and we all know it... that doesn't scare anyone... but a Black man, you just never know. He could be the real-deal.⁶⁶

In essence, this student is saying that white people are not racist against "brown" people, but are afraid of what they might represent. He made a clear distinction that brown people are related to images of fear and violence, while white people are not. Based on this example, we can see that it is not enough for Black students to simply become integrated into the mainstream. Instead, we must begin to change the negative associations that are related to minority identity. That day, the six Black men learned that no matter how much they participate in the dominant Discourse, their access could be revoked at any moment due to their skin color.

In another example, one Washington University student expresses his belief that Asian students should speak English "except when they are calling home."⁶⁷ In his article "Lost in Translation," not only does he take it upon himself to create the parameters within which Asian students should be allowed to speak their native language, but he also offers his insight into why they are having trouble mastering the language and how they could have a more enjoyable campus experience. He says, "If these students were to speak English when they were together, their English would improve. They would be more likely to make

multicultural friends and have a better cultural experience of the United States.⁶⁸ The entire article is centered on the author's frustration about his Asian TA who does not speak English well enough to aid him in his academic pursuits. The author notes that he has to "repeat and rephrase questions—or, in some cases, switch to writing things down and pointing."⁶⁹ This comment demonstrates the author's place of privilege in believing that others must conform to the standard language that he uses, instead of believing that communication is a shared responsibility that everyone must partake in.

Multicultural Equality

Although it may be difficult to imagine a world in which languages and discourses are valued equally and communication is a shared responsibility, Kim Potowski offers a promising example. Potowski researches dual immersion schools in which the concept of two-way communication is applied. In dual immersion schools, instruction is taught in both the minority and the majority language.⁷⁰ The school endeavors to facilitate "academic proficiency, bilingualism, and self-esteem"⁷¹ and to "develop positive cross cultural attitudes."⁷² This approach acknowledges the value of the minority language not only in name, but also in deed. It demonstrates a belief that one culture is not superior to another by virtue of its majority status, and it potentially has the effect of increasing self-esteem and leveling the playing field when it comes to access to power. Dual language immersion schools are a step in recognizing communication as a shared responsibility within a multicultural world, bringing us closer to justice and equality.

William Nelson is a professor and legal historian at New York University. During his career, Nelson's most in-depth research has focused on twentieth century New York law with the meaning of "equality" as just one facet of this larger body of research. In his essay "The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law," Nelson specifically examines New York law to develop a timeline for a progressing theory of equality. Nelson recognizes the *Brown v. Board of Education* case as a cornerstone and shifting point in equality legislation, but by no means does he accept it as the beginning and end.

Inequality was not always a term applied to racial disparities and was originally used to refer to class based differences.⁷³ It was not until the 1920's when the United States began to deal with the complaints of cultural minorities, both abroad and at home, that the idea of equality began to take shape as a mechanism for the protection of cultural and ethnic minorities.⁷⁴ As the idea of inequality emerged to refer to cultural and ethnic disparities, opposing forces also materialized in an attempt to combat it. Nelson cites assimilation as the initial method used to end inequal-

ity. Legislation promoted the inclusion of many cultural and ethnic minorities such as government aid to Catholic schools;⁷⁵ however, even instances of inclusion were used to advance an assimilation-based agenda.⁷⁶ Thus, immigrants were offered the option of assimilation as a means of becoming an equal member of society, and with few other alternatives, they had little choice in the matter. Nelson says,

Immigrants and their children were invited to abandon their ethnicity and move upward into society's mainstream, but only when they accepted the mainstream's values, melted into the mainstream on its terms, and became in the process 'true Americans.'⁷⁷

The process of assimilation was slow and steady, but was eventually successful. Ethnic minorities were potentially successful in finding equality through assimilation for two reasons. First, the Europeans who had immigrated to the Americas may have been different from their white American counterparts in many respects, but they shared a similar skin color, which made it easier to blur physical distinctions and eventually cultural distinctions. Second, the court supported the assimilation of the European minorities through a gradual process of court proceedings and favorable legislation.⁷⁸ Unfortunately, Blacks did not fare as well in this regard and were thus forced to find a method for achieving equality that would embrace their physical and cultural differences.

Out of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, a new era of multicultural equality came by necessity. The rhetoric of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision called for the end of segregation with a "deliberate speed," that ran counter to the gradual process of assimilation that had been so successful for European minorities.⁷⁹ During this time, Nelson notes that egalitarian ideas had changed such that minorities wanted the "right to develop their own culture and to live by their own lights on a level playing field with others."⁸⁰ Nelson says that "if Blacks were to gain equality quickly, they could do so only by gaining equal recognition for what they already [were]."⁸¹ However, although Blacks were expected to gain equality in a speedy manner, the lack of continued judicial support did not allow this to happen. Although multicultural equality was not achieved, the premise for such equality had been set. Thus, Black people instead focused on the continued development of their own culture that they hoped could be valued on the same level as the white culture in the true spirit of multiculturalism. In looking at the assimilationist view of equality vs. the multicultural view, it is clear that the assimilationist approach to equality does not value all cultures. On the other hand, the vision of a multicultural form of equality is founded upon the grounds that people are accepted and valued for

who they are, and not for what they can be turned into. It is this view of equality that I believe we should be working towards.

Conclusion

Although we may come into the world with a blank slate, it does not remain that way for very long. As Gee has already told us, language is the way that we construct the reality that we experience and perceive. Although it is difficult to imagine a world that truly upholds multicultural equality by valuing all cultures equally, it is important to note that whatever the reality is, we have made it this way, or allowed it to be this way. The practices that govern society are no doubt deeply rooted, and after a while we cease to see the world as the way we made it, but as the way that it is. Instead of accepting the structures that currently govern society as immutable practice, I argue that we should evaluate them to determine if they hold up against notions of justice and equality, not just practicality.

In this paper, I do not intend to offer a comprehensive solution. Instead, I hope that the argument has caused the reader to consider multiple facets of Discourse. That is, the dominant Discourse can cause harm to those who must assimilate into the dominant culture; languages are arbitrarily and differentially valued, and some individuals have access to the culture of power while others do not. I recognize that it is important for minority groups to have access to the culture of power, and that in order to gain access they must learn the ways of the dominant Discourse. But minorities, including myself, do not have to do so silently. Even as I write this paper, I speak out against the institution of academia that requires me to write this way, think this way, and even research this way. And yet, here I am. Even though I recognize the importance of access to status Discourse and the culture of power, this does not mean that I am unable to understand that my own Discourse is being devalued and hope that one day it can be considered more legitimate than in the past. Acquiring the Discourse of power is a strategic negotiation in which something is given and something is gained. But it is important to be aware of how this negotiation affects those who choose to negotiate while being honest about the implications.

Martin Luther King did not fight so that Blacks can have the freedom to become what society deems appropriate. He and others like Malcolm X fought so that Black Americans can be valued for their cultural contributions, not in spite of them. In order for all people to achieve true equality, it is important to value multiple ways of being and focus on things that get to the substance of a person rather than just the surface. I can hardly imagine what such a society would be like, but I know that before we can get there we have to recognize that devaluing Black Discourses or other

minority Discourses is problematic within the context of multicultural equality, which, I believe, is the only type of equality that is truly equal.

- 1 Martin Luther King, Jr., *Why We Can't Wait* (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), viii.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 National Poverty Center, "Poverty Facts," National Poverty Center. <http://www.npc.umich.edu/poverty/#5>.
- 5 Alliance for Excellence in Education, "Nation's High Schools," <http://www.all4ed.org/files/UnitedStates.pdf>.
- 6 Herbert Kohl, "I Won't Learn From You: Thoughts on the Role of Assent in Learning" *Rethinking Schools* 7, no.1 (Autumn 1992): 1.
- 7 James Paul Gee, *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method* (New York: Routledge, 1999): 23.
- 8 Ibid., 17.
- 9 Ibid., 19.
- 10 Paul Garrett and Patricia Baquedano-Lopez, "Language Socialization: Reproduction and Continuity, Transformation and Change" *Annual Review of Anthropology* 31 (2002): 339.
- 11 Gee, *An Introduction*, 17.
- 12 James Paul Gee, "Literacy, Discourse, and Linguistics: Introduction." *Journal of Education* 171, no. 1 (1989): 7.
- 13 Ibid., 8
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid., 7
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid., 10
- 19 Ibid., 7
- 20 Ibid., 8
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Lisa Delpit, "Acquisition of Literate Discourse: Bowing Before the Master?" *Theory Into Practice* 31, no. 4 (1989): 298
- 23 Ibid., 298
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid., 299
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Ibid., 298-299
- 33 Lisa Delpit, *Other People's Children: Cultural Conflict in the Classroom* (New York: The New Press, 2006), 24.
- 34 Ibid., 25
- 35 Ibid., 18

- 36 Paulo Friere, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos, 30th anniversary ed. (New York: Continuum, 2000), 47.
- 37 Ibid., 47.
- 38 Pauline Lipman. "Bringing out the Best in Them," *Theory into Practice* 34 (1995): 203.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 A status Discourse is one that leads to status in society, similar to the dominant Discourse.
- 41 Lipman, "Bringing out the Best," 203.
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 Ana Celia Zentella, *Building on Strength: Language and Literacy in Latino Families and Communities* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2005): 30.
- 44 Ibid., 13.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid., 30.
- 47 Gloria Ladson-Billings. "Reading Between the Lines and Beyond the Pages: A Culturally Relevant Approach to Literacy Teaching" *Theory Into Practice* 31, no.4 (Autumn1992): 314.
- 48 Ibid., 312.
- 49 Ibid., 314.
- 50 Ibid.
- 51 Ibid., 313.
- 52 Kohl, "I Won't Learn," 1.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Ibid., 2
- 56 Robert Williams, "The BITCH-100: A Cultural-Specific Test," *Contemporary Issues in Black Psychology* (1971): 1-19.
- 57 BITCH stands for Black Intelligence Test of Cultural Homogeneity.
- 58 Williams, "The BITCH."
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Eliza Adelson, "Students Protest Race Discrimination at Chicago Bar During Senior Class Trip," *Student Life*, October 19, 2009.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Ibid.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Brent Sherman, "Lost in Translation," *Student Life*, October 28, 2009.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Kim Potowski. "Student Spanish Use and Investment in a Dual Immersion Classroom: Implications for Second Language Acquisition and Heritage Language Maintenance" *The*

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- 71 Ibid., 75.
- 72 Ibid., 76.
- 73 William Nelson, "The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth Century Constitutional Law" *Washington and Lee Review* 52 (1995): 75.
- 74 Ibid., 76.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Ibid., 75.
- 77 Ibid., 25.
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Charting the Benefits of Relationships: A Case Study of Appalachia Service Project

Tim Shaw

Abstract: *This case study of Appalachia Service Project (ASP) analyzes the power of relationships and their effects on the organization. The formation of many of those relationships seems unlikely; the cultural, economic, and geographic distance between the people involved would seem to prevent those relationships from forming. However, because of its focus on creating healthy relationships, Appalachia Service Project is able to create and harness these unlikely social bonds. The paper uses literature on strong and weak tie relationships and proposes a temporal dimension of relationship analysis in order to review the various relationships formed by the organization. The paper shows their influence both on the individuals involved and the organization itself. The paper's comprehensive review shows the power of relationships when seen in aggregate, and suggests that further research should be conducted on relationship management, the categorization of relationship types, and the power of these types of relationships within organizations.*

In the mountains of Appalachia, the sounds of construction echo in the hollers. Circular saws buzz, hammers pound, and drills whine. But in this impoverished area of the United States, it is not only the sound of construction that should surprise the average passerby, but the sound of the voices also. The residents of these houses are chatting not with seasoned veterans of professional construction crews, but with teenagers. These teenagers do not have the local mountain accent; they have accents that in some cases come from as far as California. And here they are in rural Appalachia, doing construction on a family's home. Who are these people? They are volunteers from the biggest emergency home repair organization in Appalachia: Appalachia Service Project (ASP). They come from around the country to participate in this Christian ministry that does emergency home repair for the needy residents of this area. In the process, not only do they build homes, but they build relationships with the families they work for, with the staff who guide them, and with each other. In some cases, for those involved, those relationships are more important than the construction itself.



