Anne Baril

Anne Baril

Senior Lecturer in Philosophy
PhD, University of Arizona
research interests:
  • Ethics
  • Epistemology
  • Social and Political Philosophy

contact info:

mailing address:

  • Washington University

    CB 1073

    One Brookings Drive

    St. Louis, MO 63130-4899

Anne Baril has research interests in ethics, epistemology, and their intersection. She is especially interested in the role of epistemic virtues and values in the good life.

Selected Publications

Papers

  • "What Makes the Epistemic Virtues Valuable?" The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, ed. Heather Battaly. (Forthcoming)
  • "The Role of Epistemic Virtue in the Realization of Basic Goods." Episteme 13(4): 379-395. (2016)
  • "The Nature and Importance of Roles." The Journal of Value Inquiry 50(4): 721-734. (2016)
  • "Equality, Flourishing, and the Problem of Predation." The Moral Rights of Animals, ed. Mylan Engel Jr. and Gary Lynn Comstock. Lexington Books. 81-103. (2016)
  • "Virtue and Well-Being." The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being, ed. Guy Fletcher. Routledge. 242-258. (216)
  • "Eudaimonia in Contemporary Virtue Ethics." Handbook of Virtue Ethics, ed. Stan van Hooft and Nicole Saunders. Acumen Press. (2014)
  • "The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 51(4): 511-535. (2013)
  • "Pragmatic Encroachment in Accounts of Epistemic Excellence." Synthese 190: 3929-3952. (2013)
  • "A Eudaimonist Approach to the Problem of Significance." Acta Analytica 25(2): 215-241. (2010)

Reviews

  • Review of The Virtues of Happiness: A Theory of the Good Life by Paul Bloomfield, Oxford University Press. Ethics 126(2). 2016.
  • Review of Intelligent Virtue by Julia Annas, Oxford University Press. Mind 122(485): 241-245. 2013.
  • Review of Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy of Belief by Linda Zagebski, Oxford University Press. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2013.
  • Review of Aristotle and the Virtues by Howard Curzer, Oxford University Press. Ancient Philosophy 34: 216-219. 2014.