Volunteers and clients work together on construction.
Image courtesy of the Author.

These powerful relationships that are formed by ASP are intriguing because of their impact and also because of their unlikelihood. There are several reasons for this improbability, mostly the result of the distance between ASP participants and ASP clients, on both a social and a geographic level. Appalachia has been historically an isolated community often seen as culturally distinct from mainstream culture¹ whereas volunteers and staff members come almost exclusively from outside the region. This cultural difference comes with linguistic differences that can hinder smooth communication. Socio-economic differences provide another barrier to successful communication. Appalachia is currently and has been historically one of the most impoverished regions in the United States². Volunteers, on the other hand, come mainly from middle to upper class backgrounds, and that socio-economic distance includes values that separate the two groups of people³. As if these differences were not enough, relationships between volunteers, staff members, and clients are also extremely brief. Volunteers interact with staff and clients for only one week, and afterwards they rarely maintain contact. All of these factors combine to create a situation in which the possibility of forming healthy relationships between Appalachian people and ASP participants would seem remote, and the potential for conflict would seem high. In spite of this daunting situation, the relationships formed by ASP are healthy and transformative at times, and conflict is often avoided. The object of this paper is to explore how ASP's focus on relationship management overcomes these communication barriers, and how the relationships in turn affect the organization.

This paper will explore the relationships ASP participants build during their interactions with ASP using two

key perspectives. First, the paper will focus on individual relationships and how ASP develops them. How does ASP foster the relationships that occur among the different actors involved in its work? How do relationships function as a goal in themselves of ASP? When they are formed, how do these relationships affect the individuals involved? Second, the paper will explore how those different kinds of relationships affect the work and the running of ASP as an organization. In what ways do they achieve the organization's overall goals, and in what ways do they hinder them? If these questions can be answered by a careful analysis of ASP's work and methods, we will be able to better understand the effects of the relationships on the running of an organization with employees who do not live in the community as well as the effects on a community outside the non-profit's stated goals. In order to answer these questions, this essay will analyze the different types of relationships involved with ASP's work and look at how each type of relationship suggests an answer to these questions. I will first discuss the initial contact with community leaders of the various counties that the organization works in, then the community contacts that are made during the summer, and finally the client relationships that are made with volunteers. The study makes it clear that the relationships that ASP fosters, both actively and inactively, contribute strongly to making it an effective organization.

The relationships will be analyzed for impact in three basic ways. First, how are these relationships created? Some are specifically sought out by ASP, while others just occur naturally. Second, how does each particular relationship impact the goals of ASP? The relationships will be analyzed for their direct impacts on the achievement of the organization's stated goals: keeping houses warmer, safer, and drier. The impact can come in a variety of ways, including but not limited to financial benefits, access to clients, and the navigation of local legal issues. Third, are these relationships indicative of indirect impacts that are not stated in ASP's goals? This can be measured in the perceived impact on the individuals that the interviewees see and experience, as well as the impression that community members have of the organization. The indirect effects are clearly less quantifiable, but arguably just as important since they can also have powerful effects on the communities and individuals that ASP is involved with. According to this system, the paper will try to analyze the impact of these relationships and begin to answer some of the basic questions about how relationships affect the work of ASP and perhaps organizations like it through the following theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework

For years sociologists have studied networks and their effects on individuals and society. This paper will take

its framework from two particular bodies of work. The first is outlined in Mark Granovetter's paper entitled "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." In his theory Granovetter postulates that there are two kinds of relationships, strong ties (family and friends) and weak ties (acquaintances)⁴. While his work focuses on the power of weak ties, Granovetter notes that both kinds of ties serve important, albeit different, purposes. Similarly, the recently popularized Social Capital Theory imagines those relationships as a network in a societal system to create a notion of capital⁵. The theory separates types of social capital along similar lines: bonding social capital (family and friends) and bridging social capital (acquaintances). Individuals gain differing benefits from the two types of relationships. From the closer, more personal relationships an individual can reach out for psychological comfort in a traumatizing situation, or perhaps borrow money over the short term when the going gets rough. On the other hand, the average person has a greater number of less personal relationships, and from those that person can network for a job or obtain information from people not in his or her inner circle of friends⁶.

These two categories work well for identifying certain relationships involved in the overall ASP relational network. The relationships identified in this paper as connecting to these theories will be relationships among staff members, between staff members and administrative staff, as well as between staff and local leaders. In the analysis of these relationships, I will describe them in terms of their type (for the purposes of this paper, strong or weak), and in terms of the differing benefits individuals gain from their interactions, including social, economic, and psychological benefits. The deconstruction of these relationships and an understanding of their impacts are possible through the use of these network theories.

On the other hand, there is a set of relationships crucial to the ASP experience that these theories do not account for. The analyses assume that all relationships of value are long term. The benefits exist if an actor involved in a relationship can return to access benefits from that relationship at some time in the future. For many of the relationships formed by ASP, such as those between volunteers and clients, this is not the case. The relationships are almost exclusively short term, and yet the evidence shows that the participants do glean benefits from them. These short term relationships simulate the qualities that define long term relationships, such as gaining trust, obtaining information, and obtaining psychological support⁷, and can simulate both strong and weak bonds. Those benefits, however, are only accessed during that short period of time, and are understood by both parties to be temporary. Traditional methods of analyzing impacts of relationships such as those

proposed by Putnam would not pick up on these relationships, but they clearly have impacts on individuals.

In order to deal with this issue I will be using an additional dimension of relationship analysis to add to the strong tie/weak tie relationships described by Granovetter and Social Capital theory. The analysis types can be under-

	<i>Long Term</i>	<i>Short Term</i>
<i>Strong Bond</i>	<p>“Friend”</p> <p>Volunteer-Volunteer Staff-Staff</p>	<p>“Counselor”</p> <p>Volunteer-Client Staff-Client</p>
<i>Weak Bond</i>	<p>“Co-Worker”</p> <p>Staff-Staff Staff-Local Leaders</p>	<p>“Teacher”</p> <p>Volunteer-Staff</p>

Fig. 1: Relationship Dimensions: 2X2 model for combining temporal and functional relationship types.
Courtesy of Author.

stood by a 2x2 diagram, as shown in Figure 1, with Strong Ties and Weak Ties on one axis and Long Term and Short Term on the other. Each quadrant contains within it the relationships within ASP that are of that type, and for simplicity's sake are labeled and will be referred to by one of the prototypical examples of each particular quadrant: “Friend,” “Co-worker,” “Teacher,” and “Counselor.” In this manner each type of relationship important to ASP will be analyzed appropriately.

This paper will analyze three of these types of relationships for their effects on the individuals involved in Appalachia Service Project: the “Friend,” “Co-worker,” and “Counselor” relationships. In analyzing relationships in the whole of ASP and not just individual relationships I hope to shed light on the questions posed above by demonstrating two things. Firstly, I hope to show qualitatively the way ASP encourages these relationship experiences and the impacts that these relationships have on the individuals involved. Secondly, I will discuss the way these relationships affect ASP as an organization. All organizations need relationships to function effectively, and this comprehensive overview of ASP's use and promotion of relationships will serve to show qualitatively the power that relationships have when healthy and seen in aggregate.

Methods

The bulk of this paper relies upon primary sources gathered in the field. I spent three months at a center of operations in Appalachia conducting interviews with 12 clients and 12 staff members of ASP, and in the follow-

ing months collected interviews from 12 volunteers for the organization as well as 5 administrative staff members, all by telephone. The clients interviewed were encountered through cold calls from records kept by ASP. All had been served by one specific center in one of the five previous years. Alternatively, the volunteer and staff interviews were drawn only from groups that worked this particular summer. The volunteers worked at one specific center and were from 9 separate churches that came through and volunteered at the center. The summer staff members who were interviewed were from two centers located in the same county. These interviews as well as some literature put out by ASP will serve as the main primary sources drawn upon for this paper. This study does not use quantitative analysis of data due to a lack of time and resources. However, this qualitative analysis will show important aspects of relational impact that have occurred for ASP. Qualitative analysis at the micro level can interact with and help highlight key quantitative results, and it is my hope that this study is treated as a supplement and inspiration for good quantitative research on the subject, and not as a replacement for it.

Appalachia Service Project: How it Works

The first key to understanding the study is to understand how the day-to-day operations of ASP work. The main programming of ASP takes place in the summer.⁸ For 8 weeks in the summer ASP operates 27 emergency home repair centers, throughout Appalachia, working in counties in Eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, and Tennessee. In each center, mostly schools or community centers, a four- or five-member staff is placed for the entirety of the summer to manage the facility and day to day life for volunteers, manage the volunteer repair work, and choose the projects to be worked on during the summer. Before volunteers arrive, the staff read through applications they receive from community members for home repair. They are in charge of deciding which of the many applications are actually selected; a typical summer center will work on 12-15 homes in a summer, though they receive anywhere from 5 to 10 times that many applications, depending on the center. Then the staff visit the homes of likely applicants, who are further screened by proximity to the center and the type of work that needs to be done on the home. The staff decides which homes are most appropriate for ASP repair work, and then they prepare for volunteers to arrive.

During each of the following eight weeks, groups of volunteers come for a week, almost always from churches and mainly made up of high school youth with adult supervision. They are split up into groups of 4-7, and those “work crews” work on one project with one family for their stay. In the evenings the staff runs Christian programming for the purposes of spiritual growth and the processing of the

experience of poverty, which is often new for volunteers. That programming is reserved specifically for volunteers, and never in the process are clients forced to participate in Christian activities. At the end of the week the volunteers leave, and a new group takes their place. A typical center works on around 8-10 homes in a given week and houses 50-70 volunteers a week.

Once volunteers leave, the project managers (administrative, year round ASP staff) check in with the local facility manager (usually the principal of a school) and return the facility to his or her care. During the year the hiring process for summer staff is carried on by project managers. In addition, project managers are in charge of finding facilities for the summer. They contact community members whom they have worked with to reopen facilities, or they contact new potential facility managers and enter into new communities. Once staff is hired and facilities are found for the next summer, the process repeats.

"Co-Worker" Relationships: Administrative Staff and Local Leaders

According to the various project managers interviewed for this study, the process of entering new communities and building rapport with the important leaders there is largely made up at their discretion. Despite that fact, the strategies of the various project managers are similar. First and foremost they try to familiarize the leaders (usually a school principal, then the superintendant and school board) with ASP as an organization. A basic presentation is made about how ASP works and how that work will affect the facility. In addition leaders are provided with "Economic Investment Reports" which detail how much money ASP brings into the county through its work there. Included in the calculation is the cash equivalent of the hours worked by volunteers. When that number is added to money for food, gas, and hardware that ASP spends in the counties, project managers estimate that the organization brings several hundred thousand dollars worth of purchases and work to areas, and in a few cases over a million dollars. According to one project manager, local leaders are also impressed by the fact that ASP tries to buy local and sustain local businesses with its work. All these things work to warm local leaders up to the organization, and if they agree, ASP begins work in the area. These interactions establish the initial business relationships with the organization, which give ASP access not only to a facility but often also to local employees for cooks and resources to draw on for information about the county.

These relationships are prototypical examples of weak ties between individuals as described by Social Capital theorists and Granovetter. The relationship between the administrative staff and local leaders is clearly a business

relationship. If the administrative staff can prove that ASP can provide some sort of benefit to the community (money, home repair) without significant detriment (damaging property, being disruptive in the community), then often the local leaders will provide ASP with the facilities needed to conduct its work for the summer. However, sometimes showing the benefits of ASP is not enough.

Some county leaders are more receptive to ASP than others. The money brought to the area is often a big draw, but in some cases project managers indicated that there seemed to be a distrust of ASP, for reasons unknown. In one case a project manager was told that ASP would be allowed to use a facility by a superintendant, who then instructed his principals to say no when ASP asked to use specific schools. In another county ASP was refused multiple times by county leaders on the grounds of a damaged facility, but when asked what damages occurred so they could be paid for or repaired, that evidence was not given.

In these areas what is missing is clearly not a financial draw to allow ASP into the county. The organization makes it clear that it brings large amounts of assistance to these areas and that the work it provides is not taking jobs from other local workers. What is lacking is a social link to leaders of the county that could convince them to allow ASP into the county. With that link ASP would be able to expand into other areas, which they are constantly trying to do.⁹ In some cases just their presence has created relationships of weak ties that could be utilized to do exactly that. For example, when one project manager encountered a problem like this where county leaders were resistant to having ASP in the county, she was able to contact another county the organization had worked for in the past. That established relationship made it easy for her to set up a facility there for the summer, even though it was a last minute request with time constraints.

"Co-Worker" Relationships: Summer Staff and Local Leaders

Once ASP is in a community, the initial business relationships built between local leaders and administrative staff are not maintained aggressively. There is one clear, pragmatic reason for this: time. Neither the project managers nor the local leaders have the time to keep up that relationship. As one project manager stated, over time it becomes clear which community contacts are willing to put a lot of time into work with ASP, and which ones want to do only the basic things needed by ASP. However, the constant work in the counties and the positive reputation that ASP has built over time has allowed people who want to do more for ASP to come out of the woodwork.

When those people emerge, it is the summer staff members who are put in charge of maintaining those

relationships. In order to facilitate the development of such relationships, ASP holds a brief training session on community contacts for the Center Directors of each county (the highest ranking summer staff members). They are encouraged to utilize the members of the community that have been helpful in the past. Typically, community contacts serve one basic service: referencing clients. The contacts are often from organizations that work with families or individuals who may need home repair, and if they deem that those people could use ASP's services, those potential clients are referred to the organization. To encourage the weak tie relationships between community contacts and summer staff members, every summer those contacts are invited on a brief tour of homes they referred to ASP that summer staff chose to work on. These weak ties allow ASP to choose from a larger pool of applicants and therefore target houses that are more likely to be worked on by the organization, since community contacts typically know what type of projects ASP works on. While this is one of the primary functions of community contacts, there are also several examples of other ways that those contacts affect the work of ASP.

One such example relates directly to the issue of rejection from counties mentioned above. In addition to the staff mentioned, ASP also hires "construction consultants" to help solve particularly tough construction problems, and many of these consultants live in Appalachia. During the year they hold other jobs, and summer after summer they advise ASP on construction for the summer. An interview with one such employee showed that the relationships staff members had built with these construction consultants can prove more valuable than just the work they provide as employees. This particular man lived in a county where ASP did not work, and had gotten the job from a friend who had contacted him to work for ASP. His work with the organization had convinced him that its work was extremely valuable for communities, and he took it upon himself to contact, as he put it, "the powers that be" and attempt to convince them to let ASP back into that county. The relationship that ASP had built with him and his subsequent identification with the organization gave ASP a link to another community that they did not have before.

A second example of a community contact willing to do a significant amount of work for ASP comes out of interviews with summer staff members. All four staff members of a specific county center mentioned the county clerk. He had heard about ASP before the summer began, but as of this summer was not particularly involved. However, when the staff approached him about helping more actively, he was more than willing to help. By the time summer was over, he had done several things for them. First, he navigated the legal system for the staff when they were trying to

work on a house whose family had a complicated ownership. Second, when there was an incident with a neighbor's lawn caused by volunteers, the community contact offered to hire landscapers to take care of the problem. Finally, at the end of the summer a work crew hit a gas line at a house. The staff was not sure how to take care of this problem. They were told multiple stories about how the incident had happened, what needed to be done, and what legal papers and reports needed to be filed. They called this community contact, and by the next day, the problem had been solved. As one staff member put it, "he had our backs 100%." The staff had built a significant relationship with this man, and when the problem occurred they were able to leverage that relationship. In some cases there is clearly a dollar amount that can be placed on his contributions, but in addition he saved the local staff members a great deal of stress and navigated the local political system for them, probably increasing ASP's reputation in the community in the process. After that summer, he was targeted for a more permanent role with the organization, and future staff will be put into contact with him.

These weak tie relationships between summer staff and local leaders further demonstrate the effects of encouraging healthy relationships between staff members and local leaders. These relationships will clearly never turn into strong bonds. While the staff members indicated in their interviews that they were very fond of the county clerk in their interviews, it is highly unlikely that they would, for example, call him up for advice on a personal matter. However, if they ever returned as staff members to the area, it is clear that they would not hesitate to ask him for advice or help on community matters involving their job. These weak tie bonds are clearly very useful for ASP, both in supporting its summer staff members and increasing its reputation in different communities.

"Friendship" and "Co-Worker" Relationships: Relationships among Staff Members

The amount of time the summer staff spends involved in their relationships with local leaders, however, pales in comparison to the time they spend with each other. Unlike staff in other professional situations, these staff members never "go home" or spend a significant amount of their time away from work and their co-workers. Instead, they are around their work and co-workers nearly 24-7, eating with, sleeping near, and socializing with each other for an extremely large percentage of their time. The relationships they form with each other are powerful for them as individuals, and sometimes volatile.

In this particular case, it is clearly unnecessary for ASP as an organization to encourage the formation of these relationships; they are inherent to the position. Similarly,

it is almost unnecessary to describe the benefits that the organization will gain from positive relationships among staff members. Staff members who like each other will have a higher chance of working well together and will be under less stress throughout the summer, and generally will be better at their jobs. As a result, ASP's focus deals mainly with maintaining healthy relationships. There are training sessions on conflict mediation and dealing with other staff members, and administrative staff create the different summer staff positions in each county with the intent of grouping people who will work well together. Sometimes these encouragements do not work out. Although it was a rare occurrence, the center I observed for a summer had one staff member quit because of a soured relationship with a co-worker. Despite this particular story, the active encouragement that ASP uses often does lead to productive relationships which have benefits for all those involved.

The relationships formed among staff members have the characteristics of both strong and weak ties, depending on the individuals involved. In many situations, the ties are typical to a business style, weak relationship. Staff members are encouraged to ask for recommendations from their supervisors and through updates and occasional reunion events ASP encourages staff to stay in contact with each other outside of the confines of the summer. In other cases, the relationships become strong friendships. ASP staff members spend a lot of time together, and if the friendship goes well it can often extend long into life after the summer. It is common to hear of former staff members inviting previous co-workers to their weddings or going to each other for emotional support. In fact, the staff member who chose to leave ASP the summer I visited frequently talked to another ASP staff member for emotional support in determining his future with the organization. In these ways ASP serves to form both the strong and weak tie models with the relationships among its staff members.

"Friendship" Relationships: Relationships among Volunteers

In addition to the relationships ASP forms with the community, simply the experience of going on ASP with a church community seems to foster bonds within that community. The relationships that the volunteers form with the families they work for are almost always temporary; once the week is over communication with families can happen, but it is often sparse, and not many volunteers keep up these relationships consistently. The consistent relationships are formed with the other volunteers they worked with. As one volunteer put it, they get to "...go through a powerful experience together, and talk about it together." At the end of the work week, ASP has an evening gathering designed to bring out the feelings of the volunteers, many of whom

are youth who have never seen poverty first hand before. It is a community debriefing of sorts, in which the volunteers can say what the experience has meant to them. That community feeling seems to carry over once the volunteers go home. Volunteers talked about strong relationships that would never have formed without ASP, relationships created by the week of shared service that ASP provides its volunteers.

These relationships are strong ties, and in this situation they serve two purposes. First, they are important for the volunteers, who value those relationships and value the time and experience that allows them to develop. Adult volunteers mentioned over and over the impact the project had on the youth they served with, as well as the formation of a stronger community among church members who served on a team together. One woman talked about a time when she mentored a young volunteer from her church. The youth had never seen poverty before, but through conversations the woman was able to help her deal with and understand the situation, and to this day they talk quite a bit. This story highlights an important theme across the interviews: almost every single volunteer interviewed stated he or she felt closer to the members of the team than before the project started. This may seem like an obvious result of intense work with a small group of people, but to write it off as a foregone conclusion is to ignore that the experience is unique. It is not often that a person takes a week of vacation to work with acquaintances on a stranger's home. ASP allows for this significant event to occur in people's lives and creates a place for those people to grow relationships through working together. It is clear from the interviews that many of the volunteers consider those relationships an invaluable part of what they gained through going on ASP.

From a practical standpoint, strong ties give ASP a regular workforce. It is clear from the interviews and personal observation that many, perhaps most of the workers on ASP are repeat volunteers. People come back for as many as twenty years for a week of service because the experience is so powerful for them. ASP fosters this particular part of the experience by providing community programming aimed at reflection on the work that the volunteers do, and in return it has a consistent and large pool of volunteers to choose from, despite the cost of participating. ASP's program is so popular among church groups in fact, that ASP regularly has to turn groups away.

Examples of Long Term Relationships: Summary and Analysis

These four sets of relationships are well fit for analysis using the strong and weak tie method described by Granovetter and Social Capital theory. The previous sections analyzed the ways that ASP as an organization

encourages the formation of healthy relationships where it can, and the ways that those long term relationships affect the organization and the individuals involved. The weak tie relationships among staff, summer staff, and local leaders demonstrated the business utility of weak ties and the way they enhance ASP's access to resources and clients as well as the personal resources that those actors gain from their interactions. The friendships among staff members showed the impacts of strong ties. Friendships among staff members serve to reduce stress, create strong and sometimes lifelong bonds among staff members, and give them resources to rely on for psychological and emotional support. The strong ties among volunteers also highlighted the impacts of friendship on the individuals and the organization. Adult volunteers often end up serving as mentors for youth, forming a strong support system for those young people undergoing a powerful experience. These relationships in turn serve ASP by providing them with a regular work force.

These observations are not altogether surprising. Relationship building is inherent in any social system, and the models for creating business connections and building healthy relationships through practices like conflict mediation training are common. Working together on a team as the volunteers do often brings people closer than they were before. However, these models are part of the entire system of ASP relationships that this paper is trying to understand. Without them, it would be impossible to analyze the system as a whole. These examples will also serve as models for comparisons for the next step of the paper: the analysis of a short term relationship. Using these models as a base, the paper will attempt to demonstrate the power of short term relationships in comparison to long term relationships. In the process, it will become clear that short term relationships are created by many of the same factors that contribute to the creation of normal, long term relationships and have similar utility both for those involved and for ASP as an organization.

"Counselor" Relationships: Clients and Volunteers

The crux of ASP's work is its service for families and individuals who need emergency home repair, either because they cannot afford the materials or they are physically incapable of doing the job themselves. Those families who need help submit an application, and if the staff review the home and decide it is appropriate for ASP, volunteers come to the home and begin repair. Volunteers spend about 8 hours a day on site with the families and often interact a great deal with the family. Once the week is over, however, I would estimate that at a minimum 95% of these relationships do not become permanent, for various reasons,

including lack of access to e-mail, aversion to letter writing, and the lack of expectation. However, it was mentioned over and over that despite the brevity of these relationship experiences, they were powerful for both the volunteers and the clients. The analysis will show how ASP encourages the existence of these short term relationships, how they simulated long term relationships, and what benefits they gave the individuals involved.

ASP encourages these short term relationships in several ways. First, the organization is extremely focused on training volunteers to enter the homes without preconceived notions or expectations. A quote mentioned many times by the organization is by its founder, Tex Evans, who stated "We accept people right where they are, just the way they are." In this spirit, the volunteers are trained not to expect the families to have the same priorities and values they have, and they experience prior training on what they might expect when going on ASP. In addition, on the first morning of the week the staff gives a presentation of the Three S's. The first two, Safety and Stewardship, deal with the construction. The third is sensitivity, and it provides guidelines for volunteers to be open and tactful when entering a client's home. A brief introductory visit Sunday night prepares the family by introducing them to the team leader who will be at the site that week, and volunteers are encouraged to invite the clients to eat with them at lunch time. Finally, at every ASP center the first day of work is entitled "Mosey Monday." What Mosey Monday entails is that work should not start immediately upon reaching the worksite, but rather the team should introduce themselves to the clients and spend a significant amount of time talking with them before getting started on the work.

All these encouragements come together to form short term relationships that directly simulate long term relationships. Every client interviewed mentioned forming positive relationships overall with volunteers, and many reported crying or feeling sad when the volunteers and staff left. A few talked about how the volunteers, even for that short amount of time, had become "family" to these clients, and some mentioned that this was even more important than the construction itself. Even in situations in which specific clients were unsatisfied with the work, the strength of the short term relationships seemed to hold true. One client had become extremely disillusioned with ASP as an organization, but nevertheless reported positive experiences with the volunteers. ASP volunteers and clients share a great deal of time together for a week; they become friends and share experiences. The simple reference to "family" indicates the type of bonds that form, despite the short length of time they exist.

The relationships formed by clients ended up giving ASP a reputation within the communities it works for. Most

clients reported that they had told someone else about ASP after work was done on their home, mostly friends. The positive relationships with these clients and the increasing number of successful jobs done on people's houses by ASP's volunteers have built its reputation, which has a particularly powerful effect in areas where ASP has been around for many years.

The general knowledge of ASP by members of the community was reported to affect its work in multiple ways. Staff reported that certain transactions went smoothly, such as setting up accounts at local businesses. In one county, they did not even have to show paperwork at certain stores for tax-exempt status. Benefits included events even as basic as a random donation by a local woman who bought one staff's groceries one day. By the same token, staff in an area where ASP has been around for years noted a sense of entitlement by some residents in the area. People would put in applications for work on homes that were clearly not in emergency condition, and others disapproved of ASP because they felt that the home choosing process was political. These critical attitudes proved to be a double edged sword. They were more difficult to deal with because staff had to deal with critiques which were inherently stressful and time consuming, but at the same time one staff member noted that it was easier to find ways to improve how ASP works with those criticisms. In contrast, staff reported that people in counties ASP had only recently entered were more patient and "more vocal with their gratitude" than people were in established ASP counties.

In addition to the benefit of a positive reputation for ASP, the organization receives monetary benefits from these relationship experiences as well. It is common for volunteers to supplement the basic work that ASP does with gifts and donations of their own to specific families. Despite the initial cost of going on ASP (\$290 per volunteer not counting transportation), groups regularly buy extra materials for families that the staff cannot afford, such as expensive appliances like bathtubs or donating extra money to the center, sometimes for specific services like drilling a well.¹⁰ It is also normal to find volunteers giving gifts to their families at the end of a week of work, such as toys for the kids or new chairs for a recently constructed porch. This extra giving was reported by both volunteers and clients.

These extra donations do not occur just because of relationships. Volunteers come with the expectation of meeting someone less fortunate than they are, and it would be remiss not to say that they also expect to give more money and donations when they arrive. At the same time, the transformative aspect of these relationship experiences cannot be ignored. There is considerable distance between the volunteer and the client at the beginning of the week, caused by cultural and socio-economic difference as well

as simple physical distance. It is a shock to close that gap so quickly, to go from complete stranger to someone who can be referred to as "family." When that happens (which is not all the time), the experience becomes transformative for the volunteers. At the share circles at the end of the week, it is not uncommon to hear the phrase "they helped me more than I could ever have helped them" uttered week after week. I would argue that despite the fact that some of the extra money given is due to the expected sense of giving, quite a bit of that extra money is also due to the power of the relationship experiences of the volunteers with the clients.

Furthermore, these relationships are essential to the overall experience of going on ASP. Families with children are regularly sought out by volunteers because the relationships with those clients tend to be much stronger, for obvious reasons. On the other end of the spectrum, when a family is not actively present, the experience suffers. One volunteer who was the leader of a team noted in an interview that it was difficult to make the experience the same for the youth on the trip when there is not a family to relate to. He then chose to focus on the volunteer to volunteer relationships, but "...it just isn't the same." This powerful aspect of the program is similar to the volunteer relationships in the sense that it brings volunteers back. In a promotional video that ASP has created, relationships are made a selling point of the clip for the ASP experience¹¹. The organization's CEO, Susan Crow, is quoted as saying, "It's so much more than just about home repair. It's the relationships that are formed that really are the powerful part of ASP." The organization recognizes these relationships' power, and has promoted them as a reason for both participating in the program and donating to the organization.

Analysis of the Short Term Relationships

This analysis of the short term relationships of volunteers and clients proves informative in several ways. First, we can see how short term relationships model traditional, long term relationships. Although there is little to no expectation that the experience will last beyond the week, clients began to refer to volunteers as family, and volunteers reported emotional and spiritual growth from their relationship experiences with clients. The tie displays all the characteristics of a strong tie, despite its brevity. Second, the study finds that despite that brevity, the short term relationships remain powerful for the individuals involved. The clients spoke fondly with specific stories about volunteers who had come, often years before. One man related a story about when the volunteers had brought his family a birthday cake to celebrate, while another woman looked fondly back upon the way the volunteers would play with her child. On the other side, one woman remembered viv-

idly when one man she worked for finally opened up to her and spoke with her, while a male volunteer related a story about learning about a man he worked for who was incapacitated, but was one of the most giving souls he had ever met and a “fantastically strong person.” Finally, these short term relationships are just as important to the organization as the long term relationships analyzed in the first section of the paper. They often define the overall experiences of the individual volunteers and keep them coming back to volunteer. Short term relationships also create financial benefits for both the organization and the individual clients as noted above. This study has indicated that there is significant reason to believe that these short term relationship experiences can be just as important as traditional, long-term relationships.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to describe the various relationships that are involved in the workings and experience of ASP. They impact the organization in many different ways. Sometimes they make the organization more efficient; sometimes they provide it with resources; and sometimes they are a service that the organization provides. ASP’s programming and the words of its staff make it clear that these relationships are important to ASP and that it does its best to develop and foster them.

The theories put out by Granovetter and Social Capital theorists demonstrate the importance of seeing these relationships in aggregate. Analyzing each individual relationship is important; it shows the impacts that those individual relationships have on the people involved and on the organization. However, what makes ASP unique is the way in which it attempts to promote relationships as a whole, and not just individual ones deemed useful to the organization. That holistic focus pays significant dividends once we combine the individual relationship analyses to see all of the benefits that the organization gains from its relationship focus. The chart in Figure 2 shows that the sum of these impacts is not insignificant. That total is what Social Capital theorists talk about when they attempt to analyze the benefits of large groups of relationships. Large numbers of these positive relationships, they claim, make communities operate more efficiently, lower transaction costs for a community, and mitigate social conflicts.

The benefits these theorists describe seem to hold true when applied to ASP as an organization. Relationship management has been crucial in ASP’s success, especially given all the room for mistrust that is created simply from the type of program that it is. This paper has analyzed both short term and long term relationships and the benefits gleaned as a whole from ASP’s successful relationship promotion. This analysis has suggested questions that deserve further qualitative and quantitative study. How does rela-




Fig. 2 : Relationship map. Simple Box=Impact on Individuals; Dashed Box=Type of Relationship; Floating Text=Impact on Organization; Arrows=Direction of Impact. Courtesy of Author.

Fig 2: Relationship map. Simple Box=Impact on Individuals; Dashed Box=Type of Relationship; Floating Text= Impact on Organization; Arrows=Direction of Impact. Courtesy of Author

tionship management function across different organizations, and can strategies be categorized in such a way that a general theory can be gleaned? Can specific organizational benefits from relationships be categorized in similar ways? Where is the place of short term relationships in analysis of Social Capital theory? These are only a few questions suggested by this study of ASP. It is my hope that the paper inspires other scholars to try to answer these question

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- 1 John A. Williams, *Appalachia, A History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 356-357.
 - 2 Williams, *Appalachia*. See also Dwight Billings and Kathleen Blee, *The Road to Poverty: The Making of Wealth and Hardship in Appalachia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Michael Harrington, *The Other America* (New York, Touchstone, 1993); Housing Assistance Council, "Central Appalachia," *Taking Stock* (2002): 55-61; and Amy Watts, "Eastern Kentucky Achieves Progress; Parity Remains Elusive," *Foresight* 10 (2003), http://www.kltprc.net/foresight/Chpt_71.htm.
 - 3 Harrington, *The Other America*. See also Dwight Billings, "Culture and Poverty in Appalachia: A Theoretical Discussion and Empirical Analysis." *Social Forces* 53 (1974) 315-323.
 - 4 Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," *Sociological Theory* 1 (1983), 201.
 - 5 James Coleman, "Social Capital and the Creation of Human Capital," *The American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988); Gregory Fulkerson and Gretchen Thompson, "The Evolution of a Contested Concept: A Meta-Analysis of Social Capital Definitions and Trends." (1988 - 2006) *Sociological Inquiry* 78 (2008); Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of the American Community*. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2000).
 - 6 See Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 202, and Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 23.
 - 7 Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 22.
 - 8 Three centers are open year round mainly for adult programming, but they are not the focus of this study.
 - 9 ASP intends to add 13 more centers in the next 5 years (asphome.org).
 10. ASP has a separate fund for clean water provision, but it is not large enough to provide for every request it receives during a summer.
 11. Appalachia Service Project, "Volunteer with Appalachia Service Project," Appalachia Service Project, http://asphome.org/discover/ASP_video (accessed March 2, 2010).

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Indigenous Peoples and International Law: A Case for Indigenous Mobilization

Marley Williams

***Abstract:** On the 13th of September 2007, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. Indigenous peoples see the United Nations Declaration as the culmination of centuries of activism and protest on behalf of indigenous peoples' rights under international law. Indigenous activists tout the Declaration as a significant step towards addressing many of the social, economic and political issues that have been of primary concern and importance to indigenous peoples around the world. This paper addresses several fundamental questions raised by the recent adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the UN General Assembly. First and foremost, as an international law document, what sort of binding force does the Declaration have on member states of the United Nations? Second, what impact has the Declaration had on indigenous communities and governments with large indigenous populations? I will approach these questions through case studies of Peru and Bolivia: two Latin American nations that both voted for adoption of the Declaration. In this paper I will attempt to explore the role that the Declaration has played within the political systems of these two nations as an international legal instrument adopted by the United Nations and as an impetus for indigenous mobilization*

A Movement towards Representation: An Introduction

The history of international law and the indigenous human rights movement includes the stories of many committed leaders and inspiring activists. One of the most famous indigenous leaders who appealed to international law in seeking justice for his people was Chief Deskaheh of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy of North America. It is told that Chief Deskaheh, a visionary representative of the six First Nations comprising the Confederacy, traveled to Geneva in 1923, hoping to speak at the League of Nations. His goal was to defend his peoples' rights to their lands and to carry on with their traditional practices and beliefs under universal principles of international law. Chief Deskaheh, however, was never permitted to address the League of Nations. He was turned away at the door.¹

T.W. Ratana, a contemporary of Deskaheh was another indigenous leader who sought to use international law to defend the rights of his people. Ratana was a spiritual leader of the Maori peoples of New Zealand who traveled to Geneva in 1925 with an indigenous delegation, hoping to address the League of Nations. His goal was to protest the many violations by the New Zealand government of the Waitangi Treaty that had been signed with the Maori people of New Zealand nearly a century before. However, Ratana and his delegation were also never allowed access to the League of Nations.²

Though Deskaheh and Ratana both left Geneva without ever having achieved their immediate goals, their respective journeys helped launch the modern indigenous human

rights movement. Both Deskaheh and Ratana were hoping to achieve the same goals that many indigenous peoples still strive for today: to gain recognition and respect for their identities as indigenous peoples and defend their land and territorial rights. In 1982, the stories of Ratana and Deskaheh were forever immortalized as part of the founding legacy of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations: the first international representative body for indigenous peoples.³

The indigenous human rights movement has evolved significantly since these two great Native leaders of the early twentieth century first attempted to defend the rights of indigenous peoples under international law before the League of Nations. In 1989, the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted Convention No. 169 into law. Convention No. 169 is broadly considered the precursor to the Declaration and at the time of its adoption was international law's most significant document concerning the rights of indigenous peoples. Convention No. 169 is essentially a revision of the International Labor Organization's Convention No. 107 of 1957, the first ILO Convention dealing specifically with indigenous populations.⁴ Unlike Convention No. 107, ILO Convention No. 169 articulates indigenous rights in a more collective manner; indigenous peoples are seen as "historically grounded communities rather than simply individuals or states."⁵ While ILO Convention No. 169 was viewed as an important achievement for the articulation of indigenous rights, certain aspects of the Convention were seen as reflective of state aversion to the indigenous right of self-determination. In 1982, The United Nations Economic and Social Council established

the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. The Working Group “was an expert mechanism made up of non-indigenous international law experts who were appointed by the UN to study and make recommendations on indigenous human rights.”⁶ Over the past three decades, The United Nations has evolved into a powerful force for indigenous rights. The Working Group began drafting The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 1985, each year drawing more than 100 indigenous organizations to Geneva to participate in the working group commission established to complete the Declaration. After nearly twenty years of work, the Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly on September 13, 2007.⁷

Indigenous peoples see the United Nations Declaration as the culmination of centuries of activism and protest on behalf of indigenous peoples’ rights under international law. Indigenous activists tout the treaty as a significant step towards addressing many of the social, economic and political issues that have been of primary concern and importance to indigenous peoples around the world. This paper addresses several fundamental questions raised by the recent adoption of the United Nations [UN] Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the UN General Assembly. First and foremost, as an international law document, what sort of binding force does the Declaration have on member states of the United Nations? Second, what impact has the Declaration had on indigenous communities and governments with large indigenous populations? I will approach these questions through case studies of Peru and Bolivia: two Latin American nations that voted for adoption of the Declaration. Peru and Bolivia both have large indigenous populations. But these two countries have drastically different historical experiences with regard to treatment and recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. Both countries have also adopted different approaches toward implementation of the principles contained in the Declaration. In this paper I will attempt to explore the role that the Declaration has played within the political systems of these two nations as an international legal instrument adopted by the United Nations and as an impetus for indigenous mobilization.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a relatively new international document and therefore, limited research has been done on the implementation and impact of the Declaration. As such, this paper can be seen as contributing to a new body of scholarly literature that has only recently begun to emerge since the adoption of the Declaration in 2007. My goal is to demonstrate, through an examination of the implementation process as seen in Peru and Bolivia, that the Declaration has impacted indigenous communities in a tangible way, as demonstrated through various indigenous mobiliza-

tion efforts and state adherence to the various tenets of the Declaration.

The Soft Law Debate

The Declaration, like all non-budget-related resolutions of the General Assembly,⁸ is not considered “binding” (meaning states are not obligated to comply with any of the provisions set forth in the Declaration). Rather, like other Declarations on human rights adopted by the General Assembly, it is seen as an aspirational document, declarative of the general human rights principles that UN member states are expected to adhere to in their treatment of indigenous peoples. Regardless of its non-binding character, indigenous activists hope the Declaration will have a major effect in terms of the rights afforded to indigenous peoples worldwide. The Declaration addresses many important issues for indigenous communities such as collective rights to lands and self-determination, cultural rights and identity, as well as more policy-based issues such as education, health, employment and language. The Declaration grants agency to indigenous peoples by asserting the right of indigenous communities to “strengthen their own institutions, cultures and traditions and to pursue their development in accordance with their aspirations and needs.”⁹ Indigenous peoples and scholars assert that the Declaration will assist indigenous peoples in their efforts to combat discrimination and racism.

The debate from within both the legal and scholarly communities about the significance of non-binding legal documents, such as the Declaration and other international human rights agreements, consists of two primary conflicting views. On the one hand, there exists a body of scholars who claim that the Declaration, as a “soft-law” document, maintains very little significance within UN member states. According to these scholars, states will abide by the tenets of the Declaration only when it is beneficial or expedient for them to do so.¹⁰ Conversely, there exists another group of scholars who argue for a more binding interpretation of international law documents like the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. They posit that the Declaration elaborates upon a set of preexisting human rights principles and as such, the standards of the Declaration connect to existing state obligations under other human rights instruments.¹¹

In this paper I will frame my analysis around the assertion of legal scholar and recently named UN Special Rapporteur¹² S. James Anaya. Anaya is among the group of scholars who assert the compulsory capacity of the Declaration. The title of Special Rapporteur holds a particularly important political significance internationally, and the person to whom it is given is broadly considered the preeminent authority on indigenous issues within the UN human

rights system.¹³ Anaya's position rests on the idea that the provisions of the Declaration should be implemented at the local, state and international level in accordance with other international agreements and treaties. The crux of Anaya's argument can be summarized as follows:

The Declaration does not attempt to bestow indigenous peoples with a set of special or new human rights, but rather provides a contextualized elaboration of general human rights principles and rights as they relate to the specific historical, cultural and social circumstances of indigenous peoples. The standards affirmed in the Declaration share an essentially remedial character, seeking to redress the systematic obstacle and discrimination that indigenous peoples have faced in their enjoyment of basic human rights. From this perspective, the standards of the Declaration connect to existing State obligations under other human rights instruments.¹⁴

In essence, by this reading, the Declaration does nothing more than reassert a set of pre-established principles concerning the place of indigenous peoples within their own states, into one internationally recognized document. This "common body of opinion," as Anaya refers to the Declaration, resulted from the demands for recognition from indigenous peoples across the world. Anaya argues that state compliance with these demands is only unique in that prior documents and treaties are now seen as applicable to indigenous peoples specifically.

Anaya argues that International Labor Organization¹⁵ Convention No. 169, one of the catalysts that led the UN human rights system to the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, serves as an important basis for the human rights principles reiterated in the Declaration. The Convention, adopted by the ILO in [1989] provides "significant recognition of indigenous peoples' collective rights in key areas, including cultural integrity; consultation and participation; self-government and autonomy; land, territory and resource rights; and non-discrimination in the social and economic spheres."¹⁶ Nineteen states within Latin America ratified Convention No. 169. This convention provided a common normative understanding regarding the rights of indigenous peoples and resulted in the development of domestic legislation as well as other international agreements. Because these human rights principles are already present within the framework of pre-existing international law, Anaya argues that member countries that have implemented provisions of Convention No. 169 are only reaffirming their commitment to indigenous rights.

The most important aspect of Anaya's argument comes from his assertion concerning the Declaration's place in

relation to other "human rights instruments." The reason the Declaration bears political significance is that many of its provisions are outlined in other international treaties or Declarations. The perfect example of this comes in the form of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." According to Anaya, indigenous peoples hold the same human rights recognized as belonging to all peoples. Therefore, it logically follows that general human rights principles apply to indigenous peoples. This document, widely considered to be the most significant piece of human rights legislation addressing indigenous peoples' rights, is incorporated into the "Declaration on Indigenous Rights," thereby making those provisions specifically concerning the human rights of indigenous peoples an important part of the prevailing normative understanding within many countries.

In summary, Anaya, and many other scholars, see the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as rearticulating a set of rights already granted to indigenous peoples in other legal instruments previously ratified at the national and international levels. However, never before have these rights been established in one coherent document as relating to indigenous peoples as distinct populations. According to scholars like Anaya and Robert A. Williams, the Declaration should be seen by ratifying nations as legally binding due to their obligations under other human rights instruments.

Not all legal scholars agree with the understanding about the Declaration held by Anaya and Williams. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, authors of *The Limits of International Law*, would argue that Anaya's assertion about the Declaration is essentially irrelevant. Anaya's arguments about the importance of the Declaration rest on the assumption that international law¹⁷ holds some sort of significance within the international community. True, the Declaration may operate on the principles previously agreed upon within other international documents, but what significance do these standards have within states that agree to abide by them?

Goldsmith and Posner do not believe that international law plays a role in state formation. The two authors posit a rational choice model for understanding international law. States, they say, are rational actors, in that "states act rationally to maximize their interests given the perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power."¹⁸ In laymen's terms this means that states will abide by the tenets of international law only when it becomes beneficial for them to do so. They argue that in even the most hopeful examples of international law, the positive result of implementation is purely coincidental. They explain this assertion in relation to the United Nations Genocide Conventions. While international law may have been enacted to prevent crimes of genocide, the

relatively few incidences of genocide since World War II cannot be linked to the conventions specifically. If enough citizens have enough anger directed toward a specific group of people, argue Goldsmith and Posner, genocide can and will still occur with or without the Geneva Conventions. Goldsmith and Posner do not believe that there is any evidence that the ratification of human rights treaties affects human rights practices.

Dinah Shelton and the various authors who contributed to her book *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System* see the significance of international law and state actions differently from Goldsmith and Posner. These authors see international law as essential to promoting human rights and resolving international conflict. Shelton disagrees with Goldsmith and Posner about their basic assumptions regarding state actions. States, argues Shelton, will not always act in terms of rational self-interest. Oftentimes, state compliance is based upon an assumption that an international document is necessary (hence the ratification process) and therefore compliance is expected. Although this is not always sufficient for complete implementation of all provisions, Shelton believes that state officials view international norms as “multi-purpose policy tools that may be used to accomplish broader objectives.”¹⁹ Essentially, compliance with international law in the present could provide leverage in regards to foreign policy decisions in the future.

At the core of the debate regarding the significance of international law lies the issue of compliance. Compliance, as Shelton defines it, includes “implementation of international norms (i.e. incorporating norms into domestic law through legislation, judicial decision, or other processes) but is broader in that ‘compliance refers to whether countries in fact adhere to the provisions of the accord and to the implementing measures they have instituted.’”²⁰ Anaya, like Shelton, takes the view that states are obligated to comply with the Declaration because of their commitment to other binding and non-binding legal documents, specifically through the adoption of new laws. However, Goldsmith and Posner maintain that states have no obligation due to the non-binding aspect of the Declaration. Unlike two individual actors that have consented to a contract, states are not individuals and therefore have no “moral obligation” to uphold agreements into which they have entered. The only way a state will conform to the provisions of a non-binding agreement is when the self-interest of the state is being threatened. Violation of the Declaration is not sufficient to warrant international sanctions, and therefore states incur little, if any cost if they ignore the provisions within the Declaration. This view neglects the role of individuals within a state who maintain the ability to hold governments accountable through various forms of political participation

such as voting, or mobilizing in the form of protest.

Although all three scholars differ on their expectations of compliance, they also agree that compliance with soft-law is possible and with regard to certain agreements, probable. Goldsmith and Posner argue that only sufficient international expectation will result in compliance with “soft-law” documents, meaning nations must hold one another accountable for the implementation of the Declaration. The authors specifically mention technological advancement in recent years as an effective form of human rights enforcement that can result in international pressure for countries to conform to the provisions of an international law. The rise in media outlets has made human suffering in other countries more visible on an international stage and can result in citizen mobilization around a particular human rights cause. Shelton argues that the non-binding aspect of the Declaration could result in greater state cooperation with the Declaration’s principles. When the “cost” of state compliance is reduced, more states are willing to enter international agreements, leading to a broader implementation of the provisions within the document. In a study conducted to determine state compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,²¹ it was found that ninety national constitutions contained statements of fundamental rights inspired by the Universal Declaration. Like Goldsmith and Posner, Shelton would agree that there is no way to effectively measure compliance, but when the Universal Declaration is used as an example of a non-binding document, it is obvious that ratification of international “soft” law can result in legislative changes within states. This can also be seen in the argument iterated by Anaya concerning Convention No. 169, where both member and non-member countries began to incorporate indigenous rights into their own domestic legislation.

Many critics of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples assert that the document is mostly aspirational in nature. Goldsmith and Posner, along with a large body of legal scholars, would agree with this assertion. However, the converse to this viewpoint is expressed in the writings of both Anaya and Shelton who take a more hopeful stance with respect to the limits of international law:

Whether the norms are binding or non-binding, compliance seems most directly linked to the existence of effective monitoring and independent supervision. In short, it is the synergy between human rights bodies created by inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations that leads to greater compliance by states.²²

While there are no explicit systems in place to penalize those states that violate an international treaty or document, compliance is possible in states where individuals are

working with governments to implement the provisions of a human rights agreement. Legal and academic scholars agree that compliance with international “soft” law is possible and even probable in situations where states are working with indigenous peoples to implement the provisions of the Declaration into domestic legislation. This is the view I will subscribe to while maintaining the perspective of Goldsmith and Posner, who argue that states only comply with those aspects of soft-law that serve their own interest. I will argue that through a process of indigenous mobilization around the rhetoric of human rights articulated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Declaration has begun to exert binding pressure on ratifying nations. As a soft-law legal instrument, the Declaration should not be considered the solution to all indigenous problems; however, it can be viewed as a significant achievement for indigenous communities globally and an impetus for further indigenous efforts to secure their fundamental rights as guaranteed to indigenous peoples under national and international law.

The Right to Self-Determination: A Fundamental Question

The right of self-determination of peoples has been a principle of the United Nations legal system since the beginning of the organization in 1945. Although the right of self-determination is enshrined in multiple international legal documents, the concept of self-determination as a unique right pertaining to indigenous peoples has only recently begun to be developed in an international law context.²³ In Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the indigenous right of self-determination stands alone as its own tenet:

Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” (Article 3, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples)

Much of the criticism surrounding the Declaration pertains to the concept of self-determination as it applies to indigenous peoples. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States all refused to vote for adoption of the Declaration by the UN General Assembly, citing self-determination and the rights associated with self-determination as applied to indigenous peoples as “unworkable in a Western democracy under a constitutional government.”²⁴ These governments, as well as other critics of indigenous self-determination, claim that recognizing the indigenous right of self-determination could potentially threaten the political and territorial unity of states. During the drafting of the declaration, many of these western nations encouraged

indigenous peoples to place limitations on the word “self-determination,” specifically qualifying the indigenous right to self-government and autonomy. However, indigenous peoples argued that their right of self-determination could not be qualified. Article 3 was left as drafted and even without the support of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, the Declaration was still adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 with 144 countries supporting the use of self-determination and its incorporation into the United Nations legal system.

Professor Erica-Irene A Daes, the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations, has described the right of self-determination as being “best viewed as entitling a people to choose its political allegiance, to influence the political order under which it lives, and to preserve its ethnic, historical, cultural or territorial identity.”²⁵ While some critics claim that this interpretation of indigenous self-determination advocates indigenous secession from the state, indigenous peoples do not view self-determination rights as an impetus for nation formation. Furthermore, Article 46 of the Declaration states “nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.” The Charter of the United Nations guarantees states’ territorial integrity and political unity.²⁶

While many nations maintain an ambiguous definition in regards to indigenous land and territorial rights, indigenous self-determination guarantees indigenous peoples a minimal right to consultation concerning their lands and resources. As indigenous²⁷ scholar Oren Lyons argues, indigenous peoples have a unique relationship with the natural world that is intrinsically linked to the land and territory that indigenous peoples have traditionally occupied. The right of self-determination grants indigenous peoples control over the natural resources that are found on their lands.²⁸ For many of Latin America’s indigenous peoples, the right to control their land, territory and resources is often an explosive issue between indigenous communities and their states. Although governments have agreed to the tenets of the Declaration, many continue to violate the indigenous right of self-determination. Fortunately, its inclusion in the Declaration has galvanized many indigenous peoples and organizations into action.

As discussed previously, during the drafting of ILO Convention No. 169, many nations resisted language explicitly granting indigenous peoples the right to self-determination. UN member states associated the term “self-determination” with independent statehood, and use of the concept continues to create controversy between indigenous communities and the governments under which they live.

Contemporary understandings of international human rights law regard “self-determination” as an umbrella term that encompasses many fundamental indigenous rights: the right to live as distinct communities, the right to lands, territories and resources, the right to practice indigenous language and religion. Without the explicit incorporation of the right to self-determination in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, indigenous rights advocates and leaders have consistently asserted that the document would lose much of its significance and meaning for indigenous communities.

Indigenous communities living within Peru and Bolivia have engaged for decades in struggles to obtain their self-determination and other basic human rights as distinct groups. Due to extensive natural resource extraction policies in both of these countries, indigenous peoples in Peru and Bolivia are being displaced in great numbers, and their traditional lands and territories are suffering irreparable damage. In an effort to combat these fundamental violations of indigenous rights, indigenous peoples in both of these countries are turning to Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and citing their right to self-determination in order to protect their lands and territories, as well as their traditional ways of life. The indigenous rights movement in these countries is varied in terms of both process and outcome, but the issues of rights associated with indigenous self-determination remain at the forefront of both of these movements.

The Peru Case

In 1993, Peru’s former dictator Alberto Fujimori ratified International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and incorporated the Convention into domestic law. This essentially made its principles and recommendations compulsory for the Peruvian state and those operating within it (i.e. oil and logging interests).²⁹ As discussed previously, ILO Convention No. 169 (one of the catalysts that led to the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) was, at the time of its adoption, broadly considered to be the most important piece of international legislation concerning indigenous peoples. Convention 169 specifically states that indigenous peoples have the right to “free, prior and informed consultation such as may lead to agreement being reached or consent being given” (Art. 6.1 of Convention 169).³⁰ In sum, indigenous peoples must be consulted before any activity can be conducted within their territory. However, indigenous peoples in the Amazon claim that the Peruvian government continuously violates this right: a right assured to indigenous Peruvians under Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration, “the right to self-determination.”

Along with most countries in the world, Peru’s government voted to ratify the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, although they did not adopt the Declaration into national legislation. However, around the same time, Peruvian President Alan Garcia signed a series of decrees (aimed at complying with the Peru-US Free Trade Agreement) into legislation that threatened indigenous territorial rights, and violated the indigenous right to consultation.³¹ This sort of contradictory action has become commonplace for President Alan Garcia. On October 28, 2007, President Garcia published “El síndrome del perro del hortelano” (The Dog in the Manger Syndrome). This document blamed Peru’s poor economic status on indigenous peoples, comparing indigenous attitudes to the “law of the dog in the manger,” which basically refers to what Garcia considers to be the indigenous attitude of “if I can’t do it, nobody can do it.” Essentially, according to Garcia, Peru’s indigenous persons were prohibiting exploration and extraction on their lands simply out of spite for the rest of the Peruvian population; if they can’t have the land, nobody else can either. In a particularly shocking statement made by Garcia to the Peruvian press, the president exclaimed, “Who are 400,000 natives to tell 28 million Peruvians that they have no right to come [to the Amazon],” thereby concretely distinguishing indigenous Amazonians from “real Peruvians.”³²

Garcia’s solution to the “indigenous problem” as he saw it, was to implement large scale land reform that effectively destroyed indigenous community land and territory. In 2008 the Garcia administration passed over 90 decrees aimed at attracting large-scale foreign investment into the Peruvian Amazon through the concentration of land and natural resources into foreign hands. Of the 3800 land-titling requests made by indigenous communities over the past decade and a half, the Garcia administration refused to respond to any of them and instead sold dozens of hydrocarbon blocks to foreign corporations hoping to exploit oil and gas.³³ The blocks cover nearly 72% of the Peruvian Amazon, and at least 58 of the 64 blocks overlay lands titled to indigenous peoples.³⁴ For Garcia, the Peruvian Amazon is essentially acres of deserted land, waiting to be capitalized upon by foreign corporations.

In response to the Garcia administration, indigenous peoples throughout the Amazon were galvanized into action.³⁵ In the summer of 2009, between 15,000 and 20,000 indigenous people from more than a dozen Amazonian ethnic groups participated in a 10-week protest, blockading highways and Amazon tributaries, shutting down rural airports and closing an oil pipeline pumping station. The protests were organized and controlled by AIDESEP (The Peruvian Rainforest Inter-Ethnic Development Association), the largest indigenous representative organization

in Peru.³⁶ In response to governmental accusations that indigenous peoples were “blocking the road to progress” for the Peruvian nation, indigenous peoples turned to ILO Convention 169 and the Declaration. As AIDSESEP President Alberto Pizango stated in an interview given to the Peruvian press, “These decrees are unconstitutional and run counter to international instruments that protect indigenous people like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169.”³⁷

Two months of protests finally came to an end in what would come to be referred to as the tragedy at Bagua. On June 5, 2009, several thousand indigenous and non-indigenous peoples had assembled in protest at the Amazonian town of Bagua. A violent clash ensued between indigenous protestors and state police, leaving 5 indigenous peoples and 23 policemen dead, and hundreds more injured. Shortly following the Bagua incident, the Garcia administration was forced to repeal two of the decrees involving oil concessions and arrange talks with indigenous AIDSESEP leaders.³⁸

The Bagua incident, although tragic, was probably the most effective impetus for possible institutional innovation in a country where progress concerning indigenous rights has been stalled for centuries. Due to national and international pressure, the Peruvian government is now being forced to re-evaluate the way in which it has approached indigenous territorial rights in the Amazon. President Garcia was forced to admit to the Peruvian press that it was a mistake not to consult “the heads of indigenous groups prior to implementing the decrees,” demonstrating the powerful influence indigenous leaders are beginning to exert on the Peruvian government.³⁹ The concept of the indigenous right of self-determination, and the protection of lands, territories and resources that is embodied within that concept, is becoming more salient within Amazonian communities. Indigenous peoples are recognizing their distinct political rights and mobilizing to protect those rights at a national level. The tragedy at Bagua occurred just as the Ombudsman’s office of Peru was pushing for a debate concerning the rights of indigenous populations to “free prior and informed consent regarding economic activities on their lands and territories and for the passing of legislation to protect those rights.”⁴⁰

The Bagua incident also helps demonstrate the importance of other mechanisms established within the United Nations system to aid in the implementation of the Declaration at the national level. James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur for indigenous peoples, issued a report immediately following the Bagua incident. In this report, Anaya issued a series of recommendations to the Peruvian government and stressed the need for the Peruvian govern-

ment to “adopt all measures necessary, in accordance with international human rights norms, to protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the affected indigenous peoples.”⁴¹ This type of collaboration, involving governments, indigenous peoples and international regulatory mechanisms, is imperative in the implementation process of the Declaration. According to Anaya, one of the primary functions of the Special Rapporteur is “to provide states with guidance on what provisions mean and clarification regarding those provisions as well as provide practical direction for states in applying the declaration in a concrete way.”⁴² The Bagua incident demonstrates the importance of the Special Rapporteur in the implementation process, and shows how international regulatory mechanisms can work with governments to secure indigenous rights.

While the mobilization around Garcia’s decrees from within the Amazonian indigenous communities certainly attributed a great deal to the national conversation concerning indigenous rights, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples served as the primary impetus for such effective mobilization. Indigenous peoples are well aware that their rights to self-determination and therefore their rights to consultation and consent concerning their territories are clearly articulated within international law. They are just as aware that without national legislation incorporating these rights into domestic law, the Declaration retains a purely aspirational nature in Peruvian politics.

The Bolivia Case

On January 22, 2006, as indigenous cocalero leader Evo Morales was sworn into the presidential office of Bolivia, he looked out into the throngs of cheering supporters and declared, “We are here to say enough of the 500 years of Indian resistance. From 500 years of resistance, we pass to another 500 years in power.”⁴³ The election of Evo Morales, the country’s first indigenous president in a nation where nearly 62% of the country is self-identified as indigenous,⁴⁴ was considered an incredible achievement for indigenous leaders and activists. However, the idealistic vision of sweeping changes to the economic and social systems that many indigenous peoples had hoped for has instead been met with a mixture of competing interests and criticism from indigenous organizations and communities. While Bolivia’s indigenous communities have managed to incorporate the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into the Bolivian constitution, the nuances of the various tenants have been harder for the state and indigenous peoples to reconcile.

The indigenous peoples of Bolivia have accomplished more on a national level than the indigenous peoples of any other country. However, their struggle to achieve full

recognition of their rights is still continuing today. The path indigenous Bolivians have taken in order to get to this point, from historical motivations to mobilize, to the significance of the Declaration, suggests that Bolivia can serve as a model for indigenous peoples of other places.

Bolivia has had a long and complicated history in regards to its constitutions, and only recently have indigenous rights been represented. Prior to the 2007 constitutional drafting, the last call for constitutional reform came from indigenous groups in East Bolivia during the 1990's. The primary purpose was to redraft the constitution in order to more fully integrate indigenous peoples into the political decision making processes. Among other things, the constitutional reform legitimized indigenous systems of justice, which, on a national level, granted them the same status as conventional courts.⁴⁵

The most recent constitution was drafted shortly after the election of Evo Morales and approved by the New Constituent assembly in December 2007⁴⁶; it is the first of Bolivia's many constitutions to define Bolivia as a "plurinational state,"⁴⁷ "meaning there's not just a Bolivian nation with Bolivian citizens, but you have a series of peoples who themselves are recognized as having a national standing." In this way, indigenous peoples are given the right to define their own social, economic and political systems as well as affirmation for their structures of government.

The most fundamental concept behind the formation of the plurinational state was to allow the indigenous to exercise their right to lands and natural resources as defined by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and incorporated into the new Bolivian constitution. Unlike previous constitutions, the 2007 constitution was drafted by a Constituent Assembly comprised of many indigenous participants. The constitution recognizes a range of indigenous peoples' rights and incorporates the fundamental principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. On the 7th of November, 2007, Congress adopted Act No. 3760, which made all 46 articles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples part of domestic law. Primary among these articles was the recognition of, "the right [of indigenous peoples] to self-determination within the context of state unity, which consists of their rights to autonomy, self-government, the maintenance of their culture, recognition of their institutions and consolidation of their territorial entities."⁴⁸

The new Bolivian constitution is a significant achievement for the global indigenous rights movement. Sinclair Thomson, New York University professor of Latin American Studies and author of the book *Revolutionary Horizons*, argues that the constitution "recognizes indigenous rights and demands in a much more dramatic way than any other

previous Bolivian Constitution and any other constitution in the history of the Americas." The United Nations Declaration is incorporated into the Bolivian constitution as law, and along with a recognition of the indigenous right to self-determination, for the first time, thanks to the fundamental principles of the Declaration, indigenous peoples are also granted their right to autonomy.

The indigenous right to autonomy is a substantial step forward in the recognition of indigenous rights. While the indigenous right to self-determination does grant indigenous peoples an important set of rights, such as jurisdiction over their economy and political systems, granting indigenous peoples autonomy rights is essentially taking the indigenous right to self-determination one huge step further. Sinclair Thomson describes the way indigenous autonomy is conceptualized in Bolivia as the following: indigenous peoples, constituting a demographic majority, declare their own territory. This territory would be recognized by the state, and indigenous peoples would have the ability to govern themselves without interference from regional or departmental authorities. In theory, indigenous autonomy would incorporate indigenous' rights to their natural resources, whereby indigenous peoples would determine whether they wished to produce or distribute their resources, and the state would aid them in the process.⁴⁹ However, while this vision of indigenous autonomy is being hailed as milestone for Bolivia's indigenous, it remains to be seen how the reality of autonomy will play out in Bolivia.

Indigenous Mobilization

The 2007 Bolivian constitution, through an incorporation of the provisions guaranteed to indigenous peoples under ILO Convention No. 169 and the United Nations Declaration, attempts to redefine the relationship between the state and indigenous peoples. The recognition of indigenous rights was an important step in this process, as well as the official rebranding of the nation as a plurinational and multicultural society, in which multiple forms of culture and governance should and must be recognized.⁵⁰ Furthermore, through the incorporation of the fundamental tenants of the Universal Declaration into the Bolivian constitution, indigenous communities are guaranteed for the first time under national law the right to indigenous autonomy. As a fundamental principle established under the Declaration and incorporated into the Bolivian constitution, the indigenous right to self-determination also guarantees indigenous peoples the right to autonomy or self-government relating to their own affairs.⁵¹ Under article 289 of the constitution, indigenous peoples are given the right to form autonomous areas under national law although autonomous zones are still subject to state oversight. While the definition of autonomy may seem threatening to

certain political leaders, under the Bolivian constitution, indigenous autonomy simply gives indigenous communities a set of basic rights associated with self-government: the right to elect authorities according to their own customary practices, draw up their own governing status, levy and appropriate funds, and perhaps most importantly, determine how to administer local and natural resources.⁵²

A Model for Indigenous Movements

The indigenous movement in Bolivia has accomplished a great deal on the national political scene. However, the election of indigenous leader Evo Morales and the sweeping constitutional changes enacted under his presidency have been met with contention and even violence by many of Eastern Bolivia's elite. According to a United Nations report, there is a continual presence of discriminatory language aimed at indigenous peoples disseminated through the mass media, and many Guaraní and other indigenous populations are suffering from the effects of environmental pollutants caused by extractive industry on their traditional lands.

However, indigenous organizations and communities have evolved rapidly over the past decade. In many instances, their movements have developed a significant grasp of the principles of human rights as guaranteed to them under national and international law and have incorporated this language into their grievances and demands. In 2007 Bolivia's principal national indigenous organizations met in the capitol city for the "First National Meeting of the Natural Resource Secretaries of Indigenous Campesino Organization." The meeting produced a series of declarations among which the issue of extractive activity was addressed:

[Extractive activities on indigenous territories "violate our collective rights as recognized in the Political Constitution of the State (CPE), Laws and International Treaties and this occurs because the ministries of hydrocarbons and mining do not allow for the "implementation of a process of prior, free, informed and obligatory consultation and participation."⁵³

Thanks to the many indigenous movements around the United Nations Declaration, indigenous communities are now well aware that their right to consultation is guaranteed to them under national and international law.

While Bolivia still has a long way to go in achieving full recognition of indigenous rights, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia have managed to use the United Nations Declaration and other international laws as an impetus for social change. In this way, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia have secured more rights by law than the indigenous peoples of any other nation and can serve as a model for indigenous movements in other nations.

Conclusion: The Future of the Declaration

United Nations Special Rapporteur and indigenous human rights scholar James Anaya argues that the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples should be implemented at the local, state and international levels in accordance with other international agreements and treaties. Anaya asserts, "The standards affirmed in the Declaration share an essentially remedial character, seeking to redress the systematic obstacles and discrimination that indigenous peoples have faced in their enjoyment of basic human rights. From this perspective, the standards of the Declaration connect to existing State obligations under other human rights instruments."⁵⁴ As I discussed in the first section of this paper, despite Anaya's conviction that the Declaration is compulsory, it remains true that a scholarly consensus on the "binding" nature of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has yet to be reached. What legal and academic scholars do agree upon is that compliance with international "soft" law is possible and even probable in situations where states are working with indigenous peoples to implement the provisions of the Declaration into domestic legislation.

The cases of Bolivia and Peru represent two very different trajectories in regards to the implementation of the United Nations Declaration. In both cases, as discussed in previous sections, it is clear that indigenous mobilization, organized around key themes put forward by the Declaration such as indigenous land rights, cultural autonomy and self-determination, has been a key factor in securing many expanded forms of indigenous rights. In Bolivia, indigenous mobilization has led to the election of the country's first indigenous president and the incorporation of the Declaration into the national constitution. In Peru, the Declaration has served as an impetus for social mobilization and has instilled within indigenous communities a renewed sense of indigenous power and agency.

While the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has clearly had an effect on indigenous populations in both of these countries, the question remains: to what extent has the Declaration helped indigenous peoples achieve a new level of recognition in regards to their rights as distinct populations? The case of Peru demonstrates a situation not uncommon to Latin America: a government traditionally run by non-indigenous elites whose primary goal is the economic integration of their country into the global market through resource extraction and exportation. Unfortunately, this exploration and extraction of resources most often occurs on land claimed by indigenous peoples and directly violates indigenous rights guaranteed under Convention 169 (which the Peruvian government ratified) and other international legal documents.

Indigenous peoples in Peru, especially those living within the Peruvian Amazon have articulated their demands using the discourse of human rights, specifically Convention 169, for more than a decade. Since former President and dictator Alberto Fujimori signed the Convention into law in 1994, indigenous peoples have viewed Convention 169 as compulsory within the Peruvian state. According to Raquel Irigoyen, human rights lawyer and consultant to the International Labor Organization:

The Convention is like the powerful nucleus of rights and the Declaration permits the amplification of the interpretation of the Convention in many aspects....So, you have to connect both instruments. The Declaration by itself does not have compulsory power.⁵⁵

If recent events are any indication, the Declaration has served as a powerful mobilizing force for indigenous Peruvian Amazonians. A few weeks prior to the events at Bagua, AIDASEP leader Alberto Pizango told the Peruvian Press that the government of Peru continued to violate fundamental rights assured to indigenous peoples within the Convention and the Declaration. The newest decrees were especially surprising for indigenous peoples, as the Declaration was ratified by Peru around the same time President Garcia signed into law the decrees violating indigenous rights.

While it is difficult to attribute indigenous mobilization in Peru entirely to the Declaration, and it would certainly be a stretch to claim the government of Peru has radically changed its attitude towards indigenous peoples in response to the Declaration, a combination of factors surrounding the Declaration has certainly led to a renewed sense of indigenous power in Peru. As can be seen in the rhetoric of indigenous organizations in Peru, for the first time, indigenous peoples in Peru have a sense of international solidarity in regards to the indigenous human rights movement. International monitoring mechanisms, like the United Nations Office of the Special Rapporteur, have achieved significant political clout in Peru since the ratification of the Declaration, and the government is more intent on adhering to human rights standards set forth by such mechanisms. While the repeal of Garcia's decrees are a seemingly small accomplishment in the broader picture of indigenous rights violations, the repeal represents a concrete example of something achieved by and for indigenous peoples.

In Bolivia, a country where the concept of indigenous rights has been at the forefront of the national conversation for decades, the Declaration has played a more significant role in promoting indigenous demands for sovereignty, land rights and cultural rights. The election of Evo Morales was a considerable achievement for the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, and the indigenous president promised a new

Bolivian nation that would benefit its majority indigenous population. As was previously discussed, Bolivia was the first signatory to the Declaration and the only ratifying nation that has incorporated the Declaration into its domestic legislation. Indigenous peoples have made significant gains in Bolivian politics, and the Declaration could be considered the skeleton around which indigenous rights are articulated and secured. In the most recent move for indigenous autonomous zones, indigenous communities point to the Declaration and the right to autonomy as they see secured to them under the tenant of indigenous self-determination.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is considered a pinnacle of achievement for the global indigenous human rights movement. However, it is undeniable that due to the Declaration's nature as a "soft-law" legal instrument, the document has little compulsory power without proper implementation and regulation of its many tenets. The cases of Peru and Bolivia demonstrate the difficult beginning for this implementation process. However, both cases also demonstrate the many possibilities that can be seen for the future of the indigenous rights movement and the Declaration's role in this future. While the Declaration should not be considered the solution to all indigenous problems, it can be viewed as a significant achievement for indigenous communities globally and the impetus for further indigenous efforts to secure their fundamental rights as guaranteed to indigenous peoples under national and international law.

Appendix

Interview with James Anaya, Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples, about the Position of Special Rapporteur

Marley Williams: What do you see as the primary responsibilities of the Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples?

James Anaya: The basic component is to monitor conditions and monitor human rights...more specifically to look at problem situations, engage with governments and be a sort of ombudsman. On a global level, the Special Rapporteur is someone able to respond to specific situations.... Most importantly I'm able to give a voice to indigenous peoples who otherwise wouldn't have the opportunity to have their voices heard. Yes...that is the most important responsibility of the Special Rapporteur: give a voice to indigenous peoples.

Marley Williams: *How does the Special Rapporteur and the Special Rapporteur's office assist in the implementation process of the Declaration?*

James Anaya: First, the Special Rapporteur provides clarification for ratifying nations. Specifically relating to issues surrounding the right to consultation, duty of states to

consult with indigenous peoples and land issues. Secondly I provide states with guidance on what provisions mean and clarification regarding those provisions. I also provide practical direction for states in applying the Declaration in a concrete way. For example, in regards to indigenous land rights, I interpret the Declaration regarding use and recommendation for different countries based on their own specific circumstances.

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- 1 S. James Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples in International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 - 2 “About UNPFII and a Brief History of Indigenous Peoples and the International System.” United Nations Permanent Forum II. <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfi/en/history.html>.
 - 3 Ibid.
 - 4 Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples*, 47. ILO Convention No. 107 was considered outdated by indigenous peoples and activists; Convention No. 107 stressed the need for indigenous communities to integrate into national society instead of encouraging indigenous self-determination.
 - 5 Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples*, 48.
 - 6 Robert A. Williams, “The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System.” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* (2001).
 - 7 “About UNPFII and a Brief History.”
 - 8 From the United Nations website: “The General Assembly occupies a central position as the chief deliberative, policymaking and representative organ of the United Nations. Comprising all 192 Members of the United Nations, it provides a unique forum for multilateral discussion of the full spectrum of international issues covered by the Charter. It also plays a significant role in the process of standard-setting and the codification of international law.” (<http://www.un.org/ga/about/background.shtml>).
 - 9 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly, August 2006.
 - 10 Dinah Shelton, *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5-6.
 - 11 S. James Anaya. “The Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in Light of the New Declaration, and the Challenge of Making Them Operative,” United Nations Human Rights Council (2008): 32.
 - 12 Shelton, *Commitment and Compliance*, 452. Shelton defines Rapporteur as “a common device both within the United Nations and regional organizations for monitoring state compliance with particular human rights.”
 - 13 Refer to Appendix for more extensive explanation on the role of the Special Rapporteur for Indigenous Peoples.
 - 14 Anaya, “The Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 32.
 - 15 Ibid., 14. The ILO was the first international organization to promote specific international norms and policies regarding indigenous peoples.
 - 16 Ibid., 13-15.
 - 17 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, *The Limits of International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21. Goldsmith and Posner distinguish between international law made by formal international organizations through multilateral treaty processes and customary international law. The authors assert that customary international law, defined as customary practices that states follow from a sense of legal obligation, has always regulated important elements of international relations.
 - 18 Goldsmith and Posner, 8.
 - 19 Shelton, *Commitment and Compliance*, 5-6.
 - 20 Ibid., 5.
 - 21 The Universal Declaration was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly as a non-binding resolution and has served as the model for the development of international human rights law.
 - 22 Shelton, *Commitment and Compliance*, 462.
 - 23 John B. Henriksen, “Implementation of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples within the Framework of Human Security,” International Conference on Indigenous Peoples’ Self-Determination and the Nations State in Asia, Baguio, Philippines (April 18-21, 1999): 6-10.
 - 24 This specifically refers to Article 26 of the Declaration, which insures indigenous rights to people of traditionally occupied lands and territories (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
 - 25 Henriksen, “Implementation of the Right,” 11.
 - 26 Claire Charters. “The Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” *The New Zealand Law Journal* (2006): 335-337.
 - 27 Although Lyons has authored numerous books concerning indigenous peoples and their rights, indigenous in this context is referring to Lyons’ own heritage as a member of the Seneca nation.
 - 28 Jeff Corntassel. “From Rights to Responsibilities: Rethinking Indigenous Peoples Citizenship and Self-Determination Strategies” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26-29, 2008): 19.
 - 29 ILO Convention No. 169 (arguably the catalyst that led to the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) is broadly considered the most important piece of international legislation concerning indigenous peoples.
 - 30 Anaya, “The Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” 13-15.
 - 31 Anthony Bebbington, “The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes.” *North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas* 42 (September 2009): 12-13.
 - 32 Ibid., 13-14.
 - 33 Hydrocarbon blocks are areas in which companies acquire the rights to explore for and exploit oil and gas.
 - 34 Matt Finer, Clinton N. Jenkins, Stuart L. Pimm, Brian Keene, and Carl Ross, “Oil and Gas Projects in the Western Amazon: Threats to Wilderness, Biodiversity and Indigenous Peoples.” *PLoS ONE* 3.8 (2008).
 - 35 Specifically the decrees make it easier to transfer communally owned indigenous land to private companies and open the door to the privatization of water.

- 36 Milagros Salazar. "Peru: Talks Fall Flat, Indigenous Protests Rage On." *Inter Press Service*, May 14, 2009: 2-3. <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=46852>.
- 37 Ibid., 1-3.
- 38 Bebbington, "The New Extraction," 20.
- 39 Paul Talley, "Peru-Bolivia: Hanging by a Thread," the Compass RCW Blog, *Real Clear World* (June 21, 2009). http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2009/06/peru_relations_with_bolivia_ha.html.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 "Indigenous Issues: UN Expert Urges Peru's Government to Dialogue with Amazon's Indigenous Peoples." *Indigenous Portal* (June 16, 2009). <http://www.indigenousportal.com/Human-Rights/Indigenous-Issues-UN-expert-urges-Peru-s-Government-to-dialogue-with-Amazon-s-indigenous-peoples.html>.
- 42 James S. Anaya. Personal Interview. February 25, 2010.
- 43 Amy Goodman. "Evo Morales Sworn in as Bolivia's First Indigenous President, Hails Election as End of 'Colonial and Neo-Liberal Era.'" *Democracy Now* (January 23, 2006).
- 44 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: "Mission to Bolivia." United Nations Human Rights Council (18 February 2009). Many Bolivians identify themselves as either Andean Kolla (indigenous) or camba from the lowlands, where the majority of the population defines itself as mestizo.
- 45 Alex Shaik, "Bolivia's New Constitution." *North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas* (January 21, 2009).
- 46 Linda Farthing, "Bolivia's Dilemma: Development Confronts the Legacy of Extraction." *North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas* 42 (September 2009).
- 47 Jeffrey Webber, "Bolivian Horizons: An Interview with Historian Sinclair Thomson." *Upside Down World* (November 13, 2007).
- 48 Shaik, "Bolivia's New Constitution."
- 49 Webber. "Bolivian Horizons."
- 50 Stavenhagen, "Mission To Bolivia."
- 51 Alex Shaik, "Morales Remakes Bolivia: A New Constitution Grants Indigenous Peoples Unprecedented Rights." *In These Times* (December 16, 2008).
- 52 Shaik, "Bolivia's New Constitution."
- 53 Stavenhagen, "Mission to Bolivia."
- 54 Anaya, "The Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples," 32.
- 55 Irigoyen interview.
- _____. *Indigenous Peoples in International Law*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press 2004.
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Biographies of the Authors for *The Inquiry*



Tiffany A. Johnson is a Senior African & African-American studies and Anthropology major from Detroit, Michigan, the great city that gave rise to her interest in issues related to urban inequities and education. Directed by her mentor, Professor Korina Jocson, her project explores the role of Black male youth in America's social consciousness, using the HBO series *The Wire* as a cultural case study. More broadly, her interests relate to issues of race and power, civil rights, Black Womanism and the history of Black activism. Throughout her undergraduate career, Tiffany developed a fire for educational reform, a path that she will pursue further as a Teach for America Corps member.



Selam Kidane is a senior from Houston, Texas, majoring in African & African-American Studies. Her project focuses on the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the Italian colonial state in Colonial Eritrea and the ways in which both the Orthodox Church and colonial state benefited from their relationship. This project has allowed her to further explore her interests in studying the colonial history of Eritrea. Upon graduation, Selam plans to take time off from school to work and then return to graduate school to obtain a PhD in history. She would like to thank the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship for all of their guidance and mentoring.



Latasha Kinnard was born and raised in Chicago, the oldest of three siblings. She is currently majoring in Psychology and Education, and has plans to work at Target Headquarters as a business analyst. Latasha is deeply passionate about affecting change in the education system, which is why she is involved in several programs on campus and in the greater St. Louis community. She believes that your thoughts are directly related to the reality that you create for yourself, so she tries to always be positive, and surround herself with people who inspire and encourage her.



Tim Shaw is a graduating senior majoring in Political Science and Spanish. His experiences volunteering and working in Appalachia were instrumental in forming his passion for improving impoverished communities, and he hopes to continue exploring that interest in the future. Tim will be taking a year off from his studies before continuing on to graduate school, where he plans to get a PhD in Social Work.



Marley Williams, a native of Tucson, Arizona, is a senior double majoring in International and Area Studies on the Latin American Studies track and Spanish. Marley's project focuses on issues relating to indigenous human rights, and her research interests have taken her to different and diverse communities all around the world. Marley ultimately plans to pursue a career in human rights and public policy that will allow her to continue advocating for low-income people of color both within the United States and abroad. Marley would like to thank the Mellon program, specifically the amazing professors and mentors affiliated with Mellon for their continued support and guidance over the past two years and for helping her to realize that academia and activism are not mutually exclusive, but rather cohesive forces for powerful social change.



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